Johnson v. Knebel
| Decision Date | 28 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S96G1968,S96G1968 |
| Citation | 485 S.E.2d 451,267 Ga. 853 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 1429 JOHNSON v. KNEBEL, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Jeffrey B. Hanson, Sell & Melton, Mitchel P. House, Macon, for Rhonda Johnson.
Michael G. Gray, Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Perry, Robert Claude Norman, Jr., Wendell Kerry Howell, Jones, Cork & Miller, Macon, for David Knebel.
Certiorari was granted to review the Court of Appeals' ruling that appellee's expert witness could render an opinion at trial as to which of two successive automobile collisions resulted in appellant's personal injuries. The trial court admitted the testimony as the opinion of appellee's expert witness. The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony was admissible as the opinion of a lay witness. For the reasons explained below, we find that the Court of Appeals erred by reviewing the admissibility of testimony accepted by the trial court as expert opinion under the standard applicable to lay opinion testimony. We also find that the opinion testimony offered by appellee's witness was not admissible in the trial court as the opinion of either a lay or expert witness. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
Appellant Johnson suffered a broken leg as the result of two successive automobile collisions that occurred at night. In the first collision, appellee Knebel collided head-on with the car in which Johnson was traveling as a passenger, leaving Johnson trapped in the vehicle as it sat in the road disabled and without lights. While the car sat in this condition, appellee Fitzpatrick collided with the rear of the car. Johnson filed suit against both Knebel and Fitzpatrick, alleging that they were joint tortfeasors. At trial, Fitzpatrick contended that the initial impact, the one involving only Knebel, had caused Johnson's injury, and therefore Fitzpatrick was not liable.
In support of this contention, Fitzpatrick employed an expert accident reconstructionist, Lindsay. During expert qualifying, Lindsay stated his qualifications as a licensed professional engineer with training and experience in accident reconstruction. Even though Lindsay testified that he had been called upon in previous cases to render his opinion as to which of several automobile collisions had caused an injury, he admitted that he had no training, education, or experience with regard to deducing (1) forces and stresses exerted by an automobile collision on a human body within an automobile, or (2) the damage inflicted by such forces on a human body in an automobile. During expert qualifying, Johnson objected to Lindsay stating an opinion concerning the apportionment of Johnson's injuries as beyond the realm of Lindsay's expertise. Nonetheless, over Johnson's renewed objection, during direct examination Lindsay was allowed to state that in his opinion, the first collision, involving Knebel, in all likelihood caused Johnson's injuries. Lindsay testified that in reaching this opinion, he had relied solely upon photographs that showed the damage to the vehicles caused by the collisions.
On cross-examination, Lindsay testified that his expertise enabled him to examine the physical damage caused to vehicles by a collision, and from that examination, determine the forces and severity of impact. Lindsay admitted, however, that it was impossible for him to state with any degree of professional certainty which, if any, of several impacts caused an injury. Rather, Lindsay testified that his review of the photographs permitted him only to form an opinion as to which impact caused an injury. When asked, Lindsay stated that he could not differentiate between his opinion and the opinion of "the common public" as to which of the two impacts in this case caused Johnson's injury. Lindsay also stated that in forming his opinion that the first impact caused Johnson's injuries, he had not performed any tests or calculations, but rather that his opinion was based solely upon his examination of the photographs of the damaged vehicles. The trial court denied Johnson's motion to strike Lindsay's opinion testimony concerning the cause of Johnson's injury, and the jury returned a verdict finding Knebel liable, and Fitzpatrick not liable.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Lindsay's testimony was properly admitted as the opinion of a lay witness:
Johnson contends Fitzpatrick's expert, Mr. Lindsay, was not qualified to give his opinion as to which of the two collisions resulted in her injuries. Pretermitting whether the trial court properly allowed Lindsay to testify as an expert on this subject, the record shows he related the facts upon which he based that opinion, including his review of photographs showing the damage to each vehicle. Because even a lay witness may give his opinion so long as he relates the facts upon which he bases that opinion, Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb, 138 Ga.App. 810, 812(3), 227 S.E.2d 418 (1976), we find no error here. 1
Certiorari was granted in order to review this ruling. For the reasons explained below, we reverse.
1. Properly qualified expert witnesses may render an opinion on any matter within their realm of expertise, so long as it is based upon conclusions drawn by the expert that the jury could not ordinarily determine for themselves. 2 Expert opinions may be based upon facts proved by other witnesses. 3 Lay witnesses, however, may state their opinion only when it is based upon their own observations, and a lay opinion is admissible only when it is necessary in order for the witness to convey those same observations to the jury. 4 The opinion of a lay witness is not admissible when all of the facts and circumstances upon which it is based are capable of being clearly defined, so that the jury may readily reach its own opinion therefrom. 5 Thus, the opinions of lay and expert witnesses are admissible under different circumstances, and for different purposes.
We recognize that in certain situations, an expert witness might be capable of rendering a lay opinion. However, before permitting an expert to give lay opinion testimony, the trial court should take precautionary measures to ensure that the expert does not opine on matters outside the scope of her expertise, when she has no personal knowledge of the underlying facts. 6 This can be achieved by carefully evaluating the admissibility of each type of opinion testimony under the standard applicable to it, and taking measures to ensure that the jury understands which portion of the expert's testimony is given as an expert witness, and which portion is given as a lay witness.
Similarly, in reviewing the admissibility of opinion testimony, an appellate court must assess the testimony in accordance with the appropriate standard. In reviewing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, an appellate court must not use the standard assigned to lay opinion, and vice-versa. In this case, because Lindsay's testimony was admitted by the trial court as expert opinion, the Court of Appeals erred by judging its admissibility pursuant to the standard appropriate for lay witnesses.
2. Even if Lindsay did testify as a lay witness, his opinion would not have been admissible. In its ruling, the Court of Appeals stated that because Lindsay's opinion that the first of the two impacts caused Johnson's injury was based upon his review of the photographs showing the damage to each vehicle, and because even a lay witness may testify as to his opinion so long as he relates his basis for it, Lindsay's testimony was admissible as lay opinion. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon its earlier opinion in Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb. 7 However, in relying upon Webb, the Court of Appeals failed to fully consider that opinion. When Webb is examined in its entirety, it becomes obvious that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard for assessing the propriety of lay opinion testimony.
Even though lay witnesses generally are prohibited from expressing their opinion as to the existence of a fact, 8 the Webb opinion recognizes the long-standing principle that:
when the subject matter of an inquiry relates to numerous facts perceived by the [lay witnesses'] senses, to a series of instances passing under the observation of a witness, or to a variety of circumstances ... which, under the limitations of language, cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury with the same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness, the witness may state his ... opinions based upon the facts and circumstances observed by him. 9
Thus, lay witnesses may relate their opinions as to the existence of a fact, so long as the opinion is based upon the witnesses' own observations, and so long as the witness cannot adequately relate those observations to the jury without also relating a personal opinion formed through such observations. 10
Even this rule, however, has its limitations. As noted above, it is well established that a lay witness cannot state an opinion where the facts upon which that opinion is based are such that they can be clearly described for the jury, and the jury can rely upon those same facts and reach its own opinion. 11 In other words, the jury, being apprised of the same information as the lay witness, when possible will...
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