Johnson v. Lyon

Decision Date14 August 2018
Docket NumberNo. 2:17-cv-124,2:17-cv-124
Citation406 F.Supp.3d 651
Parties William JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Nick LYON, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

David G. Sigale, Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., Glen Ellyn, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Cassandra A. Drysdale-Crown, Jennifer LaChell-Arver Walker, Joshua Sean Smith, MI Dept Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION

Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs in this matter challenge a rule promulgated by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services that mandates how foster parents store firearms in their home. Plaintiffs assert that the rule violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments and seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to have it declared invalid and to enjoin its enforcement. They have sued the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Nick Lyon, in his official capacity.

Now before the Court is Defendant Nick Lyon's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons to be discussed, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs William and Jill Johnson have pleaded a plausible Second Amendment claim. However, Plaintiffs Brian and Naomi Mason will be dismissed from the action for lack of standing, and Counts II and III will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

I. Background

The following discussion of the facts is adapted from Plaintiffs' complaint, and for purposes of the instant motion, must be taken to be true.

A. The Plaintiffs
1. The Johnson Family

William Johnson lives with his wife, Jill Johnson in Ontonagon, Michigan. Mr. Johnson is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps, and he possesses a Michigan Concealed Pistol License. On March 28, 2017, the State of Michigan removed the Johnsons' five-year-old grandson from his mother's custody. A state court then authorized the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to take custody of the Johnson's grandson for care and supervision.

The Department placed the child with the Johnsons in a "relative care placement." Relative care placements are unlike typical foster care because the child is placed with a family member, and the Department does not require that the guardian be a licensed foster parent. However, the Johnsons began the licensing process anyway because the Department asked them if they would be willing to provide foster care to other children too.

When the Johnsons went to pick up their grandson, a caseworker searched Mr. Johnson. The employee demanded to see his concealed-carry license and stated that he would have to provide the serial numbers for any guns that he stored in his home. Mr. Johnson questioned the need to do so, and the caseworker allegedly responded, "If you want to care for your grandson, you will have to give up some of your constitutional rights." The employee declared that there "would not be a power struggle" over the Johnson's grandson—if Mr. Johnson did not comply with the firearm-related requirements, the Department would take the child and place him in a foster home.

Two weeks later, the state court held a hearing to formalize the relative care placement. The judge allegedly said during the hearing, "We know we are violating numerous constitutional rights here, but if you do not comply, we will remove the boy from your home." The Johnsons complied with the Department's requirements and their grandson lived with them from April to August of 2017.

On August 1, 2017, the court ordered that the Johnsons' grandson be returned to his mother's care. But the Johnsons decided to continue with the foster care process even after these interactions with the Department. They received their foster care license on October 23, 2017 and are licensed to foster up to three children. On November 1, 2017, the Johnsons agreed to take a 12-year-old boy into their home as a foster child.

2. The Mason Family

Brian and Naomi Mason also live in Ontonagon, Michigan. Mr. Mason is a pastor with the Ontonagon Baptist Church and the Chair of the Ontonagon County Department of Health and Services Board. Mr. Mason possesses a valid Concealed Pistol License and is NRA-certified as a range officer. The Masons assert that they would become foster parents in Michigan, but they have refrained from doing so because they know that they would not be able to possess loaded, functional firearms in their home.

3. The Second Amendment Foundation

The Second Amendment Foundation is a non-profit corporation, formed and based in Washington. The Johnsons and Masons are members of the SAF. SAF was incorporated with the purpose of advancing the constitutional right to privately own, possess, and bear firearms. It accomplishes its purpose through education, research, publishing, advocacy, and legal action on behalf of its members. The Court notes that SAF has represented its members in two similar suits in federal district court in Illinois and Oklahoma.

B. Rule 400.9415

At issue in this suit is Rule 400.9415 of the Michigan Administrative Code ("Rule 415"), promulgated by the Michigan Department of Health & Human Services. That rule states:

R 400.9415 Hazardous materials. Rule 415.
(1) A foster parent shall follow the agency's hazardous materials policy.
(2) Dangerous and hazardous materials, objects, weapons, chemicals, medication, or equipment that may present a risk to children placed in the foster home shall be stored securely and out of the reach of children, as appropriate for the age and functioning level of the children.
(3) Firearms are subject to the following conditions:
(a) Stored in a locked metal or solid wood gun safe or
(b) Trigger-locked and stored without ammunition in a locked area.
(c) Ammunition shall be stored in a separate locked location.
(d) A handgun shall be registered. Documentation of the registration of the handgun shall be available for review.
II. Posture of the Case and Standard of Review

Plaintiffs filed suit on July 17, 2017, raising three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Department filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in lieu of an answer on September 29, 2017. It asserts that the complaint should be dismissed for one or more of the following reasons: lack of standing, unripe claims, Burford abstention, or for failure to state a valid constitutional claim. The Court held a hearing on June 7, 2018 and indicated that it was treating the instant motion as a motion to dismiss only and would not be considering the motion for summary judgment prior to any formal discovery. The Court also ordered supplemental briefing on the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny for Plaintiffs' Second Amendment claim. The parties timely filed the briefs, and the motion is now ripe for resolution.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing how the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A defendant bringing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint.

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. , 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and the "claim to relief must be plausible on its face" Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim is plausible on its face if the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano , 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. Discussion
A. Justiciability

The Department challenges the justiciability of Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that they lack standing, have not presented ripe claims, and are barred by abstention doctrine. The Department also requests that the Court stay the case due to pending legislation.

1. Standing

Article III courts have limited jurisdiction—they hear "cases or controversies." U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. The requirement that a plaintiff have standing "limits federal court jurisdiction to actual controversies so that the judicial process is not transformed into ‘a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.’ " Coal Operators & Assocs., Inc. v. Babbitt , 291 F.3d 912, 915 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. , 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700, (1982) ). A plaintiff's personal interest in the litigation must exist at the commencement of the suit and throughout the duration of the suit. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

To establish standing, "a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he or she has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and (3) it is likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Ailor v. City of Maynardville, Tenn. , 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

However, an action for a declaratory judgment, like here, is generally brought before a completed injury-in-fact has occurred. The plaintiff bringing the action has standing if he is able to demonstrate...

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