Johnson v. McGinley, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-2359
| Decision Date | 22 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-2359 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | ARMONI MASUD JOHNSON, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT THOMAS MCGINLEY, PA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents |
(Judge Conner)
Petitioner Armoni Masud Johnson ("Johnson") filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment and conviction imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the petition.
On August 7, 2011, Johnson stabbed Justin Barna, an individual who had previously purchased drugs from Johnson. On November 15, 2011, an information was filed in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas charging Johnson with two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal conspiracy, and one count of burglary. Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. CP-40-CR-0002713-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Cty.). On August 6, 2012, Johnson entered a guilty plea. Id. However, on October 12, 2012, the trial court granted Johnson's request to withdraw his guilty plea and the matter proceeded to trial. Id. Prior to the commencement of trial, the Commonwealth withdrew the criminal conspiracy charges. Id. On July 16, 2013, a jury trial commenced. Id. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and not guilty of burglary. Id. On October 11, 2013, the trial court sentenced Johnson to 66 to 156 months' imprisonment, followed by 60 months' special probation, on count one of aggravated assault, and 15 to 60 months' imprisonment on count two of aggravated assault, to run concurrently with count one. Id.
Johnson filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. (Doc. 31-1 at 7-18). On direct appeal, Johnson raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence of prior bad acts; (3) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on a charge of causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury because the Commonwealth did not introduce expert medical evidence to sustain such an instruction; and (4) whether his conviction for aggravated assault was against the weight of the evidence. (Doc. 31-1 at 23). On July 30, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. (Doc. 31-1 at 19-34, Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 2119 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 30, 2015)). On August 28, 2015, Johnson filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 661 MAL 2015 (Pa. 2015). On February 3, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. Id.
On April 12, 2016, Johnson filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq., collaterallyattacking his conviction. Johnson, No. CP-40-CR-0002713-2011. Counsel was appointed to represent Johnson and subsequently submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (en banc). Id. On October 31, 2016, the PCRA court held a hearing regarding the motion to withdraw and the PCRA petition. (Doc. 31-1 at 56-66). The PCRA court ultimately granted the motion to withdraw filed by PCRA counsel and denied the petition. See id. Johnson filed a notice of appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2092 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct.). On August 1, 2017, the Superior Court vacated the PCRA court's decision and remanded the matter for a determination of whether Johnson wished to proceed pro se or whether counsel would be appointed for him. (Doc. 31-3 at 10-15, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2092 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2017)). The Superior Court noted that although "[Johnson's] 'appellate issues are raised in such a confusing, rambling, incoherent fashion as to be devoid of the slightest discernability,'" he appeared to be denied the right to counsel in his PCRA proceedings, thus necessitating remand. (Doc. 31-3 at 12).
On remand, the PCRA court appointed counsel for Johnson. Johnson, No. CP-40-CR-0002713-2011. However, Johnson requested to proceed pro se. The PCRA court held a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), wherein Johnson waived his right to counsel. Id. On December 1, 2017, the PCRA court held a hearing on the petition. (Doc. 31-3 at 20-74, 12/1/17 PCRA Hr'g N.T.). At the hearing, Johnson raised three issues: "ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violation, and after-discovered evidence." (Id. at 72). On January 4,2018, the PCRA court denied the petition. Johnson, No. CP-40-CR-0002713-2011. Johnson filed a notice of appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court raising two issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on a Brady violation/prosecutorial misconduct. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 MDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Ct.). On August 27, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision denying the petition. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2018 WL 4076280 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018). Johnson did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Johnson then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The court construes Johnson's habeas corpus petition as raising the following claims: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) a due process violation because he was unable to obtain notes of hearings; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel had a conflict of interest and failed to raise a Brady violation; and (4) a Brady violation. (Id. at 5-10).
The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). A habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,67-68 (1991). Rather, federal habeas review is restricted to claims based "on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68.
It is first necessary to determine whether Johnson's claims presented in his habeas petition are cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding and whether they have been exhausted in the state courts and, if not, whether the circumstances of his case are sufficient to excuse his procedural default.
The provisions of the federal habeas corpus statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) require a state prisoner to exhaust available state court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. To comply with the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner first must have fairly presented his constitutional and federal law issues to the state courts through direct appeal, collateral review, state habeas proceedings, mandamus proceedings, or other available procedures for judicial review. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351(1989); Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 1996). Moreover, a petitioner must present every claim raised in the federal petition to the state's trial court, intermediate appellate court, and highest court before exhaustion will be considered satisfied. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the exhaustion requirement hasbeen met. Ross v. Petsock, 868 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir. 1989); O'Halloran v. Ryan, 835 F.2d 506, 508 (3d Cir. 1987).
Exhaustion is not a jurisdictional limitation, however, and federal courts may review the merits of a state petitioner's claim prior to exhaustion when no appropriate state remedy exists. Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 1997); Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681; Carter v. Vaughn, 62 F.3d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, a petitioner shall not be deemed to have exhausted state remedies if he has the right to raise his claims by any available state procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
Turning to procedural default, if a petitioner presents unexhausted habeas claims to a federal court, but state procedural rules bar further state court review, the federal court will excuse the failure to exhaust and treat the claims as exhausted. Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2001); Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although deemed exhausted, such claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749 (1991); Lines, 208 F.3d at 160.
A federal habeas court cannot review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner meets one of two exceptions. To satisfy the first exception, a petitioner must show (1) cause for his failure to raise his claim in state court; and (2) prejudice to his case as a result of that failure. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To demonstrate "cause" for a procedural default, the petitioner must show that something "external" to the defense impeded the petitioner's efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Once"cause" has been successfully demonstrated, a petitioner must then prove "prejudice." "Prejudice"...
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