Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co.

• Citation: 558 F.2d 841
• Decision Date: 24 June 1977
• Docket Number: NEKOOSA-EDWARDS,76-1819,P,A,Nos. 76-1686,AFL-CI,s. 76-1686
• Parties: 14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1658, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7597 Linda JOHNSON and United Paperworkers International Union,ppellants, v.PAPER COMPANY, Appellee. Linda JOHNSON and United Paperworkers International Union,laintiffs, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, v. NEKOOSA PAPERS, INC. (Ashdown, Arkansas), Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 841

558 F.2d 841

14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1658, 14 Empl. Prac.

Dec. P 7597

Linda JOHNSON and United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO, Appellants, v. NEKOOSA-EDWARDS PAPER COMPANY, Appellee.

Linda JOHNSON and United Paperworkers International Union,

AFL-CIO, Plaintiffs, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, v. NEKOOSA PAPERS, INC. (Ashdown, Arkansas), Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 76-1686, 76-1819.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 17, 1977.

Decided June 2, 1977.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 24, 1977.

Pamela D. Walker, on brief, Little Rock, Ark., for appellants in case No. 76-1686.

Gerald D. Letwin, EEOC, Washington, D. C., for appellant, EEOC, in case No. 76-1819.

LeRoy Autry, on brief, Texarkana, Ark., for appellee in case No. 76-1686 and case No. 76-1819.

Abner W. Sibal, Gen. Counsel, Joseph T. Eddins, Associate Gen. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, and Marian Halley, Attys. of EEOC, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.

Before CLARK, Associate Justice, Retired, ^* GIBSON, Chief Judge, and HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

This action was filed by Linda Johnson and the United Paperworkers International Union against Nekoosa Papers, Inc., alleging the existence of sex discrimination in its employment practices at Nekoosa's Ashdown, Arkansas, facilities. The named plaintiffs sought to represent a class including all past and present female employees and all female job applicants who were denied employment opportunities because of their sex. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was allowed to intervene. The District Court initially certified the class to include only present employees but later decertified the class entirely and ruled that "the EEOC may not expand the scope of this action beyond that which the Plaintiffs are permitted to pursue." ¹ The District Court's decision to decertify the class and to limit the scope of the EEOC's intervention is challenged in this consolidated appeal. ²

Prior to bringing this action, Johnson and the Union had filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that "(f)emale employees have been denied job opportunities, wages and fringe benefits because of their sex, including but not limited to the treatment of maternity conditions by the employer." ³ After an investigation, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that Nekoosa discriminated against women in violation of Title VII with respect to maternity benefits, job opportunities and wages. The EEOC issued its determination of probable cause on June 19, 1974, and indicated that an EEOC representative would be in contact with each party in the near future to begin conciliation. In early August, 1974, the attorney for Nekoosa contacted the EEOC by letter and telephone seeking to expedite the conciliation process. The EEOC did not respond to Nekoosa's overtures. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Johnson and the Union at their request on August 19, 1974. This action was filed on September 9, 1974.

I.

We first consider the threshold question of whether we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the order of the District Court denying class certification. Under the circumstances of this case we hold that the order is not appealable and, therefore, dismiss the appeal in No. 76-1686.

As this Court recently noted, "nearly every court which has considered the question has found that a discretionary order refusing to certify a class is not in itself appealable." In Re Piper Aircraft Dist. Sys. Antitrust Lit., 551 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1977). Appeals have been permitted, however, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the denial of class certification as a practical matter sounds the death knell of the action, Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1108 (8th Cir. 1977); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120-121 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035, 87 S.Ct. 1487, 18 L.Ed.2d 598 (1967); or under the collateral order doctrine when the issue is "too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated;" Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171-172, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); and under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) when the denial of class certification narrows the scope of injunctive relief available. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).

The death knell doctrine is not applicable in this case because the District Court has permitted the joinder of seventeen individual plaintiffs and has allowed the EEOC to intervene, thus making it likely that the action will proceed even though certification is not granted. Moreover, the action is brought under Title VII which provides attorney fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This significantly undercuts the economic rationale for the death knell doctrine. See Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 368, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 125, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 47, 46 L.Ed.2d 46 (1975); Hackett v. General Host Corporation, 455 F.2d 618, 622-623 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 2460, 32 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972).

The collateral order exception is not applicable because the order decertifying the class fails to satisfy the tests set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra. See also 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 110.10, at 133 (2d ed. 1975). The order denying class certification does not present a separate and collateral issue because whether or not the class should have been certified involved a consideration of the merits of the entire action. See In Re Piper Aircraft Dist. Sys. Antitrust Lit., supra at 217; Share v. Air Properties G. Inc., 538 F.2d 279, 284 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923, 97 S.Ct. 321, 50 L.Ed.2d 290 (1976). Nor is a question of general significance presented here. Instead, the decision of the District Court denying certification of the class depended upon the narrow facts of the case. A final reason that review of class certification is inappropriate under the collateral order exception is that it can usually be examined on appeal from final judgment. Williams v. Mumford, supra at 368; Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 (3rd Cir. 1974).

Even if we were to extend the injunction exception and allow appeals from orders denying class certification, it would not be applicable here. A number of Circuits have permitted appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) when the denial of class certification narrows the scope of injunctive relief available if the plaintiff later prevails on the merits. Jones v. Diamond,supra; Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1974); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972); Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933, 83 S.Ct. 1538, 10 L.Ed.2d 690 (1963). ⁴ The Eighth Circuit has not yet decided whether to extend the injunction exception to permit appeals from class certification orders, Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 529 F.2d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1976), nor do we need to reach that issue since only one of the two requirements for its application has been satisfied here. The first requirement is that "the plaintiff's prayer for an injunction must constitute the heart of the relief he seeks." Jones v. Diamond, supra at 1095. The second is that "the practical result of the order denying the proposed class must be to deny the requested broad injunction." Id. at 1096. It is the latter requirement that is not satisfied here. Because we are permitting the EEOC to intervene upon a broad basis, the class will in effect be represented, see Part II, infra, and the scope of relief available will be as broad as if the class had been certified.

Since none of the exceptions discussed above apply, the order of the District Court refusing to certify the class is not appealable. Accordingly, the appeal in No. 76-1686 is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ⁵

II.

We next consider whether the District Court properly held that the EEOC may not expand the scope of the action beyond that of the charge filed by the plaintiffs with the EEOC. The District Court certified the following questions to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). ⁶

1. Whether the Commission's suit in intervention properly enlarges the scope of the private plaintiffs' suit so as to include all forms of discrimination described in the Commission's Determination of Plaintiffs' underlying charges.

2. Whether the Court properly held that "the EEOC may not expand the scope of this action beyond that which the Plaintiffs are permitted to pursue" in view of the fact that the EEOC had not prior to the filing of its Motion to Intervene endeavored "to eliminate any such alleged, unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" as required by § 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) and that the EEOC had not as required by its rules, 29 CFR § 1601-23 (1974), notified the Defendant in writing "that such efforts have been unsuccessful and will not be resumed except on the Respondent's written request within the time specified in such notice."

3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in permitting the EEOC to intervene in this action in view of the fact that the EEOC had not, prior to the filing of its Motion for Intervention, endeavored to eliminate any alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion as required by § 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) and that the EEOC had not, as required by its own rules, 29 CFR § 1601-23 (1974), notified the Defendant, in writing "that such efforts have been unsuccessful and will not be...