Johnson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., Civil Case No. 2013 CA 001107 B
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. 2013 CA 001107 B |
| Parties | WILLIE F. JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | D.C. Superior Court |
Calendar II
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation's ("Amtrak's") Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff Willie F. Johnson's opposition, and Amtrak's reply thereto. Johnson brings a negligence claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA")1 for Amtrak's failure to properly lubricate a hand thrown switch and its failure to provide a safe walkway. Amtrak moves for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Johnson failed to establish a standard of care for the lubrication of switches in a rail yard and for sloped ballast in an area near a hand thrown switch as it relates to walkways; (2) Johnson failed to establish a causal link between Amtrak's conduct and Johnson's injury; and (3) Johnson's claim of lost wages requires speculation and is not reasonably certain. Johnson responds that the proffered expert testimony sufficiently establishes both a standard of care and a causal link, and the determination of lost wages remains a question for the jury. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Amtrak's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Johnson worked for Amtrak as a Class 4 Engineer until November 27, 2010. Johnson's job duties included the throwing of switches for the adjustment of tracks to facilitate trains entering and exitng the Amtrak Ivy City Maintenance Facility Annex. Johnson alleges that on February 19, 2010, he attempted to throw switch #944, and the handle jammed This allegedly resulted in acute lumbar and left leg pain Johnson claims that when he felt the pain, he took a few steps backward, slipped and fell from the ballast (gravel/broken stone) down an embankment and into a ravine (the area at the bottom of an embankment), suffering injury to his hip and lower back.
On March 8, 2010, Johnson sought treatment from William Tanner, M.D., a primary care physician at Patient First for injuries sustained following the accident. Dr. Tanner referred Johnson to an orthopedist, Michael J. Magee, M.D., for his hip and lower back pain. During Johnson's March 10, 2010 visit, Dr. Magee made the following notation: "[Johnson] fell on the snow a couple of weeks before this." Plaintiff's Exhibit L at 107. Dr. Magee further noted that Johnson showed "[m]ild tenderness to palpitation near the left S1 joint." Id. During a subsequent office visit on April 7, 2010, Dr. Magee noted a left hip contusion and lower back pain and continued Johnson with physical therapy. Johnson underwent eight weeks of physical therapy, from February 2010 to April 2010, for treatment of his injuries.
On August 20, 2010, Johnson returned to Dr. Magee after he became symptomatic again. Dr. Magee referred Johnson to an orthopedic surgeon, Leonid Seyla, M.D., who practices in the same office as Dr. Magee, and sent Johnson for an MRI study of his lumbar spine. Johnson visited Dr. Seyla in September 2010 and January 2011. Johnson ceased treatment with Dr. Seyla for approximately nine months, but commenced treatment again in October 2011 because of"new and aggressive pain." Dr. Seyla recommended surgery to relieve Johnson's symptoms after performing additional radiology studies, which showed no change in Johnson's condition. Johnson underwent a spinal fusion in December 2011 for his back injuries.
Amtrak alleges that Johnson's need for surgery resulted from an injury unrelated to his employment with Amtrak because Johnson's employment with Amtrak ceased in November 2010. Amtrak further contends that because Amtrak did not employ Johnson during the nine-month period of non-treatment, no casual link exists between the February 19, 2010 accident and the pain that Dr. Seyla described as "new and aggressive."
Johnson counters that his on-the-job injury on February 19, 2010, necessitated the surgery and that he remained in "full remission" during the nine-month period of non-treatment. Moreover, he proffers the deposition of Dr. Seyla, who provides that the February 2010 incident led to Johnson's surgery.
The parties dispute the amount of time Johnson missed from work while an employee of Amtrak. Johnson first received work restrictions in October 2011, after his employment with Amtrak had ended. In addition, Johnson could not work from December 19, 2011-June 12, 2012, because of the spinal fusion surgery. Amtrak contends that Johnson missed no work due to his alleged injuries, and Johnson contends he missed work while undergoing physical therapy. Moreover, the parties dispute why Johnson's employment ended in November 2010. Johnson contends that Amtrak terminated him, and Amtrak contends that Johnson left willingly.
Dr. Seyla opined that Johnson reached maximum medical improvement in June 2012, and could return to Amtrak. Johnson currently works as a bus driver. Amtrak contends that Johnson has no intention of returning to Amtrak, although physically capable to do so. Johnson rebutsthis claim by providing the expert testimony of Dr. Charles Kincaid, who opined that Johnson remains non-competitive in performing his past relevant work as a Class 4 Engineer.
Amtrak now moves for summary judgment, claiming that Johnson failed to establish a standard of care for a jury to determine liability, Johnson failed to establish a causal link between Johnson's injuries and Amtrak's conduct, and Johnson failed to provide sufficient proof of lost wages.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate, based upon the pleadings, discovery, and any affidavits or other materials submitted, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and that the movant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grant v. May Dep't Stores Co., 786 A.2d 580, 583 (D.C. 2001); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). A trial court considering a defendant's motion for summary judgment must view the pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits or other materials in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may grant the motion only if a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff as a matter of law. Grant, 786 A.2d at 583 (citing Nader v. De Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C. 1979)); Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 817, 819 (D.C. 1995). Furthermore, the court must take care to avoid weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or substituting its judgment for that of the jury. See Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1263 (D.C. 1979).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. If the moving party carries its initial burden, then the non-moving party assumes the burden of establishing that there is a genuine issue of materialfact in dispute. Grant, 786 A.2d at 583 (citing O'Donnell v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 645 A.2d 1084, 1086 (D.C. 1994)). The non-moving party may not simply rest on conclusory allegations or denials of the movant's pleadings to establish that a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Boulton v. Inst. of Int'l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 502 (D.C. 2002); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e). Rather, to avoid conceding a fact, the non-moving party must come forward with a response showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). Moreover, general hearsay assertions of others cannot create a factual dispute that survives a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Burleson v. Burleson, 277 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C. 1971); Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Tsehaye v. William C. Smith & Co., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 185, 195 (D.D.C. 2005); Hussain v. Principi, 344 F. Supp. 2d 86, 100 (D.D.C. 2004). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see Boulton, 808 A.2d at 502; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160-61.
FELA is a broad remedial statute that must be construed liberally to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949). Importantly, the language of 45 U.S.C. § 51, which provides damages for injury caused "in whole or in part from the negligence . . . of such carrier," is accompanied by case law that emphasizes the relaxed standard of causation for negligence cases under FELA. Therefore, FELA applies a relaxed burden ofproof for plaintiffs bringing FELA claims. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-543 (1994). As the court held in Gottshall, "[under FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought ..." See Fogg v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 585 A.2d 786, 790 (D.C. 1991) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957)).
The Supreme Court has outlined the duty of the judiciary in examining a FELA claim:
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or death due 'in whole or in part' to its negligence.
Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506-07. The Court has...
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