Johnson v. Bradley
| Citation | 279 Cal.Rptr. 881,7 Cal.App.4th 236 |
| Decision Date | 09 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. B051955,B051955 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 229 Cal.App.3d 80, 235 Cal.App.3d 1765, 7 Cal.App.4th 236 229 Cal.App.3d 80, 235 Cal.App.3d 1765, 7 Cal.App.4th 236 Ross JOHNSON, et al., Petitioners, v. Tom BRADLEY, et al., Respondents. |
Ross Johnson, Sacramento, Kopp & Di Franco, Quentin L. Kopp, San Francisco, for petitioners.
James K. Hahn, City Atty., Anthony Saul Alperin, Asst. City Atty., and Raymond S. Ilgunas, Deputy City Atty., for respondents.
Bradley S. Phillips and Mark H. Epstein, Munger, Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles, for amicus curiae Com'n to Draft an Ethics Code for Los Angeles City Government, Geoffrey Cowan, and California Common Cause on behalf of respondents.
In this original mandamus proceeding petitioners Ross Johnson (a member of the California State Assembly), Quentin Kopp (a member of the California State Senate) 1 and Ernani Bernardi (a member of the Los Angeles City Council) (collectively "petitioners") seek to invalidate and enjoin the implementation and enforcement of those provisions of a campaign reform measure adopted by the voters of the City of Los Angeles which provide for the partial public financing of campaigns for city elective office. The respondents are the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, eleven members of the City Council, the City Controller and the City Clerk. 2
In June of 1988, the voters of California adopted Proposition 73 which, among other things, precluded the use of public funds to finance any political campaign, whether statewide, legislative or local. In June of 1990, the voters of the City of Los Angeles adopted a comprehensive campaign, election and ethics reform plan which expressly authorized such use of public monies.
After resolving questions of standing and severability, we discuss the plenary powers of charter cities and conclude, irrespective of County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 687, 271 Cal.Rptr. 802, 3 that the decision by the voters of the City of Los Angeles to expend city funds to partially finance political campaigns for city elective offices is a matter of purely local concern and is not invalidated by contrary general state law. We therefore deny the writ.
On June 5, 1990, the voters of the City of Los Angeles adopted Measure H, which included amendments to the City Charter relating to governmental ethics, election campaign financing and compensation of elected officials. It had been referred to the voters for their approval or disapproval by the City Council and established a scheme for partial public matching funds and certain conditional campaign expenditure limitations. The relevant portion of Measure H (section 11, thereof) which is the subject of our consideration is new City Charter Section 313. 4
In addition, Measure H also provided for (1) the creation of a City Ethics Commission and a special prosecutor to oversee, administer and enforce the new rules (section 1), (2) limitation on campaign contributions (section 3), (3) limitations on the total amount of contributions that a candidate may accept in any election (section 4), (4) prohibitions on the transfer of contributions between candidates or their controlled committees (section 5), (5) the disclosure of candidates' economic interests and income in the previous twelve months (section 14) and (6) the compensation of elected officials and limitations on outside activities and gifts and honoraria that public officials could accept (section 16).
Petitioners here attack only one portion of Measure H. They seek to set aside and enjoin the implementation and enforcement of section 313 on the ground that its authorization of the use of public moneys to partially finance election campaigns is prohibited by the provisions of Government Code section 85300 which was enacted by the voters of California when they approved initiative measure Proposition 73 at the statewide primary election of June 7, 1988. 5
Petitioners invoke our original jurisdiction (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 731, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299) by their request for mandamus relief which seeks our consideration of an issue of public importance which should be resolved immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56(a).) We deemed it appropriate to accept such jurisdiction and to consider and decide the matter (see e.g., Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301; Citizens For Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 671, 129 Cal.Rptr. 106, 547 P.2d 1386. On August 9, 1990, we issued an alternative writ and a temporary restraining order enjoining, pending further order, the appropriation or expenditure of any public moneys for the financing of campaigns for elective city office pursuant to Measure H. 6
Petitioners contend that (1) Government Code section 85300 prohibits the use of public money for the financing of local as well as state political campaigns 7 and (2) section 313, added to the city charter by Measure H, is therefore invalid and unenforceable.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in opposition that (1) the petitioners lack standing to sue, (2) the petitioners are not proceeding against proper parties and (3) the City of Los Angeles, as a charter city, may enact laws of local concern which conflict with general state law and the decision to expend city moneys as part of a reform of local political rules is a matter of local, not statewide, concern.
We deal first with the threshold procedural questions and then turn to the dispositive substantive issue.
Respondents assert that two of the three petitioners (Johnson and Kopp) lack standing to seek mandamus relief. They argue that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, a petitioner must be "beneficially interested" and that requirement (Braude v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 83, 87, 276 Cal.Rptr. 256.) As petitioners Johnson and Kopp are not residents of the City of Los Angeles, and their only apparent interest is their status as the authors and proponents of Proposition 73, respondents contend that their interest is indistinguishable from the public at large. As to petitioner Bernardi, respondents urge that since he is a member of the City Council he is barred from prosecuting this proceeding under the authority of Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276, which concluded that an administrative board member seeking to compel the board on which she sat to comply with a certain regulatory statute was "not a citizen-taxpayer for the purpose of having standing to sue the very board on which she sits." (Id. at p. 801, 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276.)
While petitioners Johnson and Kopp respond that an exception to the beneficial interest rule has been recognized where enforcement of an important public right is sought (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256), we need not address the merits of that argument. It is sufficient if at least one of the petitioners clearly has standing and it appears to us that petitioner Bernardi does. Under the terms of the Political Reform Act of 1974, which Proposition 73 amended, any resident of the concerned jurisdiction may sue to enjoin violations or compel compliance. 8
This statutory authority is sufficient to overcome the objection that as a member of the City Council, Bernardi can not bring this action. First, the statute is clear and explicit; it grants standing to "Any person residing in the jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) The petitioner Bernardi is admittedly such a person. Second, in Carsten, the Supreme Court sought to address policy concerns which simply are not presented by this case. There is no threat here of (1) an undue interference with administrative efficiency or (2) an adverse impact of internecine litigation upon members of an administrative board or its limited budgetary resources. (Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 799, 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276.) Further, to recognize Bernardi's standing here will not, as in Carsten, permit a dissident board member to simply have a duplicative rerun, in a second, more formal forum, of the disputed issue as to which he was initially unsuccessful in persuading his administrative colleagues. (Ibid.) Unlike the petitioner in Carsten, who in effect sought an advisory opinion by means of a mandamus petition, (id. at p. 798, 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276), Bernardi seeks the clarification of an important legal issue which will impact the validity of the central portion of a major campaign reform effort on the part of the City of Los Angeles.
Here, Bernardi seeks to enforce a clear statutory mandate which, as we discuss below, conflicts with a city charter amendment approved by the voters of the City of Los Angeles. Government Code section 91003, subdivision (a) grants him sufficient standing to prosecute this petition.
As we have noted (see fn. 2), the several respondents have been named as individuals rather than in their official capacities. Respondents raise this as a procedural objection to the petition. However, it need not detain us long.
First, the respondents are properly identified in the body of the petition. Second, the relief sought, if granted by this court, would be within the...
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