Johnson v. Price
Decision Date | 27 August 1999 |
Citation | 743 So.2d 436 |
Parties | Patsy Free JOHNSON et al. v. Dr. Steven R. PRICE. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James Harvey Tipler of The Tipler Law Firm, P.C., Andalusia, for appellants.
Walter W. Bates and L. Jackson Young, Jr., of Starnes & Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellee.
We granted permission, under Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P., for Patsy Free Johnson, Angela J. Strickland, and Victoria J. Foley, as co-administratrixes of the estate of Billy Johnson, to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order striking expert medical testimony. We affirm.
The issue presented concerns the interpretation of the 1996 amendment to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-548(e). In particular, this appeal centers on two related questions. First, does § 6-5-548(e) require that a health-care provider who testifies as to the standard of care for a "similarly situated health care provider" be certified by the very same board as the defendant health-care provider? Second, if § 6-5-548(e) does require that the two healthcare providers be certified by the same board, does the fact that this cause of action was filed before the 1996 amendment prevent that amendment from applying here?
On June 15, 1994, Dr. Steven Price, who is not a medical doctor, but rather a doctor of osteopathy, and who is certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Surgery, performed surgery on Billy Johnson. Johnson was later transferred to Flowers Hospital, on June 19, 1994, where his condition deteriorated; he died on June 29, 1994. The administratrixes sued Dr. Price, claiming that he had negligently caused Billy Johnson's death. Dr. Price moved for a summary judgment, supporting his motion with his own affidavit stating that he had complied with the applicable standard of care in treating Mr. Johnson. The plaintiffs opposed that motion with the affidavit of Dr. Gary Kirchner, a general surgeon certified by the American Board of Surgery. Dr. Kirchner testified that Dr. Price had deviated from the appropriate standard of care and that in his opinion Dr. Price's negligence had proximately caused Mr. Johnson's death. Dr. Price moved to strike Dr. Kirchner's affidavit on the ground that Dr. Kirchner was not a "similarly situated health care provider" and, therefore, that he could not testify as to the applicable standard of care. The trial court granted that motion.
As in any action for medical malpractice, the plaintiffs have the "burden of proving by substantial evidence that the health care provider failed to exercise such reasonable care, skill and diligence as other similarly situated health care providers in the same general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in a like case." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-548(a). The plaintiffs offered Dr. Kirchner's testimony to rebut Dr. Price's testimony that he had complied with the applicable standard of care. The trial court struck Dr. Kirchner's affidavit, relying on § 6-5-548(e), because Dr. Price and Dr. Kirchner are certified by two separate organizations. Dr. Price is certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Surgery and Dr. Kirchner is certified by the American Board of Surgery. The trial court held that this difference in certification boards was enough of a discrepancy to prevent Dr. Kirchner from testifying, under § 6-5-548(e).
Section 6-5-548(e) reads:
(Emphasis added.) That portion of the statute emphasized here was added by the amendment, which became effective on May 17, 1996. Relying on this section of the statute, Dr. Price argues that Dr. Kirchner cannot testify against him because they are not certified by the same boards. The plaintiffs contend that the amendment did not substantially change the statute and, therefore, that the caselaw predating the statute should be authoritative. That caselaw indicated that a health-care provider was not precluded from testifying against another health-care provider merely because they were not certified by the same board. However, those cases are not controlling here, because the amendment sets out a clear new standard for expert testimony by a health-care provider. This case presents a question of first impression, then, involving the interpretation of § 6-5-548(e).
This Court has repeatedly held that a statute will be construed by the plain meaning of the words written by the Legislature:
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)); see also Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.1991); Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 524 So.2d 357, 360 (Ala.1988); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So.2d 1219, 1223 (Ala.1984); Dumas Brothers Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 534, 536 (Ala.1983); Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer & Fire Protection Auth., Inc., 376 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.1979). Consequently, this Court must interpret the statute strictly according to the language of that statute in order to follow the intent of the Legislature, and to do otherwise would "turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers." DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 276 (Ala.1998), citing Ex parte T.B., 698 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.1997). See Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., [Ms....
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