Gillis v. Smith

• Decision Date: 28 May 1917
• Docket Number: 19157
• Citation: 114 Miss. 665,75 So. 451
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: GILLIS ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL

75 So. 451

114 Miss. 665

GILLIS ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL

No. 19157

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 28, 1917

Division B

APPEAL from the chancery court of Lauderdale county, HON. G. C TANN, Chancellor.

Suit by Mrs. L. E. Smith and others against Herbert Gillis, Guardian of Jack C. Jarvis, Jr., and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Decree reversed and bill dismissed.

Currie & Smith, for appellants.

It will be seen that the complainants in this case undertook the burden of proving, first, that Miss Susan E. Caraway executed the said deed at a time when she was "totally and wholly mentally incapacitated to executed a valid deed;" and second that the same was "procured by deception, fraud and duress practiced upon the said Susan E. Caraway by certain of her relatives," to wit Mrs. Nannie Peterler.

It is hardly necessary to call the court's attention to the fact that the burden rested upon the complainants to prove these allegations by a preponderance of the testimony and that the legal presumption is that the grantor in this deed was fully capacitated to make and execute the deed and that this presumption remained until overturned by evidence as above stated. See 1 Black on Rescission and Cancellation section 253, and also section 263; Burnett v. Smith, a Mississippi case quoted in 47 So. 117, Stanfield v Johnson, 49 So. 223.

When a court of equity is called upon to cancel and annul a solemn and formal instrument such as a deed to real estate, it is called upon to exercise one of its highest prerogatives and we submit that before granting such a request it ought to be moved to do so only upon very clear and convincing testimony.

The complainants in this case in order to secure the relief asked for, to wit: the cancellation of this deed, were by the law brought under the necessity of proving either that this grantor was wholly mentally incapacitated to execute this deed or else that she was "unduly influenced," within the meaning of the law, to execute said deed.

Before entering upon an examination of this testimony, we would like to bring to the court's attention the law with reference to "mental incapacity" and also with reference to "undue influence" so that as the testimony is gone into, we can keep before our minds the legal standards by which to weigh and measure the testimony.

Mental capacity--test of. The test of mental capacity necessary to enable a grantor to make a valid deed is that he is capable of understanding in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act in which he is engaged. 7 Dec. Digest, under the title of Deeds, section 68, 1 1/2; Cyc. 13-573.

Mental capacity--test of. The measure of mental capacity of a grantor is that he be capable of comprehending the condition of his property and his relation to those who are the natural object of his bounty and to reasonably, understand the nature and effect of what he is doing. 7 Dec. Digest, under the title of Deeds, section 68, 1 1/2. Cyc. 13-573.

The learned author of Black on Rescission and Cancellation, which is a very late and through treatise on this subject says in section 262 in Vol. 1, that the test of mental capacity generally agreed upon is that: "A deed or contract cannot be set aside on the ground of insanity if the person had sufficient mental capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature of the particular transaction in which he was engaged and its consequences and effects upon his rights and interest. It is sometimes said that a person has capacity to make a deed if he has sufficient mind to be capable of transacting ordinary business affairs or of pursuing his own ordinary business in his usual manner. But this is too loose. The proper inquiry is whether he was capable of understanding and appreciating the nature and effect of the one particular act or transaction which is challenged."

Mr. Black appends an imposing array of authority to support this proposition. For two exhaustive notes setting out at length the law with reference to mental capacity, we refer the court to the case of Slaughter v. Heath, reported in 27 Vol. L. R. A. (N. S.) page 1; also the case of MacCrellish reported in L. R. A. (N. S.) 1915 A. however, the above quotation from Mr. Black is the most satisfactory general statement of the test of mental capacity that we have been able to find.

We will call the court's attention to the quotation from Black on Rescission and Cancellation, section 240, which is set out above, where he states that a transaction cannot be avoided on this ground unless it appears that the influence was exercised for an undue and disadvantageous purpose and that influence is undue only when it induces a transaction which injures some one materially or which is intrinsically unfair or unconscientious.

