Johnson v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36107,36107
• Citation: 64 N.W.2d 372,242 Minn. 130
• Parties: JOHNSON v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 372

64 N.W.2d 372

242 Minn. 130

JOHNSON v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RY. CO.

No. 36107.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 30, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., the duty to use equipment that will not fail from defect, overstrain, or any other cause is an absolute one from which the carrier cannot be excused by any showing of care however assiduous.

2. Although the use by a common carrier of any equipment, such as a coupler, which breaks or otherwise fails is a violation of Federal Safety Appliance Act which creates an absolute liability for damages, such absolute liability is clearly limited to the recovery of those damages which are Proximately caused, in whole or in part, by such violation.

3. An act of negligence, or as here an act of statutory violation, which creates an absolute liability is not a direct and proximate cause of a plaintiff's harm simply because the harm would not have occurred But for such act unless the act is a substantial as well as an actual factor in bringing about such harm.

4. Where the plaintiff, as engineer, complied with the order of his superior, the conductor, by running his locomotive into a zone of known danger although in doing so he violated the operating rule that he should not obey an order of the conductor if it might endanger the safety of the train or require a breach of rules, plaintiff's violation of such operating rule was not as a matter of law a bar to his action since the violation involved only a general cautionary regulation; and it was for the jury to determine whether the conductor's order to proceed with the locomotive was negligence which contributed proximately to the collision.

Donald A. Chapman, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Thomas Mohn, Red Wing, Faegre & Benson, Paul J. McGough, Wright W. Brooks, Minneapolis, for respondent.

MATSON, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside a directed verdict and grant a new trial.

This is an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by an employee for damages for injuries suffered in a head-on collision between two trains.

On June 2, 1951, at 7:10 a.m., a 157-car freight train left Stockton, Illinois, westbound for Oelwein, Iowa. William Johnson, the plaintiff, was the engineer of the five-unit diesel which was pulling this train. Before leaving, the crew, including the plaintiff, received copies of an order notifying them that an eastbound freight would be held on the main line 15 miles west at North Hanover until 8:20 a.m. Pursuant to this order the westbound train was to go into the siding at North Hanover so that the eastbound train could proceed on the main line, since part of the right of way between Stockton and North Hanover was single-tracked. The westbound train proceeded past Golden (the point at which the single track began), and about three to five miles west of Stockton when the breaking of an air hose set the emergency brakes so hard that the resulting strain on the couplings broke a knuckle on the 58th car, separating the train at that point. Repairs were begun immediately, the broken knuckle was replaced, and the train recoupled. By then it was 8:08 a.m., or only 12 minutes until the eastbound train would be authorized to leave North Hanover.

At 8:08 a.m. the conductor ordered the diesel detached from the train in order that they might be able to proceed west in time to warn the eastbound train of the situation. In the diesel at that time were the engineer (plaintiff), the conductor, the fireman, and the head brakeman. The conductor stated that he wanted to go all the way to North Hanover which was nine miles from the point where the train was stalled. Plaintiff intended to stop at Woodbine, one to two miles west of the stalled cars, and put out a flag, but when he began to slow down the conductor ordered him to 'keep going.' They then proceeded to Elizabeth, some four miles farther. Plaintiff wanted to stop here and halt the eastbound train when it came past, but the conductor again told him to keep going. At the moment they passed the switch west of Elizabeth it was 8:17 a.m., which gave them three minutes to get to North Hanover which was three miles west. From Elizabeth to North Hanover the speed was increased to 55 to 60 miles per hour in hope of getting there before the eastbound train started out. The plaintiff was holding his watch in one hand and glanced at it frequently since every second counted. Fifteen seconds before 8:20 a.m. plaintiff decided that they were not going to make it, and he began applying the brakes with the intention of stopping, setting out a warning flag, and backing up. As the diesel was being slowed down, the eastbound train (also a diesel) appeared around a curve 1,000 to 1,600 feet ahead. By this time it was approximately 8:21 a.m., and the westbound train had lost any right to be on the main line.

At the moment the trains came within sight of each other, the westbound train, under the control of plaintiff, was going approximately 45 miles per hour, and the eastbound train was going 18 to 20 miles per hour. Plaintiff applied the emergency brakes, and the other three members of the crew jumped out of the engine by the side doors. Plaintiff was unable to jump because the others got to the doors first. At the moment of impact the westbound train was going 22 miles per hour and the eastbound train was going approximately 18 miles per hour. Plaintiff was pinned in the diesel for one and one-half hours. He received permanent injuries to his leg and hip and remained in the hospital for six months.

Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant railroad company to recover damages for his injuries. When plaintiff rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict which was granted. This appeal is from the order denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the directed verdict and grant a new trial.

We are concerned with issues of: (1) Whether under the Federal Safety Appliance Act the duty of the carrier to use equipment that will not fail from defect is an absolute one which cannot be evaded by a showing of due care, (2) proximate cause, and (3) whether plaintiff's violation of a general cautionary regulation is a bar to his action.

1. Under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., the breaking of the train coupler (irrespective of the presence or absence of either due care or negligence on the part of the defendant carrier and without regard to any latent defect in the coupler's manufacture or whether the coupler was subjected to strain beyond its capacity) created an absolute liability for damages for injuries Proximately resulting therefrom, ¹ in whole or in part, to a plaintiff-employee, and any action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S.C.A. § 53, to enforce such absolute liability is not barred by plaintiff's contributory negligence (or assumption of risk ²) since contributory negligence goes only to a proportionate diminution in the amount of the damages. ³ The duty to use equipment that will not fail from defect, overstrain, or any other cause is an absolute one from which the carrier cannot be excused by any showing of care however assiduous. ⁴

2. Although the use by a common carrier of any equipment, such as a coupler, which breaks or otherwise fails is a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act which creates an absolute liability for damages, such absolute liability is clearly limited to the recovery of those damages which are Proximately caused, in whole or in part, by such violation. ⁵ Damages are not proximately caused by a violation of the act if such violation does nothing more than create an incidental condition or situation which merely sets the stage for the operation of other forces which directly, and as independent factors, intervene and operate in an unbroken sequence to produce the injuries and the resulting damages. ⁶ No purpose will be served by a detailed discussion of the theory of proximate cause since that has been ably taken care of elsewhere. ⁷ Whether a particular act, or a failure to act, has, wholly or in part, proximately caused an accident depends in the last analysis on the application of common sense to the facts of each case. ⁸

The distinction between a statutory violation which merely creates an incidental condition or situation--or shall we say merely creates the occasion for the operation of independent or intervening forces of causation--and a statutory violation which directly and proximately causes the accident is well illustrated by a comparison of the federal cases of Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 37 S.Ct. 598, 61 L.Ed. 995, and Reetz v. Chicago & E.R. Co., 6 Cir., 46 F.2d 50. The Gotschall case involved a brakeman who was walking along the tops of the cars and was thrown off and killed when a coupler of the moving train opened, resulting in a sudden application of the brakes. The failure of the coupler was an efficient and proximate cause of the accident and obviously did more than merely create an incidental condition or occasion for the occurrence of the accident. In the Reetz case couplers broke, setting the brakes and stopping the train. While plaintiff was walking beside the train to locate the trouble, he fell off a bridge and received injuries from which he later died. The court held that the broken couplers created an incidental condition or situation but were not an eficient cause of or the instrumentality through which the injury was brought about. ⁹ It is not to be overlooked, however, that a statutory violation is not neutralized or superseded as a factor of direct and proximate cause by the acts of the employee when such acts are a normal reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by the defendant's wrong. ¹⁰

3. In the instant case the rupture of the air hose, followed by the instant setting of the...