Johnson v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 15 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-202,90-202
• Citation: 569 So.2d 928
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2807 William R. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Jesse Brian EDWARDS, Jr. and David Van Edwards, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 928

569 So.2d 928

15 Fla. L. Weekly D2807

William R. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Jesse Brian EDWARDS, Jr. and David Van Edwards, Appellees.

No. 90-202.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Nov. 15, 1990.

Daniel Stewart of Stewart & Byrom, Milton, for appellant.

Roy V. Andrews of Lindsay, Andrews & Leonard, P.A., Milton, for appellees.

ALLEN, Judge.

William R. Johnson appeals from an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint against appellees. He contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that his suit for breach of an oral employment contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds, Section 725.01, Florida Statutes. He also argues that, even if the trial court was correct in dismissing his second amended complaint, he should have been allowed to file a third amended complaint in a further effort to state a cause of action against appellees. We affirm.

Appellant filed suit against appellees alleging that he had entered into an oral contract with the appellees. The terms of the contract were alleged in appellant's complaint as follows:

On or about January 1, 1982, the Defendants, Jesse Brian Edwards, Jr. and David Van Edwards, did enter into an oral contract with the plaintiff, the terms of which were as follows: (a) Plaintiff would move to the farm where he was given pasture for his horses as well as room and board; (b) Plaintiff would receive wages of $600.00 per month; (c) in the event Plaintiff was injured in an accident, Plaintiff was to receive full disability for loss of wages as well as all medical expenses and room and board and pasture privileges during the period of disability; (d) the Plaintiff was to manage and run the operation of the farm including raising and training many thoroughbred horses; (e) the Plaintiff was also to receive $208.00 per month for his truck payment.

Plaintiff alleged that he performed his responsibilities under the contract until May 20, 1985, when he was severely injured and disabled as a result of a horse falling upon him. Finally, he alleged that at some time after such date, appellees failed to provide the benefits due him under the contract as a result of his work-related disability.

Appellant's third effort to state a cause of action was met with a motion to dismiss, which asserted that any action upon the contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds, Section 725.01, Florida Statutes. That section provides, in pertinent part, that "No action shall be brought ... upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of 1 year ... unless the agreement ... or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith...." Appellant argued that his performance under the contract was complete, and therefore had removed the contract from the Statute of Frauds, but the trial court disagreed and dismissed the complaint.

We agree with the trial court's ruling. Appellant's services under the oral contract alleged can only be characterized as partial performance since his employment was for an indefinite period of time. It is now well established that partial performance of a contract for personal services is not an exception to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. Tobin & Tobin Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Zeskind, 315 So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Rowland v. Ewell, 174 So.2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).

Appellant also contends that, even if the trial court was correct in dismissing his second amended complaint, the dismissal should have been without prejudice and with leave for him to file yet another amended complaint. We find that the dismissal with prejudice was within the sound discretion of the trial court. Appellant had already submitted three complaints, and it is difficult to imagine what he might have alleged in a fourth complaint which would have made the alleged oral contract enforceable.

Accordingly, the order dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice is...