Johnson v. Pinckard & Lay
| Decision Date | 11 May 1916 |
| Docket Number | 7 Div. 768 |
| Citation | 196 Ala. 259,72 So. 127 |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHNSON et al. v. PINCKARD & LAY et al. |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Etowah County; W.W. Whiteside Chancellor.
Bill by R.W. Johnson and E.M. Johnson against Pinckard & Lay and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
J.M Miller, of Gadsden, for appellants.
George D. Motley, of Gadsden, for appellees.
The submission of this cause in the court below was on the amended bill and on the answer, only. The decree entered by the chancellor gave effect to his conclusion that the complainants (appellants) did not discharge the burden of proof assumed by, and resting on, them under the allegations of the amended bill.
The bill's object was to cancel a mortgage and a deed purporting to have been executed by R.W. Johnson and his wife, E.M. Johnson. The land was the property of R.W Johnson. The amended bill's averments presented two theories (in the alternative, we will assume for the occasion) under which the cancellations sought were asserted to be complainants' due, viz.: (a) Mental incapacity of R.W. Johnson to enter into or to execute these contracts; and (b) undue influence imposed upon R.W. Johnson wherefrom the contracts in question resulted. Since the law presumes every one sane until the contrary appears, and since these complainants made no proof of R.W. Johnson's mental incapacity at the time of their consummation or execution of the contracts, it is manifest that the complainants were not entitled to the relief sought as upon the theory that Johnson was mentally incapacitated to contract. Rawdon v Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 So. 689; Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 546, 49 So. 223.
The fact that the answer was but a general denial of the matters charged in the amended bill cannot avail the complainants. The rule--stated in Moog v. Barrow, 101 Ala. 209 212, 13 So. 665, and in Prestridge v. Wallace, 155 Ala. 540, 544, 46 So. 970, among other decisions delivered here--that where a material matter is charged in the bill, which prima facie is within the peculiar knowledge of the respondent, and the answer is only a general denial, the matter so charged must be considered as admitted, has no application to a case where the matter charged is not within the peculiar knowledge of the respondent so charged. City of Mobile v. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 407, 41 So. 468; ...
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Morrison v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans
... ... action. Setting up facts which show a bona fide transaction, ... thus negativing the averments of the bill, is sufficient ... Johnson et al. v. Pinckard & Lay, 196 Ala. 259, 72 ... But, ... where the facts are prima facie within the peculiar knowledge ... of the ... ...
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Gillis v. Smith
...a transaction which injures some one materially or which is intrinsically unfair or unconscientious. In the case of Johnson v. Pinckard, reported in 72 So. 127, Alabama Supreme Court holds that: In a suit to cancel a mortgage and deed on account of the mental incapacity of the mortgagor and......
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Compton v. Compton
...this rule only applies when the matter thus alleged is peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondent so charged. Johnson v. Pinckard & Lay, 196 Ala. 259, 72 So. 127; City of Mobile v. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. White v. Wiggins, 32 Ala. 424; 21 Corpus Juris, 483, notes 82 and 83; Sims......
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Hicks v. Biddle
... ... Weeks et al., 104 Ala. 331, 16 So. 165, 53 Am.St.Rep ... 50; Moog et ux. v. Barrow et al., 101 Ala. 209, 13 ... So. 665; Johnson et al. v. Pinckard & Lay, 196 Ala ... 259, 72 So. 127; Henry v. Watson, 109 Ala. 335, 19 ... So. 413; Crawford et al. v. Kirksey, 50 Ala. 590; 21 ... ...