Johnson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation

• Decision Date: 17 December 1936
• Docket Number: No. 2993.,2993.
• Citation: 99 S.W.2d 979
• Parties: JOHNSON v. EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, LIMITED.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

99 S.W.2d 979

JOHNSON v. EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, LIMITED.

No. 2993.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

December 17, 1936.

Rehearing Denied December 23, 1936.

Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; R. L. Murray, Judge.

Action by R. F. Johnson against the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited. From a judgment dismissing the cause, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

D. E. O'Fiel, of Beaumont, for appellant

King & Rienstra, of Beaumont, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

On or about the 13th day of October, 1934, appellant, R. F. Johnson, a resident citizen of the state of Texas, while in the course of his employment with W. Horace Williams Construction Company, a Louisiana corporation, in Cameron parish, La., received serious personal injuries. W. Horace Williams Construction Company, a qualified subscriber under the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended), carried its workmen's compensation insurance with appellee, Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited. Under the terms of this insurance contract, and of his employment by W. Horace Williams Construction Company, appellant was entitled to all the relief and benefits provided by the terms of the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act for injured employees, both against his employer and appellee. On the date of his injury, and continuously thereafter, appellant's employer was actively engaged in business in the state of Louisiana and in the state of Texas, and had a permit to do business in the state of Texas, but did not have an agency in Jefferson county. At the time appellant was injured, and continuously since that date, appellee was engaged in business in Louisiana and in Texas, with a permit to do business in Texas, and with an agency and a local agent in Jefferson county. On the 9th day of May, 1935, appellant instituted this suit in the district court of Jefferson county against appellee to recover workmen's compensation under the provisions of the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act, pleading specially the provisions of that act, and the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action, with prayer for appropriate relief. Appellee was duly cited to appear and answer appellant's petition. On the 8th day of June, 1935, appellee filed the following plea to the jurisdiction of the district court of Jefferson county, Tex.:

"Defendant says that this Court does not have jurisdiction of this cause, for the reason that it appears from plaintiff's petition that this is a suit arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Louisiana for an injury occurring in said State, while plaintiff was working under a contract of employment made in Louisiana and to be performed wholly within said State. In this connection defendant alleges that under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Louisiana and the laws of said State this suit or cause can be maintained only in the Courts of said State, as particularly prescribed by said Compensation Act, and only the Courts of the State of Louisiana have jurisdiction to administer said Act, and consequently this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this controversy.

"Wherefore, defendant prays judgment of the Court that this cause be dismissed.

"Defendant says that this Court does not have jurisdiction to this cause, for the further reason that the laws of the State of Louisiana, which are applicable to this case, are entirely dissimilar to and indifferent from the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Texas; that the procedure and manner of administering said Compensation Act of Louisiana is wholly different to the procedure and manner of administering the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Texas; that the rights conferred by said Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act are so interwoven with the remedy therein prescribed so that it would be impracticable for the Courts of the State of Texas to administer and attempt to enforce the same; that it is apparent after comparing said Workmen's Compensation Act of Louisiana to the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Texas that the theory and policy upon which the Louisiana Compensation Act is based is contrary to public policy, purposes, objectives and procedure of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Texas, and that by reason of such facts the Courts of the State of Texas ought not and will not attempt to administer and enforce said Act, but will leave the same to be administered and enforced by the Courts of the State of Louisiana.

"Wherefore, defendant prays judgment that this cause be dismissed.

                     "[Signed]  King & Rienstra
                               "Attorneys for defendant."
                

On the 8th day of October, 1935, the lower court heard and sustained this plea by a judgment reciting:

"It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the above styled controversy be and the same is hereby sustained, and said cause is hereby dismissed.

"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the defendant go hence without day and recover its costs in this behalf expended."

A copy of the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act is found in the statement of facts.

Opinion.

On the facts of this case, the adjudicated cases of the Texas courts support the judgment of the lower court. It is an established principle of American jurisprudence that the policy of each state decides whether and to what extent its courts will entertain jurisdiction of transitory actions arising in other jurisdictions under their peculiar statutes. Chambers v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143; Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619, L.R.A.1915F, 955, Ann.Cas.1913D, 568; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hurd (C.C.A.) 108 F. 116, 56 L.R.A. 193.

The public policy of Texas controlling the issues presented by this appeal— that is, whether or not the courts of Texas will entertain a cause of action arising under the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act of Louisiana—was defined and clearly stated by Judge Brown in Mexican National Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857, 860, 31 L.R.A. 276, 59 Am. St.Rep. 28; the doctrine of that case has not been modified by our Supreme Court, but has been generally recognized and enforced by all the courts of the state. The facts of the Jackson Case were as follows: Jackson, an employee of the Mexican National Railway Company, was injured in the Republic of Mexico and brought suit for damages against the railroad company in the district court of Webb county, Tex., which court had jurisdiction of the defendant. In the trial court, the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, based upon allegations similar to the plea in this case, was overruled, and the plaintiff recovered judgment which was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals 32 S.W. 230. The Supreme Court granted a writ of error and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals principally upon the following grounds:

Speaking for the Supreme Court, Judge Brown said:

"The law of Mexico, under which plaintiff's claim originated, having been pleaded and proved by the defendant, the rights of the parties must be determined by its provisions: `It would be as unjust to apply a different law, as it would be to determine the rights of the parties by a different transaction.' Story, Confl.Laws, p. 38. This is a transitory action, and may be maintained in any place where the defendant is found, if there be no reason why the court whose jurisdiction is invoked should not entertain the action. The plaintiff, however, has no legal right to have his redress in our courts; nor is it specially a question of comity between this state and the government of Mexico, but one for the courts of this state to decide, as to whether or not the law by which the right claimed must be determined is such that we can properly and intelligently administer it, with due regard to the rights of the parties. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns.[N.Y.] 134 ; Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow.[N.Y.] 543 . The decisions of this court (well sustained by high authority) establish the doctrine that the courts of this state will not undertake to adjudicate rights which originated in another state or country, under statutes materially different from the law of this state in relation to the same subject. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 9 S.W. 540 ; Texas & P. Railway Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627. Many difficulties would present themselves, in an attempt to determine the meaning of the Mexican law, and to apply it in giving redress to the parties claiming rights under it. * * *

"There are many points of dissimilarity between the laws of Mexico as proved in this case, and the law of this state applicable to the same subject, which we have not mentioned; but those noticed are sufficiently numerous and material to show that the courts of Texas should not undertake to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under those laws for torts committed in that country. Indeed, as we have shown, they could not properly determine the rights of parties arising under those laws. The cases of Texas & P. Railway Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627, and St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 9 S.W. 540 , were actions for damages caused by the death of the injured party, but they were decided upon the same principles that apply to this case; that is, that the courts of Texas will not entertain such actions, if founded upon a law which is materially different from the law of this state. The cases cited are sustained by the weight of authority, and are conclusive of the question in this state."

The following analysis of the Employers' Liability Law of the state of Louisiana (Act La. No. 20 of 1914 as amended), contrasted with the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (V...