Johnson v. Grissard
| Decision Date | 11 May 1889 |
| Parties | JOHNSON v. GRISSARD |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL from Faulkner Circuit Court, J. W. MARTIN, Judge.
Affirm.
J. H Harrod, for appellants.
The mortgage is so indefinite and uncertain that it conveys nothing against the claims of third persons. 11 N.W. 621.
E. A Bolton, for appellee.
1. The description in the mortgage was sufficient. It could be made definite by extrinsic proof. 79 Ala. 385; 66 Id., 258; 78 Id., 28; 65 Id., 256; 92 U.S. 325; Thomas on Mortg., 55, 56; 65 Ga. 644; Jones Ch. Mortg., 64.
2. No verbal agreement can constitute a lien against a recorded mortgage, not even with a landlord. 5 Heisk. (Tenn.), 210; 43 Miss. 456.
The appellee brought his action in the Faulkner circuit court to recover the value of three hundred pounds of seed cotton and fifty bushels of corn, which he alleged he owned and appellants had converted to their own use in 1884. Appellants answered, denied the ownership of appellee, the conversion by them, and that appellant was damaged. The case was tried by the court sitting as a jury upon the complaint, answer and an agreed statement of facts. The court found for appellee and gave judgment in his favor for $ 63.40. Appellee claimed the property under a mortgage executed to him by T. B. Lawson and recorded in that county on the 6th day of December, 1883. The property is described therein as "All my crop of corn cotton or other produce that I may raise, or in which I may in any manner have an interest, for the year 1884, in Faulkner county, Arkansas," and other property not in controversy in this case. On the trial the appellee offered this mortgage in evidence; the appellants objected upon the ground that "the description of the mortgaged property is indefinite and uncertain, and, against the claims of third parties, gives no lien to plaintiff." The court considered the mortgage in evidence; and found that Lawson raised a crop of cotton and corn on the land of the defendants Johnson & Johnson, in Faulkner county, Arkansas, in 1884; that Lawson paid Johnson & Johnson all the rent due them in 1884; that Grissard's debt due him by Lawson was not paid; that Johnson & Johnson received from and converted to their own use cotton raised by Lawson in Faulkner county, Arkansas, in 1884, of the value of $ 41.95, and corn raised by Lawson of the value of $ 21.46; that they took the cotton and corn sued for here in payment for supplies furnished Lawson, after they had been fully paid all their rent for 1884; that the property so converted was demanded of them by W. H. Grissard before suit and that they refused to deliver it. The only question necessary to consider, and the only one made by appellant's counsel here is, is the description in the mortgage of the property in controversy sufficient? The appellants in the court below asked the court to declare the mortgage was too general, indefinite and uncertain in the description of the property conveyed; that it created no lien against an innocent purchaser for value, who had no notice of it except constructive notice from its registration; that under the facts admitted the lien of appellants is superior to the lien of the appellees; that the law was against the plaintiff and that the defendants were entitled to judgment--all of which were refused by the court. The court of its own motion declared "the law to be for the plaintiff and that his mortgage constitutes a valid lien on the property in controversy and superior to the claim of the defendants." To the refusal to declare the law as asked by the appellants and to the declaration of law made by the court on its own motion the appellants excepted at the time made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and appealed to this court.
The description of the property in the mortgage in controversy in the cause is, "all my crop of corn, cotton or other produce that I may raise, or in which I may have in any manner an interest for the year 1884, in Faulkner county Arkansas." The only question raised here is, is the description so general and indefinite as to avoid the mortgage as to third parties? We have not been able to find that the precise question as to the sufficiency of a description so general and indefinite has been determined in this court. Counsel for appellants contends that "a chattel mortgage ought not to be a drag-net covering a whole county in any such general terms" as was...
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