Johnson v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 27 July 1955
• Citation: 134 Cal.App.2d 600,285 P.2d 713
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Bernice E. JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 20801.

Page 713

285 P.2d 713

134 Cal.App.2d 600

Bernice E. JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 20801.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

July 27, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 15, 1955.

Hearing Denied Sept. 21, 1955.

Ralph B. Helm and Gordon T. Shepard Los Angeles, for appellant.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., Victor P.Spero and Weldon L. Weber, Deputy City Attys., Los Angeles, for respondent.

PARKER WOOD, Justice.

Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall allegedly caused by tripping on a defect in a public sidewalk. Plaintiff appeals from judgment in favor of defendant.

The amended complaint alleged that the accident occurred on July 27, 1952; that on September 18, 1952, plaintiff filed, with the clerk of the legislative body of defendant, 'a verified written claim for damages specifying the name and address of the plaintiff claimant, the date and place of the accident, and the extent of the injuries and damages received'; that defendant negligently permitted a portion of a public sidewalk on the west side of Main Street at or near its intersecting point with 82nd Street to deteriorate and become 'a dangerous, defective and broken hazard to persons using said sidewalk'; that 'the area [portion of sidewalk] complained of' extended from a point about 18 inches east of the south corner of the north entrance (on Main Street) of the 'Corner Market' on the southwest corner of the intersection of Main Street and 82nd Street to a point about 30 inches east of said south corner of said entrance; that said area was about 12 inches long, about 6 inches wide, and about 4 inches deep. The complaint was filed July 6, 1953.

A recital in the judgment is that counsel for the parties stipulated: 'that the issue as to the legal sufficiency of the claim first be tried as a condition precedent to the maintenance and prosecution of said action before proof of damages be made'; and 'that the claim filed in behalf of the plaintiff stated the location of the accident was on the sidewalk at the southeast corner of 82nd and Main Street'; and 'that the accident actually occurred on the sidewalk at the southwest corner of 82nd and Main Street in the City of Los Angeles.'

The question is whether the claim filed by plaintiff was legally sufficient with respect to specifying the place of the accident.

Section 53052 of the Government Code provides: 'When it is claimed that a person has been injured * * * as a result of the dangerous or defective condition of public property, a verified written claim for damages shall be filed with the clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the local agency within ninety days after the accident occurred.'

Section 53053 of the Code provides: 'The claim shall specify the name and address of the claimant, the date and place of the accident, and the extent of the injuries or damages received.'

There is no reporter's transcript herein. A copy of the claim is not attached to any of the pleadings. The claim is not before this court--it does not appear from the record that it was received in evidence or for identification.

Appellant argues that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of said Section 53053 that the claim specify the place of the accident; that there was no evidence of intent on the part of plaintiff to mislead the defendant, and that in the absence of anything indicating that defendant was misled the claim was legally sufficient.

In Perry v. City of San Diego, 80 Cal.App.2d 166, at page 169, 181 P.2d 98, at page 101, it was said: 'From these authorities [cited above] it seems clear that California courts have taken a reasonably liberal view of the claim statutes and that where a reasonable attempt is made to comply with the law in good faith and no intent to mislead or conceal appears the claim will be upheld in the absence of anything indicating that the municipality has been misled, if the claim substantially conforms to the requirements of the statute.' (The question in that case pertained to the sufficiency of the statement in the claim regarding negligence.)

In Silva v. County of Fresno, 63 Cal.App.2d 253, 146 P.2d 520, 521, the claim stated: '* * * 'the place of injury was on a public highway approximately four miles east of Dos Palos in the County of Fresno, State of California'' and "* * * the cause and manner of such injury and facts connected therewith are as follows: A dangerous and defective road in that there were no signs kept or maintained by said County of Fresno indicating that the public highway upon which this claimant was riding came to an abrupt end". It was held therein that there was a substantial compliance with the statute in describing the place of the accident. In that case the name or number of the highway was not stated in the claim and the place of the accident was not described with particularity. The reference therein to a highway that "came to an abrupt end" was not a reference to a 'dead end' highway but it was a reference to a right-angle turn in a highway.

Respondent cites Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 198, 120 P.2d 13, 15, wherein the claim stated that it was for 'Personal injuries received from slipping on sidewalk which was covered with mud, leaves and debris, resulting in injury * * *.' The claim therein did not state what city the sidewalk was in, but the complaint alleged that the accident occurred on the sidewalk at the corner of Union Drive and Sixth Street in Los Angeles. In that case the court, after referring to certain cases, stated, 19 Cal.2d at page 202, 120 P.2d at page 15, that those cases held 'that a defect in the form of compliance is not fatal so long as there is substantial compliance with the essentials of the requirement. In the present case [the cited...