Johnson v. Orcutt
| Decision Date | 28 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 6656,6656 |
| Citation | 92 Ariz. 295,376 P.2d 557 |
| Parties | W. Donald JOHNSON and Georgianna M. Johnson, his wife, Appellants, v. Herbert D. ORCUTT, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Moore & Romley, Phoenix, for appellants.
Fennemore, Craig, Allen & McClennen, Phoenix, for appellee.
RUSKIN LINES, Judge.
Plaintiffs, W. Donald Johnson and Georgianna M. Johnson, brought this action against defendant, herbert Orcutt, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Georgianna M. Johnson as the result of an automobile collision on State Route 84, approximately 24 miles northwest of Tucson. In the lower court the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant and judgment was entered thereon. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment and from the order denying their motion for a new trial.
The evidence discloses that in the early morning hours of July 29, 1955, Georgianna Johnson was riding as a passenger in a Buick automobile owned and driven by Herbert Orcutt. They were returning from Tucson to their homes in Phoenix. At about 2:00 A. M., when they were approximately 24 miles north of Tucson, Orcutt attempted to pass a truck traveling in the same direction. He drove his automobile to the left side of the right-of-way and alongside the truck. When he was alongside the truck a large sheet of water from the truck's wheel hit the windshield of Orcutt's automobile, causing him to veer to the right and collide with the truck.
At the place where the accident occurred, State Route 84 is a dual, divided, four lane highway. That portion of the roadway upon which Orcutt and the truck were proceeding is the northbound two lanes of this highway, which is the older portion of the highway and formerly accommodated traffic both ways from Phoenix to Tucson, via either Casa Grande or Coolidge. This roadway, which is now one-way northbound, is approximately 24 feet in width, with many dips and small holes.
Orcutt had been traveling at about 45 miles per hour prior to his attempt to pass the truck. In attempting to pass he testified that he increased his speed to 50 to 55 miles per hour and moved to the left half of the highway. The truck was entirely on the right half--to the right of the white lines separating the highway into two lanes. Orcutt swerved to the right, crashing into the truck at its left rear wheels. The car continued to travel, sometimes on and sometimes off the pavement, and hit a concrete wall of a culvert and finally came to rest 401 feet from the point of collision with the truck.
Plaintiffs' first assignment of error is that the court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability made at the conclusion of all the evidence. In reviewing the complete transcript of testimony taken in this case, it appears that the trial court did not err in this respect. We believe the record amply indicates that there was a sufficiency of evidence from which, either directly or by making reasonable inferences, reasonable men could have reached the same conclusion reached by the jury and the trial court.
Plaintiffs assert that it was Orcutt's duty to ascertain that he could pass safely before attempting the action; that he was bound to drive at a reasonable and prudent rate of speed under the circumstances. In their brief they lay heavy emphasis on the fact that it was raining heavily, that there were 'chuck holes' and depressions in the highway, and that the defendant knew that he should drive at less than ordinary speed and that he would have to travel at between 50 and 55 miles per hour to pass the truck, this speed being in violation of the prima facie maximum speed limit.
We have no argument with the abstract legal principles concerning the duty to not pass until safe or the duty to drive at a reasonable and prudent rate of speed. It is with plaintiffs' interpretation of the evidence that we quarrel. The evidence is such, that the jury could have found that Orcutt met these duties. For example, the fact, if it be one, that Orcutt 'knew' he had to drive at less than ordinary speed, or that he 'knew' he had to go over the speed limit to pass the truck are conclusions from other facts which are the sole prerogative of the jury and which were, as evidenced by the verdict, resolved against the theory advanced by plaintiffs.
There is credible testimony that it was not raining heavily; there is testimony by the officer who investigated the accident that he could not determine the exact speed of Orcutt's vehicle nor could he say whether he was going faster or slower than 50 miles per hour, the posted limit. Orcutt's testimony was to the effect that he was going 50 or 55 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The testimony of...
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...drawn from those facts, this court has held it will not substitute its opinions for the findings of the trial court. Johnson v. Orcutt, 92 Ariz. 295, 376 P.2d 557 (1962); Van Emden v. Becker, 6 Ariz.App. 274, 431 P.2d 915 (1967). This rule is founded upon the theory that the trial court, ha......
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