Johnson v. Crookston Lumber Company
| Decision Date | 17 June 1904 |
| Docket Number | 13,958 - (154) |
| Citation | 100 N.W. 225,92 Minn. 393 |
| Parties | IVER JOHNSON v. CROOKSTON LUMBER COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Red Lake county, Watts, J., denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, after a trial and verdict in favor of plaintiff for $225. Affirmed.
Contract of Employment.
Under an alleged contract of employment, whereby plaintiff was to work for an entire season for agreed daily wages, which was disputed. held, upon the evidence, that it was sufficient to sustain the conclusions that such agreement had been made and that plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged before its termination.
Evidence of Custom.
The issue of fact as to the existence of such contract rested upon the testimony of plaintiff, which was contradicted. Held, that the exclusion of evidence showing defendant's custom in hiring other employees was immaterial to rebut plaintiff's statements in this respect.
Discretion of Court.
That the discretion of the trial court in refusing to allow repetition of evidence to show a custom in hiring employees to corroborate the evidence for defendant was properly exercised.
Instruction to Jury.
With reference to certain instructions, held: (1) That the court was justified in assuming that plaintiff had been discharged (2) that the court's refusal to instruct the jury that defendant's belief that plaintiff had quit was proper.
Davis & Hollister and Marshall & Whipple, for appellant.
H. Steenerson and Charles Loring, for respondent.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he was engaged by defendant as an edgerman in its St. Hilaire Mill in Red Lake county for the sawing season of 1903 at specified daily wages; that he commenced work on April 18, and continued until May 1, thereafter, when, by reason of an accident, he became incapacitated, and secured an accepted substitute to fill his place until he recovered, which was on May 20 following, when he reported for duty, but his services were declined, and he was refused employment. In this action he seeks to recover damages for his wrongful discharge. Plaintiff coupled with his claim for the wrongful discharge a second cause of action for injuries received through his master's alleged negligence to supply him with reasonably safe instrumentalities with which to perform his work, whereby his alleged injury was received, but this was abandoned at the trial.
Defendant answered, and in referring to the statement in the first cause of action admitted that plaintiff had not been in its employ since May 1, 1903, but did not specifically deny in his answer to this cause of action that plaintiff offered to resume his duties on May 20, or that it refused to allow him to do so. At the end of the allegations of the answer to the second cause of action there is a general denial, which it is claimed for defendant applies to both causes; but this at most must be regarded as of doubtful inference. Issue was joined by reply. A verdict was recovered by plaintiff, based upon the time necessarily lost by him through the alleged wrongful discharge. A motion by defendant for judgment, or a new trial in the alternative, was overruled, which is the order appealed from.
The cause was submitted to the jury in an impartial charge by the trial court fairly presenting the issues under the evidence but it is insisted as the principal ground for reversal that in one of its instructions it was assumed as a fact which was necessary to be proven that there was no controversy about plaintiff's discharge. ...
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