Johnson v. Johnson

Decision Date20 January 1923
Docket NumberNo. 34756.,34756.
Citation191 N.W. 353,196 Iowa 343
PartiesJOHNSON ET AL. v. JOHNSON.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; J. W. Willett, Judge.

Suit in equity to set aside a deed which conveyed a certain residence property in the city of Marshalltown. The grantor was William S. Johnson and the grantee was his wife, Harriett J. Johnson, defendant herein. The plaintiffs are the sons and only heirs of William S. Johnson, who died shortly after the execution of the deed. There was a cross-bill by the defendant asking to quiet her title. There was a decree dismissing the petition and quieting the title of the defendant. The plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.Lee & Garfield, of Ames, for appellants.

E. N. Farber, of Marshalltown, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

The grounds of attack are: (1) That the grantor lacked mental capacity to make the deed at the time it was made; (2) that the deed was obtained by undue influence and was without consideration.

William S. Johnson married the defendant in June, 1916. He was at that time a widower 77 or 78 years old. His active life had been spent upon a farm which he owned in Story county. Prior to the marriage, the defendant was a maiden lady about 23 years younger than Mr. Johnson, who had engaged in active mercantile business for many years. He was then residing in Marshalltown and she at Emmetsburg. He had lived for a time at the home of her sister, Mrs. Molison, in Marshalltown. After the marriage, they lived for a year or two at Emmetsburg and then removed to Marshalltown, where they occupied as their home the property now in controversy. In the latter part of August, 1919, Johnson became very ill. He was taken to the hospital about September 1st and continued in the care of physicians and nurses constantly from that date until his death on October 21st. The deed in question was executed by him while at the hospital on September 29, 1919. The evidence is sharply conflicting at many points. The two doctors in charge were Molison and Chesire, the first being the attending physician, and the second being the surgeon who was called in to perform certain operations. The plaintiffs examined Molison as a witness in their behalf. The defendants examined Chesire as their witness. Their evidence is far from harmonious. Other witnesses for the respective parties contradict each other sharply. There are, however, certain salient facts of great importance which in the main are quite outside the range of dispute. Dr. Molison was the regular attending physician of the decedent up to October 1st. He had been the decedent's physician for several years. Dr. Chesire was called in consultation on September 1st and performed an operation on September 6th. He continued his visits to the patient up to September 16th, after which date he was absent from the state until September 27th. Dr. Molison visited the patient two or three times every day from the beginning of his illness until October 1st.

It is undisputed that upon September 1st the patient was in a state of coma as a result of his illness. He had been in such condition for several days. He was suffering from nephritis. Whether it was acute or chronic is in dispute. He suffered from prostate trouble. This had reached such a stage as to stop urination. This was supposed to be a cause or partial cause of the nephritis. The coma was the result of uremic poisoning. The use of the catheter was resorted to, but it failed to relieve the trouble. A drainage operation was therefore performed on September 6th. A tube was inserted in the wound and the drainage of the bladder was thereby accomplished. The purpose of this operation was preparatory to a later operation for the removal of the prostate gland. Such second operation was had on October 11th. Two nurses were in charge of the patient, one for the night and one for the day. The defendant also was constantly at the bedside.

The evidence for the plaintiffs tends to show that the mental capacity of the decedent was never restored; that he was in an advanced stage of arterial sclerosis; that he suffered from cerebral hemorrhage; that about September 16th he began to have illusions; that his articulation of speech became impaired; and that regardless of the question of his actual mental capacity, he did not at any time in the circumstances surrounding him have the power to exercise his own free wish and will as against the wish and will of the defendant.

The evidence for the plaintiffs also tended to show that the defendant was the stronger personality, and that during their brief married life she attended the decedent in his business transactions, and that she herself performed much of the business and issued the majority of the checks; that for some time prior to the execution of the deed she had repeatedly requested its execution and had solicited the aid of others in bringing it about; that she employed the decedent's attorney to assist her in that regard; that he came to Marshalltown upon such business at her request; that she was present at every conference between the attorney and the decedent, and was present at the time of the consummation.

The evidence for the defendant tended to show that, after the operation of September 6th, the mind of the decedent cleared up and that his capacity was fully restored and that he acted intelligently in the execution of the deed and in accord with his own wish and will. It also tended to show that he had the benefit of the advice and help of his own legal adviser, who prepared the conveyance.

