Johnson v. Neal

Decision Date15 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 20851,20851
Citation187 W.Va. 239,418 S.E.2d 349
PartiesRandall L. JOHNSON, Administrator of Estate of Regenia Gayle Johnson, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Tommy NEAL and Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants Below, Appellants.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Where in a suit for the recovery of uninsured motorist insurance benefits an issue arises which involves insurance coverage, that issue is to be resolved under conflict of laws principles applicable to contracts." Syllabus Point 1, Lee v. Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.E.2d 345 (1988).

2. "The provisions of a motor vehicle policy will ordinarily be construed according to the laws of the state where the policy was issued and the risk insured was principally located, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." Syllabus Point 2, Lee v. Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.E.2d 345 (1988).

David M. Kersey, Brewster, Morhous & Cameron, Bluefield, for appellee.

Dwayne E. Cyrus, Law Offices of Ben B. White, Jr., Princeton, for appellant, Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

PER CURIAM:

Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Mercer County holding that the insurance company's potential liability to Randall L. Johnson, the Administrator of the Estate of Regenia Gayle Johnson, was $250,000, an aggregated uninsured motorist benefit, rather than $100,000, the stated policy benefit. The circuit court interpreted the insurance policy under West Virginia law, which allows the stacking of certain insurance benefits when multiple premiums are paid. On appeal, the insurance company argues that the circuit court erred in failing to interpret the policy under Virginia law, which allows a policy to prohibit the stacking of benefits. Because we find that the policy should have been interpreted under Virginia law, we reverse the order of the circuit court.

Regenia Johnson, a Virginia resident, died shortly after she was involved in a head on collision on September 17, 1988, at approximately 1:30 a.m. The accident occurred in West Virginia when Tommy Neal, a West Virginia resident, drove in the wrong direction on a four lane road at a high rate of speed without headlights. Because Mr. Neal did not carry motor vehicle liability insurance, he is considered an "uninsured motorist" under Ms. Johnson's insurance.

Ms. Johnson was insured under a Virginia Farm policy issued to Eleanor B. Johnson, Ms. Johnson's mother. The policy includes uninsured motorist coverage for three separate automobiles, all of which are registered and licensed in Virginia. The policy provides the following uninsured motorist coverage: $100,000 per person/$300,000 per occurrence for a 1988 Oldsmobile, the involved automobile (premium $11), $100,00/$300,000 for a 1984 Chevrolet (premium $10) and $50,000/$100,000 for a 1974 Dodge (premium $9). 1 The policy included an anti-stacking provision to limit the coverage to the amount specified for each car. 2

The insurance company, a Virginia company, has its principal place of business in Virginia and issues policies only to Virginia residents. The policy was written and issued in Virginia although the insurance company acknowledges that coverage applies to any accident that occurs within the United States and Canada and that the policy shall be construed to comply with compulsory insurance laws of other states.

Randall L. Johnson, Ms. Johnson's administrator, filed suit in West Virginia against Mr. Neal and Virginia Farm. Mr. Johnson, contending that the insurance policy should be interpreted under West Virginia law, sought summary judgment to entitle him to collect from the insurance company for any judgment rendered against Mr. Neal up to $250,000, the stacked or aggregate uninsured motorist benefit for the three insured vehicles. The insurance company also sought summary judgment contending that the contract should be interpreted under Virginia law, which would limit the insurance company's liability to $100,000, the policy benefit. The circuit court granted Mr. Johnson's motion by determining that because West Virginia law applied, Virginia Farm's potential liability was $250,000. Count 1 of the complaint against Mr. Neal remains pending in circuit court.

On appeal Virginia Farm company argues that the circuit court erred in holding that its insurance contract should be interpreted under West Virginia law because the insurance contract was issued in Virginia by a Virginia company to a Virginia resident. Because we agree that the circuit court should have interpreted this insurance contract under Virginia law, we reverse the decision of the circuit court.

I

On appeal, the only issue is whether the validity of the policy's prohibition against the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage is determined by the law of West Virginia, the situs of the accident, or of Virginia, the situs of the insurance policy and the residence of the insured. In West Virginia, the policy's prohibition against the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage is void. See Syllabus Point 3, in part, State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Youler, supra n. 1 ("[s]o-called 'antistacking' language in automobile insurance policies is void under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) ..."). However, Virginia allows the antistacking language of an insurance contract to bar the stacking of uninsured motorist benefits for the multiple vehicles listed on a policy. See Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 971, 275 S.E.2d 625, 628 (1981) (the "policy ... is clear and unambiguous and requires the construction that stacking is not permissible"); Mitchell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 227 Va. 452, 318 S.E.2d 288 (1984).

In Lee v. Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.E.2d 345 (1988), we discussed a conflict of laws issue involving uninsured motorist insurance. In Lee, we first reviewed the nature and scope of uninsured motorist insurance and concluded that "uninsured motorist cases may raise questions of both tort and contract law." Lee id., 179 W.Va. at 766, 373 S.E.2d at 349. We noted that the contract questions include coverage, enforceability of exclusionary clauses and applicable limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Lee id. Based on our analyses, we concluded in Syllabus Point 1, Lee:

Where in a suit for the recovery of uninsured motorist insurance benefits an issue arises which involves insurance coverage, that issue is to be resolved under conflict of laws...

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