Johnson v. Holdrege Medical Clinic
| Decision Date | 18 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. A-94-1034,A-94-1034 |
| Citation | 3 Neb.App. 894,534 N.W.2d 340 |
| Parties | Gladys M. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. HOLDREGE MEDICAL CLINIC and Continental Insurance Co., Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. Findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court trial judge are not to be disturbed upon appeal to the review panel unless they are clearly wrong, and if the record contains evidence which substantiates the factual conclusions reached by the trial judge, the review panel should not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial judge. It naturally follows that an appellate court also does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial judge.
2. Workers' Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of fact by the Workers' Compensation Court trial judge, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, and the successful party will have the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible from the evidence.
3. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. With respect to questions of law in workers' compensation cases, an appellate court is obligated to make its own determination.
4. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. The determination of whether a particular activity arises out of and in the course of employment is a factual determination and may not be reversed unless clearly wrong.
5. Workers' Compensation: Words and Phrases: Proof. The term "arising out of" describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising from within the scope or sphere of the employee's job. The term "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. The two phrases are conjunctive and the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that both conditions exist.
6. Workers' Compensation. The general rule is that an injury sustained by an employee while going to and from his work does not arise out of and in the course of his or her employment.
7. Workers' Compensation. Walking on the employer's premises to and from the street and a building where one is employed is a necessary incident of employment, and an injury sustained in so doing is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Dale A. Romatzke, of Ross, Schroeder, Brauer & Romatzke, Kearney, for appellant.
Jay C. Elliott, of Kay & Kay, North Platte, for appellees.
Gladys M. Johnson appeals the Workers' Compensation Court review panel's decision which affirmed the trial judge's denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge found that Johnson failed to show that the injury and accident she sustained arose out of and in the course of her employment with Holdrege Medical Clinic. For the reasons cited below, we affirm.
The record reflects that at the time of trial, Gladys M. Johnson was a 62-year-old woman who had been employed as a therapist technician at Holdrege Medical Clinic for approximately 25 years. Johnson normally worked 36 hours per week at a rate of $6.90 per hour. Johnson's usual work hours were from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.; however, she often went into work at 7 a.m. to "get things straightened out and get ready to go for the day." On November 5, 1991, Johnson left her home at approximately 6:45 a.m. and drove 10 blocks from her home to a city parking lot located near the clinic. The parking lot was approximately 75 to 100 feet from the back entrance of the clinic. Johnson testified that her "normal route" was to park her vehicle in the city lot, cross Fifth Avenue, and then cut across the Home Federal Savings and Loan parking lot to an alley that led to the back entrance of the clinic. Johnson was not required to use the back door, although she usually did so. On the morning of November 5, Johnson stated that after she parked her vehicle in the city lot, she crossed Fifth Avenue and began to walk across the driveway leading to the drive-through window for the Home Federal building. Just as she was going up into the driveway of the Home Federal property, Johnson slipped on some ice and fell, injuring her left elbow. At the point that she fell, Johnson was approximately 50 feet from the edge of the clinic building. Due to her injury, Johnson was unable to work for approximately 3 months. However, she had returned to work at the time of trial.
The clinic maintains a parking lot located immediately behind the clinic. The administrator of the clinic, Thomas Canaday, testified that although employees were allowed to park in this lot at one time, a new parking policy was implemented whereby employees were asked to park elsewhere, since the lot was of limited space and parking was needed for patients and doctors. Although Canaday could not remember the exact date the clinic implemented its parking policy for employees, he testified that it was probably suggested sometime in the early 1980's. At the time the parking policy was implemented Canaday posted a memorandum advising the clinic's employees that they were no longer going to be allowed to park in the clinic's parking lot. A city map that indicated the available areas of public parking was also posted at that time. Canaday testified that the map showed four city parking lots available for employee parking along with various areas for street parking. There was no policy or rule that required the clinic's employees to park in any particular place other than to prohibit them from parking in the clinic's lot. Johnson testified that the lot where she parked was the closest city lot in proximity to the clinic.
Johnson testified that although she had at one time parked in the clinic's parking lot, she had parked in the same city lot as she did the day of her accident since the time that the clinic's employees had been asked to park elsewhere, approximately 10 [3 Neb.App. 897] to 12 years ago. Johnson testified that at the time of her accident, she was aware that she was not required to use the city parking lot she parked in that morning and that there were other places available for her parking use, including other city lots and street parking. Johnson chose that particular city lot, since it was one of the suggested parking places and it was the closest and most convenient for her to park in. Although she primarily used this particular lot for parking, Johnson had also parked in other places when that lot was full.
Johnson's application for benefits was denied by a judge of the Workers' Compensation Court. The trial judge held that Johnson was not entitled to compensation because her accident and injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment with the clinic. On appeal, a review panel affirmed the order of the trial judge.
In her appeal to this court, Johnson's two assignments of error can be summarized into the following: The trial court erred in denying her benefits, since her accident and injury arose out of and in the course of her employment with the clinic.
This court has recently summarized the principles of the standard of review applicable to appellate review of the trial judge's decision in workers' compensation cases in Logan v. Rocky Mountain Rental, 3 Neb.App. 173, 174, 524 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1994):
Findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court trial judge are not to be disturbed upon appeal to the review panel unless they are clearly wrong, and if the record contains evidence which substantiates the factual conclusions reached by the trial judge, the review panel should not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial judge. It naturally follows that an appellate court also does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial judge. See Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co., 2 Neb.App. 703, 513 N.W.2d 361 (1994). When testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of fact by the Workers' Compensation Court trial judge, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, and the successful party will have the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. See Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991). With respect to questions of law in workers' compensation cases, an appellate court is obligated to make its own determination. McGowan v. Lockwood Corp., 245 Neb. 138, 511 N.W.2d 118 (1994).
Johnson argues that the Workers' Compensation Court erred by denying her benefits, since her accident and injury arose out of and in the course of her employment with the clinic. The Workers' Compensation Act provides that "[w]hen personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, such employee shall receive compensation therefor from his or her employer...." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1993). The determination of whether a particular activity arises out of...
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Johnson v. Holdrege Medical Clinic
...in the course of employment, Johnson appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. Johnson v. Holdrege Med. Clinic, 3 Neb.App. 894, 534 N.W.2d 340 (1995). Johnson thereafter petitioned this court for further review. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appea......
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