[1] In view of the undisputed mental incapacity of the decedent at a stage of his illness prior to the execution of the deed, the plaintiffs made a prima facie case and the burden was thereby cast upon the defendant to show the restoration prior to September 29th; and, in view of the decedent's undoubted weakened condition, both mental and physical, and of his own helplessness and utter dependence upon his wife to provide for him, she must be deemed as the dominant personality and as fiduciary at least for the time being. The burden was therefore cast upon the defendant to show, not only the mental capacity of the decedent, but also that the execution of the deed was not the result of the stress of undue influence exercised upon him in his helplessness.

Needless to say that the testimony of the respective doctors is very important. In weighing the same, some incidental matters should be considered. Friction arose between Dr. Molison and the defendant which resulted in his ceasing his connection with the case on October 1st. He is a brother-in-law of the defendant, his wife being her sister. Both he and his wife were witnesses for the plaintiffs and apparently willing ones. There is thereby an indication of personal hostility which materially impairs the weight of the evidence of each. We make due allowance for it in the consideration of the record. On the other hand, Dr. Chesire up to October 1st was not the physician in charge, but was the surgeon who performed the operation. Owing to his absence from the state, he did not see the patient at all from September 16th to September 27th which latter date was on Saturday. The execution of the deed occurred on the following Monday morning. Chesire's opportunity of contact and observation during the two weeks preceding the date of the execution of the deed was not approximately equal to that of Molison. The persons present at the time of the execution were Mrs. Johnson, the defendant, Mr. Underwood, the attorney, Miss Weaver, the stenographer, and Mrs. Woodson, the nurse. Mrs. Woodson is a personal friend of the defendant and was making her home with her at and before the time of the trial. Underwood had been the legal adviser of the decedent. He had been solicited by the defendant upon at least two prior occasions to procure the deed for her. He came to Marshalltown on Sunday, September 28th, at her request and in effect accepted employment by her. All his conferences with the decedent were in her presence. He assumed the role of a scrivener only. He entered a charge upon his books against both the defendant and decedent. He was therefore not representing the decedent as a legal adviser in any respect which could be deemed hostile to the defendant.

The immediate circumstances of the execution are described by the parties present. It appears therefrom that the decedent was propped up with pillows; that Mrs. Woodson supported him on one side and Mr. Underwood on the other; that Underwood adjusted his glasses and held them in place; that the nurse handed him her pen with which he wrote his name quite imperfectly. The same witnesses testified that he read the deed in part, and that he said it was all right, and that he was glad to have it off of his mind. The acknowledgment had been written in advance. This was signed by the notary after the signing by decedent. Formal delivery was then made. The notary handed the deed to Mr. Johnson, and Johnson handed the same to the wife. The testimony of Dr. Molison was that the decedent was suffering from cerebral hemorrhage; that since September 16th he was suffering from delusions; that his power of articulation was greatly impaired and that his tongue and throat were affected; that one of the significant indications of cerebral hemorrhage was the involuntary bowel movements which the patient repeatedly and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Luse v. Grenko
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1959
    ...this connection Woolwine v. Bryant, 244 Iowa 66, 71, 54 N.W.2d 759, 762, a case much like this. This language from Johnson v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 343, 348-349, 191 N.W. 353, 355, may be repeated again: 'It is a rare case where the dominant individual in a fiduciary relation can sustain a gift......
  • First Nat. Bank in Sioux City v. Curran
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1973
    ...N.W.2d 535; In re Guardianship of Munsell, 239 Iowa 307, 31 N.W.2d 360; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N.W. 397; Johnson v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 343, 191 N.W.2d 353. Mrs. Curran contends that since Miss Crosby retained her mental faculties and determination, Mrs. Curran could not be co......
  • Burns v. Nemo
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 20, 1960
    ...other party in mind, and discards any selfish advantage for himself. It is particularly present in family relationships. Johnson v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 343, 191 N.W. 353; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N.W. 397; Woolwine v. Bryant, 244 Iowa 66, 54 N.W.2d Whether or not there was a con......
  • Barber v. Powell
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1957
    ...there is a confidential relation between the grantor of a deed and a grantee who is in a position of dominance. Johnson v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 343, 348-349, 191 N.W. 353; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 528, 284 N.W. 397; Woolwine v. Bryant, 244 Iowa 66, 70-71, 54 N.W.2d 759, 761-762; Dani......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT