Johnson v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 05 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 301CV589JCH.,301CV589JCH. |
| Citation | 294 F.Supp.2d 223 |
| Parties | Clovis Lloyd JOHNSON, v. Leslie E. BROOKS and Richard Blumenthal |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Clovis Lloyd Johnson, Inmate 189784, pro se, Somers, CT, for Plaintiff.
James A. Killen, Jo Anne Sulik, Rocky Hill, CT, for Defendant.
RULING RE: AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Clovis Lloyd Johnson ("Johnson"), currently confined at the Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut, brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, on charges of manslaughter, altering or removing identification marks on a pistol and carrying a pistol without a permit. For the reasons set forth below, the amended petition is denied.
In August 1992, Johnson pled guilty to charges of manslaughter, altering or removing identification marks on a pistol, and carrying a pistol without a permit. He was sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment of twenty-seven years. He did not file a direct appeal.
Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court on the ground that his difficulty understanding English caused him to think that the agreed sentence was twenty-seven months instead of twenty-seven years. The petition was denied on January 27, 1995, following an evidentiary hearing. The time for seeking certification from the trial court to appeal the denial expired ten days later, on February 6, 1995. Johnson did not file his petition for certification until March 5, 1995. The petition was denied as untimely filed. On May 14, 1996, Johnson attempted to appeal the denial of certification. He claimed that his attorney did not inform him of the time limits for filing an appeal. The Connecticut Appellate Court denied the appeal on July 17, 1996, and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification on April 14, 1999. (See Resp'ts' Mem. App. B at 2-3.)
In 1998, Johnson filed a second state habeas petition raising three grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, denial of credit for time spent in custody relating to this arrest, and ineffective assistance of habeas counsel. The trial court granted the petition and remanded for resentencing on the second count and denied the petition on the first and third counts. Although the trial court denied Johnson's petition for certification to appeal the denial, the Connecticut Appellate Court entertained an appeal to address whether the denial of certification was an abuse of discretion. On July 11, 2000, the Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 58 Conn.App. 729, 754 A.2d 849 (2000). The Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 928, 761 A.2d 753 (2000).
Johnson filed his first federal habeas petition on May 24, 1999. The petition was dismissed on October 25, 1999, for failure to exhaust state court remedies. See Johnson v. Warden, No. 3:99cv975 (AWT)(DFM).
On April 11, 2001, Johnson commenced this action. He asserted nine grounds for relief in his petition. After determining that Johnson had exhausted his state court remedies with regard to only three of the claims, the court stayed the action with regard to those three claims and dismissed all claims for which Johnson had not exhausted his state court remedies.1 The court also ordered Johnson to commence proceeding in state court by March 1, 2002, to exhaust his state court remedies with regard to the remaining unexhausted claims and to file a notice by March 11, 2002, reporting that he had complied with the court's order. The court cautioned Johnson that the federal habeas petition did not toll the limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition. Johnson failed to file the required notice. Thus, on April 8, 2002, the court vacated the stay, dismissed the case in its entirety and determined that no certificate of appealability would issue.
On May 2, 2002, Johnson filed a third federal habeas petition, No. 3:02cv376 (JCH), including only the claims from the second petition for which he had exhausted his state court remedies. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition as untimely filed. The court agreed that the third petition was untimely, but construed the petition as Johnson's attempt to file an amended petition in this, the second, federal habeas action. The third case was dismissed, a copy of the petition was docketed as an amended petition in this case, and the court ordered the respondents to address the merits of Johnson's claims.
The federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claim that a state conviction was obtained in violation of state law is not cognizable in the federal court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir.1998).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), significantly amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2254, and 2255. The amendments "place[] a new constraint" on the ability of a federal court to grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody with regard to any claim that was rejected on the merits by the state court unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The federal law defined by the Supreme Court "may be either a generalized standard enunciated in the Court's case law or a bright-line rule designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context." Kennaugh v. Miller, 289 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.2002).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] ha[s] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the particular case." Id. When considering the unreasonable application clause, the focus of the inquiry "is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable." Id. The Court has emphasized that "an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Id. (). In both scenarios, federal law is "clearly established" if it may be found in holdings, not dicta, of the Supreme Court as of the date of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
When reviewing a habeas petition, the federal court presumes that the factual determinations of the state court are correct. The petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir.2001) ().
Collateral review of a conviction is not merely a "rerun of the direct appeal." Lee v. McCaughtry, 933 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir.). Thus, "an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the amended petition, Johnson raises the ground contained in his first state habeas petition, that his difficulty understanding English caused him to think his sentence would be twenty-seven months instead of twenty-seven years, and the first and third grounds raised in the second state habeas petition, that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and during the guilty plea and again on the first state habeas petition.
Johnson first argues that his difficulties understanding English caused him to misunderstand the recommended sentence in the plea agreement to be twenty-seven months rather than twenty-seven years. The respondents argue that this claim is barred by Johnson's procedural default in state court. In addition, they argue that the presumption of correctness afforded state court factual findings requires dismissal of this claim.
The court first considers the respondents' argument that Johnson's procedural default in state court bars consideration of this claim. The availability of review on...
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Dhaity v. Warden
...claim that a state conviction was obtained in violation of state law is not cognizable in federal court.”); accord Johnson v. Brooks, 294 F.Supp.2d 223, 225 (D.Conn.2003); Constantopoulos v. Comm'r of Corr., No. 3:98CV1166(SRU), 2003 WL 2002769, at *2 (D.Conn. April 16, 2003); Flemming v. N......
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Dhaity v. Warden
...claim that a state conviction was obtained in violation of state law is not cognizable in federal court."); accord Johnson v. Brooks, 294 F. Supp.2d 223, 225 (D.Conn. 2003); Constantopoulos v. Comm'r of Corr., No. 3:98CV1166 (SRU), 2003 WL 2002769, at *2 (D. Conn. April 16, 2003); Flemming ......