Johnson v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 12-00-00348-CV.,12-00-00348-CV.
• Citation: 109 S.W.3d 532
• Parties: Leo JOHNSON, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Betty Johnson, Deceased; Doretha Johnson, Robert Johnson, Leon Johnson, Andrea Johnson, Kenneth Johnson, Chris Johnson and Steve Johnson, Appellants, v. NACOGDOCHES COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

109 S.W.3d 532

Leo JOHNSON, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Betty Johnson, Deceased; Doretha Johnson, Robert Johnson, Leon Johnson, Andrea Johnson, Kenneth Johnson, Chris Johnson and Steve Johnson, Appellants, v. NACOGDOCHES COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital, Appellees.

No. 12-00-00348-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Tyler.

July 25, 2001.

Rehearing Overruled August 21, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David R. Weiner, Dallas, for appellants.

William D. Guidry, Nacogdoches, for appellees.

Panel consisted of DAVIS, C.J., WORTHEN, J., and GRIFFITH, J.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

Leo Johnson, individually and as representative of the estate of his wife, Betty Johnson, and their children, Doretha, Robert, Leon, Andrea, Kenneth, Chris, and Steve, appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of Nacogdoches County Hospital District d/b/a Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital in their wrongful death and survival action against the Hospital. In two issues, the Johnsons assert that the trial court erred in granting the Hospital's motion for summary judgment because the Texas Tort Claims Act's notice provision does not apply to their federal cause of action and because there is an issue of material fact regarding whether the Hospital had actual notice of their claim. Because we conclude the summary judgment evidence raised a fact question on the issue of actual notice, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

Betty Johnson went to the Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital emergency room because she had suddenly become very ill. After about twenty minutes, she was seen by a nurse. After another forty to forty-five minutes, she left the Hospital because she felt she was not going to be seen by a doctor. She went to Nacogdoches Medical Center.¹ After being there for some time without medical attention, she left and went to a third medical facility. That clinic arranged for her to be taken to a hospital in Center, Texas from which she was care flighted to a Tyler hospital. There she died of meningitis.

The Johnsons sued the Hospital for violations of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), which requires appropriate medical screening of an emergency room patient, and section 241.027 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, governing the transfer of patients between hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp.2000); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027 (Vernon 2001). The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment explaining that it is a governmental unit which enjoys sovereign immunity and, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, it is entitled to receive notice of a claim against it not later than six months after the incident the claim is based on. Betty Johnson went to the Hospital on January 12, 1998, but the Hospital did not receive written notice of the claim against it until August 12, 1998. The Hospital also asserted that it did not have actual notice of the claim within six months of the incident. Therefore, it claimed entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The Hospital relied on an affidavit of its administrator, in which he stated that notice was received on August 12, 1998 and that the Hospital did not have actual knowledge of the claim prior to that date. The Hospital also presented deposition testimony from each of the plaintiffs in which they stated that they did not ever contact anyone at the Hospital about this case.

The Johnsons asserted in their response that EMTALA, their federal cause of action, does not have a notice requirement and, since federal law preempts state law, they were not required to give notice of the EMTALA claim. They also argued that the notice requirement of the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply to their Texas Health and Safety Code cause of action. Further, they asserted that the hospital had actual notice of their claim within six months of the incident. For this assertion, the Johnsons relied on an affidavit of Helena Abdullah, a director of the Hospital, in which she states that, in January 1998, she was made aware that Betty Johnson had gone to the emergency room, had not been provided an examination or treatment, went to a different facility, and subsequently died. She also stated that she "was made aware of the issue of the potential liability" of the Hospital for Betty Johnson's death. She asked a nurse manager to look into the matter for her. The trial court found an absence of a genuine issue of any material fact on the grounds urged and granted the Hospital's motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To obtain a summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id.

Summary judgment for a defendant is proper when the summary judgment evidence negates an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of law or conclusively establishes all elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. See Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.1990). Once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-movant to produce controverting evidence raising a fact issue as to the elements negated. Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.1970); Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Constr. Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW

In their first issue, the Johnsons contend that the trial court erred in granting the Hospital's motion for summary judgment because the notice-of-claim requirement of the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply to their EMTALA cause of action. Specifically, they argue that because the notice requirement is a state procedural provision, not a substantive provision, it is inapplicable in a suit brought pursuant to a federal statute.

The Hospital asserts that EMTALA does not preempt state law. It contends that the Texas Tort Claims Act applies, and because the Johnsons did not provide it with timely notice of their claim, the entire cause of action fails, including the EMTALA claim.

The Johnsons rely on Parrish v. Brooks, 856 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1993, writ denied). In Parrish, the Texarkana Court of Appeals stated that the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice provision of the Texas Tort Claims Act did not foreclose the plaintiffs' EMTALA cause of action because the state notice requirement is procedural, not substantive. Id. at 526. Relying on a federal district court case, Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc., 709 F.Supp. 853 (S.D.Ind.1989), the Texarkana court determined that federal procedure must be followed. Parrish, 856 S.W.2d at 526. Opinions of sister appellate courts do not set precedent and we are not required to follow them. Eubanks v. Mullin, 909 S.W.2d 574, 576 n. 1 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding). Because we determine that Reid is distinguishable, we decline to follow Parrish. In Reid, the federal district court determined that a state statutorily imposed procedural requirement did not apply to a federal cause of action brought in a federal court. Reid, 709 F.Supp. at 854-55. Here, we are concerned with the applicability of a state law of procedure to a federally created cause of action tried in state court.

Generally, when substantive federal claims are raised in state court, state law and rules still govern the manner in which the federal questions are tried and proved. See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding); Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1990) (on reh'g); Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Owens, 951 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). The federal statute at issue does not require an exception to this general rule. EMTALA's preemption provision provides: "The provisions of this section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd...