Johnson v. Merritt

• Decision Date: 27 June 1892
• Citation: 50 Minn. 303,52 N.W. 863
• Parties: JOHNSON v MERRITT.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

50 Minn. 303

52 N.W. 863

JOHNSONvMERRITT.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 27, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 231,47 N. W. Rep. 794, followed, to the effect that Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 82, establishes a general rule for computing time, not only in matters of practice, but in the construction of statutes.

Appeal from district court, Itasca county; HOLLAND, Judge.

Action by Archibald Johnson, plaintiff, against D. H. Merritt, defendant, praying that the execution and delivery of a certain mineral land contract by the state of Minnesota to defendant (under Gen. Laws Minn. 1889, c. 22) be decreed unlawful and void, and that the same be assigned and transferred to the plaintiff as a mineral lease. The complaint alleged that a lease of certain mineral lands was issued March 29, 1890, to one Leonidas Merritt, which lease, by its terms, expired March 29, 1891; that this lease was assigned April 10, 1890, to defendant; that on March 30, 1891, at 9 o'clock A. M., plaintiff made application under the statute for a lease of the said lands,-no other lease having then been issued, and defendant's lease, as plaintiff alleged, having expired,-which application was refused; that thereafter, on the same day, there was issued to defendant by the state the mineral contract herein sought to be avoided. March 29, 1891, was Sunday. Defendant demurred to the complaint as not stating a cause of action. From an order sustaining the demurrer, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. S. McClenahan, W. H. Mantor, and

J. W. Pinch, for appellant.

Barr & Catlin, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

This case comes within the decision in Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 231,47 N. W. Rep. 794. The defendant's right to a contract from the state depended not on any terms in the prior lease, but on the terms of the statute, (Laws 1889, c. 22.) The decision in the case referred to was that the rule for computation of time in Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 82, is intended to be a general rule, not only in matters of practice, but in the construction of statutes. By that rule, where the last day on which any act is to be done falls on Sunday, that day is excluded in the computation, and the act may be done on the following day. That was so in this case.

Order affirmed.