Dhaity v. Warden

• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 3:07–CV–1810 (CSH).,3:07–CV–1810 (CSH).
• Citation: 5 F.Supp.3d 215
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Fenix DHAITY, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.

5 F.Supp.3d 215

Fenix DHAITY, Petitioner,

v.WARDEN, Respondent.

No. 3:07–CV–1810 (CSH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 20, 2014.

Fenix Dhaity, Gadsen, AL, pro se.

David M. Kutzner, Michael E. O'Hare, Chief State Attorney Office, Rocky Hill, CT, for Respondent.

RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Fenix Dhaity is a former Connecticut state prisoner who was incarcerated at the Brooklyn Correctional Institution in Brooklyn, Connecticut, for a twelve-year sentence stemming from his 2003 conviction on charges of sexual assault and kidnapping.¹ As of the present date, he has completed service of that sentence and been released to serve an eight-year term of special parole, relating to those convictions.²

While incarcerated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner commenced this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he later amended in January of 2009 [Doc. 13]. In the Amended Petition, he challenged his state court convictions for sexual assault and kidnapping and claimed that he was thus being held in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 26, 2003, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Connecticut state court of sexual assault and kidnapping, both in the first degree, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 53a–70(a)(1) & 53a–92(a)(2)(a), but acquitted on the third charge of intimidating a witness, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a–151a. See Doc. 14, Appendix I (transcripts of trial, State v. D'Haity, No. CR01–0137853S, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twelve years of incarceration on the sexual assault charge, followed by eight years of special parole, and twelve years of incarceration on the kidnapping charge, followed by eight years of special parole. Because the sentences were to run concurrently, Petitioner was sentenced effectively to a twelve-year term of incarceration, to be followed by eight years of special parole.

With respect to the trial, Petitioner asserts that, upon completion of the state's case, his counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the witness intimidation charge, but the trial judge wrongfully “reserved decision” on that motion “until the close of the defense case,” ultimately “denied [his] motion for judgment of acquittal” on that charge, and then “instructed the jury on the consciousness of guilt regarding the witness intimidation charge.” Doc. 13 (Amended Petition), p. 23.

Petitioner made an unsuccessful appeal to the Connecticut Appellate Court, seeking reversal of his convictions on six different grounds, including the trial court's failure to rule on his motion for judgment of acquittal on the witness intimidation charge and instruction to the jury on consciousness of guilt. State v. D'Haity, 99 Conn.App. 375, 390–91, 914 A.2d 570 (2007). Petitioner then sought certification to appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court. Doc. 14, Appendix. F (Petition for Certiorari to Connecticut Supreme Court). In that Petition, Dhaity presented only one issue for review:

Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the Defendant's acquittal on the witness intimidation charge precluded a finding of aggrievement on the trial court rulings related to that charge?

Certification was denied. State v. D'Haity, 282 Conn. 912, 924 A.2d 137 (2007).

Petitioner's sole ground upon which he now seeks federal habeas relief is essentially identical to the one he presented to the Connecticut Supreme Court. In his Amended Petition, he thus describes “Ground One” as follows:

Did the [Connecticut] Appellate Court err in concluding that the petitioner beign [sic] acquitted on the witness intimidation charge preclude[d] a finding of aggrievement on the trial court rulings related to that charge?

Doc. 13, ¶ 19 (“Ground One”).

The Respondent claims that, although exhausted in state court, the Petitioner's present habeas claim must be rejected for 3 reasons: (1) the Connecticut Appellate Court rejected each of Petitioner's underlying sub-claims (including one mirroring the present claim) under an adequate and independent state procedural rule; (2) Petitioner “has not alleged cause and prejudice to overcome this procedural default;” and (3) if considered on the merits, the claim fails because “it is based entirely on state law and is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.” Doc. 14, p. 8.

III. THRESHOLD ISSUE—Potential Mootness

At the outset, before addressing the merits of the Amended Petition, the Court resolves the issue of whether Petitioner's release from prison has rendered his habeas corpus claim moot. Under the present circumstances, the answer is decidedly, “No.” In general, in order for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a habeas petition, the petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).³See also Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968) (“The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny. Where it is available, it assures among other things that a prisoner may require his jailer to justify the detention under the law.”). “[T]he habeas petitioner [must] be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) ( per curiam ) (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968)).

A petitioner need not, however, be “physically confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923. For example, for habeas purposes, a prisoner placed on parole is still “in custody” under his unexpired sentence. Id. (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (holding that prisoner's release into custody of parole board is significant restraint on freedom within meaning of habeas corpus statute)). The Supreme Court has reasoned that said release is “not unconditional; instead, it [is] explicitly conditioned on [the petitioner's] reporting regularly to his paroleofficer, remaining in a particular community, residence, and job, and refraining from certain activities.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923. In other words, the petitioner's criminal conviction continues to impose substantial restraints on his freedom, which are not borne by the public generally. Id.

Parole has consistently been held to constitute a sufficient “restraint” to comprise “custody” for purposes of habeas relief. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 241–43, 83 S.Ct. 373. See also Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir.2006) (with respect to habeas relief, “[p]ost-release supervision, admitting of the possibility of revocation and additional jail time, is considered to be ‘custody’ ”) (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 240–43, 83 S.Ct. 373), cert. denied sub nom. Burhlre v. Earley, 551 U.S. 1159, 127 S.Ct. 3014, 168 L.Ed.2d 752 (2007); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Dep't of Corr. Servs. of the State of N.Y., 461 F.2d 956, 958 n. 1 (2d Cir.1972) (“As we said in United States ex rel. Sadness v. Wilkins, 312 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir.1963), ‘[The Supreme Court's] opinion in Jones v. Cunningham, [371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285] (1963), now makes clear that a prisoner who is released upon parole remains ‘in custody’ within the meaning of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction,” and “that release upon parole does not render moot an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding conducted prior to release.' ”) (brackets in original).

The Court takes judicial notice that Dhaity is currently on “special parole” ⁴ as a result of his relevant convictions and will not be released until the prospective end date of August 14, 2021.⁵See http:// www. ctinmateinfo. state. ct. us/ detailsupv. asp? idinmtnum= 271955. Said parole does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to decide his habeas petition nor does it render that petition moot. The Court will thus examine the merits of the petition.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW—Federal Habeas Corpus—28 U.S.C. § 2254

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Because federal habeas relief may only be obtained for a violation of federal law, it “does not lie for errors of state law.” See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)).⁶See also Howard v. Walker, 406 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.2005) (“A claim that a state conviction was obtained in violation of state law is not cognizable in federal court.”); accord Johnson v. Brooks, 294 F.Supp.2d 223, 225 (D.Conn.2003); Constantopoulos v. Comm'r of Corr., No. 3:98CV1166(SRU), 2003 WL 2002769, at *2 (D.Conn. April 16, 2003); Flemming v. New York, No. 06 Civ. 15226(LAP)(HBP), 2013 WL 4831197, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013).

Specifically, a federal habeas court may grant habeas relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” only if the state decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” ⁷ or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” ⁸28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). “This substantive...