Johnson v. Ford Motor Company

• Decision Date: 05 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42134,42134
• Citation: 289 Minn. 388,184 N.W.2d 786
• Parties: , 63 A.L.R.3d 74 R. E. JOHNSON et al., Respondents, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Relator, Commissioner of Department of Manpower Services, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 786

184 N.W.2d 786

289 Minn. 388, 63 A.L.R.3d 74

R. E. JOHNSON et al., Respondents, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Relator Commissioner of Department of Manpower Services Respondent.

No. 42134.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 5, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

In view of the entire record, this court cannot hold that the following findings of the commissioner of employment security (now commissioner of manpower services) are unsupported by substantial evidence:

(1) Claimants for unemployment benefits were or had been employed at a separate 'establishment' within the meaning of Minn.St. 268.09, subd. 1(5).

(2) There was no strike or labor dispute in progress at such establishment during the period of time for which benefits were claimed.

(3) An agreement between employer and claimants' national union acknowledging in effect that when one plant lost time because of the continued strike at other plants, that such time lost would be time lost in the strike would be a waiver of benefits in violation of § 268.17, subd. 1, if intended to disqualify claimants for unemployment benefits.

A local plant where claimants for unemployment benefits were or had been employed did not become a larger 'establishment' within the meaning of § 268.09, subd. 1(5), because of a provision in a national agreement between the employer and claimants' union that wage increases would be withheld and increased benefits further delayed until strikes on local issues at other plants of the employer were terminated, where claimants had no control over the continued strikes on local issues at such plants.

The issue of whether a unit of employment is a separate 'establishment' or part of a larger establishment within the meaning of § 268.09, subd. 1(5), must be determined on all facts relating to the relationship of the claimants to the unit of employment. In view of the entire record, the negotiation and resolution of major but not local labor relations issues on a national and centralized basis does not require that a local plant where claimants are or had been employed be found to be part of a larger establishment.

Where all issues, national and local, had been resolved between claimants and the employer, a provision in the national agreement between the employer and claimants' union that wage increases would be withheld and increased benefits further delayed until strikes on local issues at all of the employer's plants were terminated did not create a strike or labor dispute at the establishment where claimants were or had been employed.

Claimants for unemployment benefits did not become unemployed voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer under § 268.09, subd. 1(1), by reason of an agreement between the employer and claimants' national union acknowledging in effect that when one plant lost time because of the continued strike at other plants, such time lost would be time lost in the strike, where such clause had no real special significance independent of any effect it had on unemployment compensation and where claimants had no control over the continued strike at other plants.

Dorsey, Marquart, Windhorst, West & Halladay and Curtis L. Roy and John C. Zwakman, Minneapolis, for relator.

Douglas Hall, Minneapolis, for R. E. Johnson, and others.

Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., Jerome D. Truhn, Sol. Gen., Peter C. Andrews, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Com'r of Dept. of Manpower Services.

Heard and considered En Banc.

OPINION

KELLY, Justice.

Certiorari to review a determination of the commissioner of employment security (now commissioner of manpower services) holding that claimants were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits.

On September 6, 1967, virtually all of some 101 plants of the Ford Motor Company (hereinafter Ford), including the Twin Cities plant, were struck by United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (hereinafter U.A.W.). A national agreement covering 101 Ford locations was reached on October 22, although at many of the Ford plants local issues remained unsettled. The parties recognized that the national agreement would not settle the strikes on local issues. One of the provisions of the national agreement prohibited strikes and employees continuing to strike on local issues would be in violation of this provision. To resolve this and other problems, section 5 was inserted in the national agreement. Section 5 provided, among other things, that wage increases negotiated in the agreement were to be withheld until the strike was terminated at all locations and that increased benefits, originally to take effect 90 days after the effective date of the new agreement, were to be delayed until 90 days after the termination of all strikes over local issues. These wage increases and increased benefits may be referred to as the fruits of the strike.

In addition, section 5 provided:

'The Company will waive the provisions of the new Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibiting or limiting the right to strike with respect to each plant where the strike continues for the duration of the continuance of the strike at such plant, with the understanding that time lost by employes at other plants in the Contract Unit as a result of such waiver is acknowledged by the parties to be time lost in the strike.'

This quoted provision in effect acknowledged that when one plant lost time because of the continued strike at another plant, such time lost was time lost in the strike. We will hereafter refer to this as the 'time lost clause.'

The national settlement agreement was ratified by the U.A.W. membership on October 25, 1967, and a local agreement between the management of the Twin Cities plant and Local 879 of the U.A.W. was ratified by the local membership on the same date. Although a few employees were called back for the purpose of unloading some railroad cars and working on inventory, resumption of operations at the Twin Cities plant was delayed until November 7, 1967, because of a shortage of parts, apparently resulting from the continued strike at the Monroe, Buffalo, and Cleveland plants. While there seems to be no dispute that the shortage of parts was the reason for the delay in resuming operations at the Twin Cities plant, the commissioner made no specific findings on the cause of the shortage and there is considerable argument and perhaps some 'speculation' presented on this issue. We assume here, without deciding, that the cause of the shortage of parts was a continuing strike over local issues at the three aforementioned plants.

Claimants applied for unemployment compensation benefits. Relator claimed they were disqualified, and the case was tried before an appeal tribunal of the Department of Employment Security (now Department of Manpower Services), which held that claimants were entitled to receive benefits from October 28 to November 7, 1967. On appeal, the commissioner adopted and affirmed the findings of fact and decision of the tribunal.

In essence, relator disputes the finding of the commissioner that the Twin Cities plant is a separate establishment within the meaning of Minn.St. 268.09, subd. 1(5), and the finding that there was no strike or labor dispute in progress at the Twin Cities plant after October 25, 1967. In support of the contention that there was a strike or labor dispute at the Twin Cities plant, relator referred to a part of section 5 of the national settlement agreement in effect acknowledging that when one plant lost time because of a continued strike at another plant, that such time lost was time lost in the strike. In order to sustain such contention, relator had to, and does, dispute the finding of the commissioner that such provision if intended to deprive claimants of unemployment benefits would be a waiver of benefits in violation of § 268.17, subd. 1. These three findings of the commissioner as attacked by Ford frame the issues in this case.

Minn.St. 268.09, subd. 1, provides in part that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

'(1) If such individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment * * *.

'(5) If such individual has left or partially or totally lost his employment with an employer because of a strike or other labor dispute. Such disqualification shall prevail for each week during which such strike or other labor dispute is in progress at the establishment in which he is or was employed * * *. For the purpose of this section the term 'labor dispute' shall have the same definition as provided in the Minnesota labor relations act. Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to deny benefits to any employee who becomes unemployed because of a lockout or by dismissal during the period of negotiation in any labor dispute and prior to the commencement of a strike.'

The Minnesota Labor Relations Act, Minn.St. 179.01, subd. 7, defines 'labor dispute' as follows:

"Labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning employment, tenure or conditions or terms of employment or concerning the association or right of representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms, tenure, or other conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the relationship of employer and employee exists as to the disputants.'

Section 179.01, subd. 8, defines 'strike' as follows:

"Strike' means the temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of two or more employees as a result of a labor dispute.'

The other key statutory provision involved in this case is § 268.17, subd. 1, which provides in part:

'Any agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to benefits or any other rights under sections 268.03 to 268.24 shall be void.'

In reaching a decision in this case we also bear in mind the statutory and case law on the scope of review, burden of proof, the legislative intent with respect to the...