Johnson v. Carlin

• Decision Date: 18 April 1913
• Citation: 121 Minn. 176,141 N.W. 4
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHNSON v. CARLIN.

121 Minn. 176

141 N.W. 4

JOHNSON

v.CARLIN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 18, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Nicollet County; I. M. Olsen, Judge.

Action by Karna Johnson against Carl Carlin. From the denial of a motion for judgment, or in case of denial thereof for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A farm lease provided that, if the lessor sells the farm and gives notice to the lessee that she desires to give possession to the purchaser, the lessee shall forthwith vacate upon the lessor paying to _____ of $_____ per acre for plowing newly made before the notice is given. Held, that the evidence supports the verdict that no compensation could be demanded for such plowing made by the lessee before he was required to vacate, and also that defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict for failure to prove a sale.

To prove a sale, so as to give the lessor, this plaintiff, a right to terminate the lease, oral testimony that she and the purchaser met and bargained for a sale of the farm, reduced the agreement to writing, signed it, that part of the purchase price was then paid, that the purchaser then went into possession, claiming ownership, with plaintiff's consent, and before the trial had received a deed, is admissible, and is sufficient to establish the condition upon which the lessee, this defendant, was required to vacate; it not being necessary or material to prove the contents or terms of the written contract of sale.

Upon such properly admitted evidence the court was right in holding as a matter of law that a sale was proven, and hence no prejudice could result from the improper reception of other evidence relating to the sale. Snyder & Gale and Frank J. Morley, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Young & Quandt, of Winthrop, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

On March 12, 1907, plaintiff leased a farm to defendant for the term of five years. The lease contained a provision that if plaintiff ‘sells said premises during the life of this lease and before the crop is in the ground, and desires to give possession of said leased premises to the purchaser, the second party [defendant] will forthwith surrender possession of said leased premises upon the payment to _____ of $_____ per acre for each acre of said premises newly plowed by said second party at the time said possession is demanded.’ On September 28, 1910, plaintiff sold the farm to John A. Hinquist, and on November 1st following she served a written notice on defendant to surrender possession on or before February 1, 1911, ‘for the reason that she had sold and desired to give the purchaser possession.’ Defendant refused to vacate, and on February 24, 1911, plaintiff began this action before a justice of the peace for restitution, alleging the letting, the terms thereof, the sale, notice to defendant to surrender possession, and his failure to comply. From a judgment for restitution defendant appealed to the district court, but with the same result. Upon an appeal to this court a new trial was granted. Johnson v. Carlin, 115 Minn. 430, 132 N. W. 750. Plaintiff again prevailed, and defendant now appeals from the order denying his blended motion for judgment or, in case of denial thereof, for a new trial.

[1] We do not think defendant entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, either on the ground that no sale of the farm was proven, or on the ground that the verdict on the only issue submitted to the jury is not supported by the evidence. Under instructions not now challenged the court left to the jury the sole question whether, under the ambiguous reading of the lease, the agreement was that plaintiff should pay the reasonable value for the plowing ‘newly made’ before defendant could be required to surrender possession in case of a sale of the farm. This conformed to the rule announced on the former appeal, and we think the evidence as to the situation of the parties, their negotiations when the lease was made, the fact that generally plowing is done in the fall for practically all spring crops except corn, and that when defendant took the lease the same amount substantially was plowed as the amount plowed when he was required to leave, furnishes sufficient basis for the verdict.

Did the court err in holding as a matter of law, and so instructing the jury, that it appeared as a proven fact that on or about September 28, 1910, plaintiff sold the farm to John A. Hinquist? If it clearly appears that she so did by competent admissible testimony, the case ought not to be reversed, even if the court erred in receiving evidence that should have been excluded. Defendant had agreed to vacate, if plaintiff sold the farm and desired to give the purchaser possession. Without objection it was proven that plaintiff notified defendant that she had on September 28, 1910, sold and desired to give the purchaser possession. As to the fact of sale, it is to be observed that the lease does not specify what proof, if any, should be laid before defendant. We apprehend that if the defendant had been present at the time the sale was made, had heard the bargain made, had seen the parties prepare and sign a contract purporting to conclude the bargain, had seen money paid to the plaintiff by Hinquist, had known that the supposed purchaser took possession with the seller's consent, and so remained in possession until he received a deed, plaintiff could have called him to the witness stand and elicited from him such facts without offending against any rule of evidence. And if so made to appear, we dare say that it has been sufficiently proven that plaintiff under the terms of the lease had the right to require defendant to surrender possession of...