Johnson v. O-Kay Turkeys, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 May 1964 |
| Docket Number | O-KAY,No. 40461,40461 |
| Citation | 392 P.2d 741 |
| Parties | Doran JOHNSON, d/b/a Doran Johnson Builder, Plaintiff in Error, v.TURKEYS, INC., a corporation, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A contract is to be interpreted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties at the time of contracting, and, in so doing, the language used governs if it is clear and does not involve and absurdity. The meaning of a contract is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible; the duty of the court being to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not what was intended to be written.
2. To determine the meaning of a written contract the court must look to the whole instrument, having resort to the natural signification of the words used, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them.
Appeal from the District Court of Custer County; W. P. Keen, Judge.
Action by Doran Johnson, d/b/a Doran Johnson Builder, against O-Kay Turkeys, Inc., to recover balance due on construction contract, including additional compensation allegedly due under contract. Lower court sustained demurrer to plaintiff's evidence as to such additional compensation. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Wheeler & Wheeler, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
Meacham, Meacham & Meacham, Clinton, for defendant in error.
The parties occupy the same relative positions in this court as they did in the lower court and will be referred to by name or as plaintiff and defendant.
The plaintiff, Doran Johnson, d/b/a Doran Johnson Builder, instituted this action in the lower court against the defendant, O-Kay Turkeys, Inc., to recover a balance of $22,669.55, alleged to be due plaintiff for the construction of a turkey processing plant pursuant to a written contract with the defendant, and to foreclose a lien that plaintiff had filed against the premises, and for a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendant's answer denied the correctness of the amount claimed by plaintiff to be due and alleged that it had previously tendered to plaintiff the sum of $12,331.59 in full payment of all sums due plaintiff. Defendant also cross-petitioned for $1600, because of alleged improper and incomplete construction on the part of plaintiff, and for a reasonable attorney's fee.
The case came on for trial to a jury. At the completion of plaintiff's evidence the trial judge sustained defendant's demurrer to the evidence and rendered judgment for plaintiff for $12,331.59 (that being the amount tendered by defendant) and made no allowance of any attorney's fee to either party. The journal entry makes no disposition of defendant's cross-petition, but the court minute states the defendant dismissed the same with prejudice.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Plaintiff argues that under the clear terms of the contract he was entitled to the additional compensation, and that if the contract was not clear and unambiguous, then it was a matter to be submitted to the jury.
The record reflects that on April 27, 1961, plaintiff contracted to construct a building for defendant for $167,000 in accordance with plans and specifications. The plans and specifications were not introduced in evidence, but it is obvious from the record that the contract was for the building itself and did not include furnishing and installation of the materials and equipment included in the items of refrigeration, electrical, plumbing, and insulation. This contract designates plaintiff as 'contractor' and has the following provision:
'Contractor will coordinate the work of sub-contractors assigned to him by the Owner and shall receive as compensation therefor five per cent of the amount of each such sub-contract, which compensation shall be in addition to the $167,000 hereinabove set forth.'
The defendant also contracted with four other separate concerns for the materials, equipment, and installation, embraced in the mentioned items in the following amounts: Refrigeration--$139,136.00; Electrical--$26,341.72; Plumbing--$8306.41; and Insulation--$32,975.00; or a total of $206,759.13. Plaintiff contends that under the...
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