In the case of Johnson v. Pinckard, reported in 72 So. 127, the Alabama Supreme Court holds that: In a suit to cancel a mortgage and deed on account of the mental incapacity of the mortgagor and grantor to execute the contracts, where complainants made no proof of such incapacity at the time of the execution of the contracts, they were not entitled to relief, since the law presumes every one sane until the contrary appears.

And we submit that this is good reasoning and sound law. Those who undertake to set aside solemn instruments on account of insanity should be required to make proof of such insanity or mental incapacity with reference directly and strictly to the instrument involved and the immediate occasion of its execution and of the circumstances surrounding its execution.

At this point, we desire to say that we are not unmindful of the rule of this honorable court, supported by a long line of decisions, that the chancellor's decree upon controverted facts will not be disturbed; and we are not asking this court to overturn, modify, or change this long established rule of the court, but our contention is that there are absolutely no facts in the complainant's case warranting the finding of the court that this lady was insane or was any ways mentally incapacitated to execute the deed in question.

Giving the fullest weight and credence and value of all of the statements of the witnesses for the complainants and the interferences to be drawn therefrom, we submit that the very most that it can be said to prove is that this grantor was mentally weak and we submit that under the law mental weakness is wholly insufficient to warrant the cancellation of an instrument. Clarke et al. v. Hartt, et al., 47 So. 819; Page 453, L. R. A. (N. S.) 1955 A; Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. 663, 32 Law Ed. 747; Slaughter v. Heath, et al., 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) page 1.

And our own supreme court has stated in the case of Simonton v. Bacon, 49 Miss. 582: "That a mere suggestion of a weakness of intellect alone is not of itself sufficient to avoid the contract; it must be shown that the other party used some undue means to draw him into the agreement."

These quotations and citation serve to show how far short the testimony of the complainants came from meeting the legal requirements because the facts of the above quotations show that the cases under consideration there are much stronger on the facts than the case at bar, yet those courts held that the proof of such facts were not sufficient to overturn the legal presumption of sanity.

Amis & Dunn and V. W. Gilbert, for appellees.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not there was testimony sufficient to warrant the chancellor in finding as a matter of fact that Miss Susan Caraway was on the fourteenth day of December, 1910, mentally incapacitated to execute the deed upon which the appellants rely. If the facts were sufficient to establish such mental defect of Miss Caraway on said date as to render her incapable of comprehending or understanding the effect of such act, the decree of the chancellor should not under the well settled rules of this court be disturbed; that is if this court cannot, from the facts disclosed by the record, say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in reaching the conclusion that he did, the weight of the testimony was in favor of the finding of the chancellor. Those persons who were most intimately associated with Miss Caraway during the period of her last illness are practically unanimous in their testimony which is to the effect that her physical and mental state was so low as to render her incapable of comprehending the subject and effect of any contract which she might have. That she would recognize friends and neighbors who called to see her when she should be aroused by her mother or other attendant, is not sufficient to show such mental capacity as would render her capable of understanding the importance of a deed of the character of the one in question at page 1206, 22 Cyc., the rule of mental capacity is stated thus: "The mental defect or disease necessary to entitle one to avoid his contracts on the ground of insanity need not be so great as to dethrone his reason or as to amount to an entire want of reason, but it is sufficient if he is insane to such an extent as to be incapable of comprehending or understanding the subject of the contract and its nature and probable consequences."

The text above quoted in Cyc. is supported by the decision in Darg v. Hayford, 56 Me. 426, holding that where the sanity of the grantor of lands in controversy is in issue the question to be decided is substantially whether at the time of the conveyance the grantor was in possession of mental capacity sufficient to transact the business with intelligence, understanding rationally what he was doing, and that less than this would not suffice to make a valid...