Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., CIV.A. 01-481-B-M3.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 01-481-B-M3.,CIV.A. 01-481-B-M3.
• Citation: 294 F.Supp.2d 850
• Parties: Johnny L. JOHNSON v. CROWN ENTERPRISES, INC., Dixie Harvesting Company, Inc., and Cora-Texas Manufacturing Company, L.L.C.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

294 F.Supp.2d 850

Johnny L. JOHNSON v. CROWN ENTERPRISES, INC., Dixie Harvesting Company, Inc., and Cora-Texas Manufacturing Company, L.L.C.

No. CIV.A. 01-481-B-M3.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

October 10, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dale Edward Williams, Metairie, LA, for plaintiff.

Edmond Dwayne Jordan, Brusly, LA, Thomas David Jones, Baton Rouge, LA, for defendants.

RULING

POLOZOLA, Chief Judge.

Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc. ("Crown"), Dixie Harvesting Company, Inc. ("Dixie"), and Cora-Texas Manufacturing Company, L.L.C. ("Cora-Texas") have filed motions for summary judgement and to dismiss against plaintiff Johnny L. Johnson pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In their memorandum in support of the motions, defendants make the following arguments. Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims under Title VII should be dismissed because: (1) plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (2) plaintiff's allegation of racial discrimination is not legally cognizable under Title VII because plaintiff is an independent contractor. Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because: (1) plaintiff's § 1981 claim is barred by the statute of limitations, or in the alternative, the equitable doctrine of laches; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding plaintiff's ability to come forward with direct or circumstantial evidence to prove his claims under § 1981.¹ With respect to both claims, defendants contend that Crown and Cora-Texas should be dismissed from the suit because plaintiff was not an "employee" of Crown or Cora-Texas and has never been an "employee" of Crown or Cora-Texas. Defendants also object to plaintiff's request that the Court apply the term "enterprise" under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1978 to make plaintiff an "employee" of Crown or Cora-Texas under the facts of this case.

The plaintiff has filed an opposition to the defendants' motions. In his opposition, plaintiff argues that: (1) plaintiff was indeed an employee of the three defendants because there is common ownership; (2) there was a continuing violation which interrupts the statute of limitation; (3) the plaintiff did exhaust remedies; (4) the Court should adopt the definition of "enterprise" as interpreted in the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1978 ("FLSA"); and (5) there are material issues of fact in dispute which preclude the Court from granting summary judgment. For reasons which follow, the Court finds that defendant's motions should be granted.

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."² The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."³

If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial.⁴ The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.⁵ Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."⁶ The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."⁷ Unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, there is no genuine issue for trial.⁸

B. Title VII Claims

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies under Title VII

Defendants contend that this Court had no jurisdiction over plaintiff's case against Crown and Cora-Texas because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies vis-a-vis these two defendants. Plaintiff concedes and it is clear from a review of the record that plaintiff did not file a complaint with the E.E.O.C. against Crown or Cora-Texas alleging racial discrimination.⁹ Plaintiff's opposition provides that plaintiff and defendant have stipulated to litigate only the § 1981 claims with respect to Crown and Cora-Texas and the Title VII claim should be dismissed against these two defendants.¹⁰ The Court agrees to accept the stipulation. It is well-settled that a complainant must exhaust his administrative remedies with the E.E.O.C. in a Title VII action, and his failure to do so deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction over the Title VII claim.¹¹ Thus, plaintiff's Title VII claims against Crown and Cora-Texas are dismissed without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff's Status as an Independent Contractor

In their memorandum, defendants also allege that this Court has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under Title VII because plaintiff was not an "employee" of Dixie under Title VII. Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff was an independent contractor.¹² Plaintiff's opposition states that plaintiff and defendants have stipulated to not litigate this matter under Title VII.¹³ The Court agrees to accept the stipulation because the contract entered into between plaintiff and Dixie contains language often included in a typical independent contractor agreement. The language in this agreement clearly shows that plaintiff was an independent contractor under the facts of this case. Further, it is well-settled that an employee-employer relationship is an absolute prerequisite to claims filed pursuant to Title VII. An independent contractor relationship does not satisfy this prerequisite.¹⁴ Since plaintiff has stipulated to the fact that he cannot meet this prerequisite as to Dixie, Crown, or Cora-Texas and because the evidence is clear that plaintiff was indeed an independent contractor, plaintiff's Title VII claims against Dixie, Crown, and Cora-Texas are dismissed with prejudice.

C. Claims under § 1981

1. Is the § 1981 claim barred by the statute of limitations, or in the alternative, the equitable doctrine of laches to the § 1981 claim

Plaintiff was "fired" on September 30, 2000. His original complaint was filed on June 15, 2001 seeking recovery under Title VII. The § 1981 claim was not included in the original complaint. On May 10, 2002, plaintiff requested leave to amend his original complaint to include his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After considering defendants' opposition, the magistrate judge granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint on July 23, 2002. Because the § 1981 claim was filed over one year from the date that plaintiff was fired, defendants claim that plaintiff's § 1981 claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees.

In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,¹⁵ the United States Supreme Court held that suits brought under § 1981 are governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury suits as set forth by the law of the forum state.¹⁶ Both the Fifth Circuit¹⁷ and the Middle District of Louisiana¹⁸ have recognized and followed Goodman and have held that § 1981 claims are subject to Louisiana's one-year period applicable to tort violations. Even though state law governs the limitation period, federal law determines when a civil rights action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run.¹⁹

Therefore, the Court holds that even though the plaintiff may have filed a timely Title VII claim with the E.E.O.C., such a filing does not save the § 1981 claim, nor does it interrupt the one-year statute of limitations.

In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,²⁰ the United States Supreme Court held that the filing and processing of charges with the E.E.O.C. under Title VII does not toll the running of the state prescriptive periods governing § 1981 claims.²¹ The Fifth Circuit has adopted the holding of Johnson in subsequent cases.²² Plaintiff argues that his § 1981 claim was not prescribed on June 15, 2001, when his original complaint was filed asserting his Title VII claims only. Plaintiff claims his § 1981 suit is not prescribed for two reasons: (1) there was a continuing violation; and, (2) the provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Plaintiff alleges defendants' actions constitute a continuing violation of § 1981 because defendants continually violated plaintiff's rights each time they failed to renew his contract. Because the most recent "violation" occurred when defendants failed to renew plaintiff's contract in August 2003, plaintiff argues he is well within the § 1981 prescriptive period. Plaintiff also contends that the § 1981 claim asserted in the amended complaint should relate back to the filing of the original complaint on June 15, 2001. If the Court finds the amended complaint does relate back to the date the original complaint was filed, plaintiff contends his § 1981 suit was timely filed.

a. Continuing Violation

Plaintiff relies heavily on the continuing violation theory to oppose defendants' motions. The jurisprudence on continuing violations has been characterized as "inconsistent and confusing."²³ "The continuing violation theory provides that where the last act alleged is part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination and occurs within the filing period, allegations concerning earlier acts are not time-barred."²⁴ The Fifth Circuit has identified three factors that must be considered by the Court when...