Johnson v. Bradstreet Co.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1891
• Citation: 13 S.E. 250,87 Ga. 79
• Parties: Johnson v. Bradstreet Co.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

13 S.E. 250

87 Ga. 79

Johnson v. Bradstreet Co.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 23, 1891

Syllabus by the Court.

Under section 2967 of the Code, as amended by the act of 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 73,) an action for libel, pending at the time the act passed, does not abate upon the death of the plaintiff.

Error from city court of Atlanta; Van Epps, Judge.

Lumpkin J.

The question presented for our determination in this case is whether or not an action for libel, brought before the passage of the act recited in the headnote, and pending when the act was passed, is abated by the death of the plaintiff. It appears that Johnson died September 1, 1890, which was, of course, after the passage of the act. It does not appear from the particular record now before us on the present hearing of this case whether or not the suit was brought before the passage of the act referred to, but we learn from statements of counsel that such is the fact. Besides, this same case came to this court in the life-time of Johnson, the intestate of the plaintiff in error. See Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 81 Ga. 425, 7 S.E. 867. The record there shows the case was brought before the passage of the act. It will thus be seen that the case was pending when the act passed, and that Johnson died thereafter. We have considered and determined the case with reference to these facts. The act undoubtedly applies to cases brought after its passage, and no reason appears, or was suggested to us in the argument why it should not apply to pending suits. The language of the act is sufficiently comprehensive to include pending actions and we hold that it does. No position to the contrary was either taken or insisted upon by counsel for the defendant in error. The only contention presented by the discussion of the case was whether or not the section as amended applied to actions for libel. It is unquestionably true that, before the section was amended, such an action would not have survived the death of the plaintiff. The amending act provides that no action "for homicide, injury to person, or injury to property shall abate by death." If the words "injury to person" are to be restricted to mere bodily or physical injuries, an action for libel would be abated by the death of the plaintiff, but if these words are held to extend to all injuries to person, then such action would not be so abated. In our opinion these words are used in a technical legal sense, and should be construed accordingly. Some light is thrown upon the question at issue by reference to the position which the amended section occupies in the Code. Title 8, pt. 2, of the Code treats of "torts, or injuries to persons or property." Chapter 2 of that article deals with "injuries to the person." This chapter is divided into three articles. The first treats of "physical injuries," the second of "injuries to reputation," and the third of "other injuries to the person." According to this classification it will be seen that injuries to reputation are included in the chapter dealing generally with injuries to the person. The article relating to physical injuries treats only of injuries to the body; that relating to reputation includes and defines lible and slander; and the remaining article of that chapter deals with still other personal injuries, such as false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and injuries to health. All of the foregoing injuries, as has been shown, are classed under the general subdivision covering injuries to the person. It is more than probable that the legislature, in making this new law a part of the Code, intended that it should harmonize with its surroundings; and in amending this section it was doubtless their deliberate purpose that the words used in the amending act should be construed and understood with reference to the existing arrangement and classification of the law of torts, in which this new law found its place. If, however, the meaning of the words "injury to person" cannot be determined by the position of the amended section in the Code, it may be arrived at by reference to the common law. At common law absolute personal rights were divided into personal security, personal liberty, and private property. The right of personal security was subdivided into protection to life, limb, body, health, and reputation. 3 Bl. Comm. 119. If the right to personal security includes reputation, then reputation is a part of the person, and an injury to the reputation is an injury to the person. Under the head of "security in person," Cooley includes the right to life, immunity from attacks and injuries, and to reputation. Cooley, Torts, (2d Ed.) 23, 24. See, also, Pol. Torts, *7. Bouvier classes among absolute injuries to the person, batteries, injuries to health, slander, libel, and malicious prosecution. 1 Bouv. Law Dict. (6th Ed.) 636. "Person" is a broad term, and legally includes, not only the physical body and members, but also every bodily sense and personal attribute, among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others, and is capable of growth and real existence, as an arm or leg. If it is not to be classed as a personal right, where does it belong? No provision has been made for any middle class of injuries between those to person and those to property, and the great body of wrongs arrange themselves under the one head or the other. Whether viewed from the artificial arrangement of law-writers or the stand-point of common sense, an injury to reputation is an injury to person; and oftentimes an injury of this sort causes far more pain and unhappiness, to say nothing of actual loss of money or property, than any physical injury could possibly occasion. As already suggested, it is of great importance to arrive, if possible, at the intention of the legislature as to the meaning to be given to the words "injury to person." We have endeavored to show that the legislative intent may, to...