Johnson v. Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action

• Decision Date: 17 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 3:00CV330.,CIV. A. 3:00CV330.
• Parties: Viola M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. QUIN RIVERS AGENCY FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

128 F.Supp.2d 332

Viola M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. QUIN RIVERS AGENCY FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 3:00CV330.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

January 17, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bernice Stafford Turner, Chesterfield, VA, for Viola M. Johnson, plaintiff.

Herbert Fried, Jr., Richmond, VA, Mark Baron, Richmond, VA, Laura Graham Fox, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, Charles Garrison Meyer, III, LeClair, Ryan, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc., Quin Rivers Executive Bd. of Directors, Michelle E. Greenidge-Moore, Mary V. Ware, defendants.

Margaret Alice Browne, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, Mark Baron, Richmond, VA, for Commonwealth of Virginia Head Start Programs Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Joan E. Evans, U.S. Attorney's Office, Richmond, VA, James C. Newman, Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of General Counsel, Philadelphia, PA, for United States Office of Human Development Services Department of Health and Human Services Head Start Programs Head Start Branch Chief, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss. The remaining defendants in this action are the following: Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc., ("Quin Rivers"), Quin Rivers Executive Board of Directors, ("Board of Directors"), Quin Rivers Head Start Program ("Head Start Program"), Mary V. Ware ("Ms.Ware"), Michelle E. Greenidge ("Ms.Greenidge"), and Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc. Head Start Policy Council ("Policy Council"). These defendants have filed a 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).¹ In addition, the Head Start Branch Chief of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has been named as a defendant. HHS has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b).

I. Background

Quin Rivers is a private, non-profit organization that operates a Head Start program. Ms. Ware is an employee and Executive Director of Quin Rivers. Ms. Greenidge is also an employee of Quin Rivers and serves as the Director of the Head Start Program. The Policy Council is a voluntary advisory board to the Quin Rivers Board of Directors. The Policy Council is comprised of parents whose children participate in the Head Start program. The council provides parental input and advice to the Board of Directors regarding the operation of the program.

Plaintiff, Viola M. Johnson, filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on December 18, 1999. Plaintiff complained in her EEOC charge that Quin Rivers discriminated against her based on her race and her age. She also contended that she was "retaliated against for complaining of discrimination." The EEOC subsequently dismissed plaintiff's charge and, on February 25, 2000, gave plaintiff notice of her right to sue.

Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, on May 25, 2000. Without obtaining leave of Court, she then filed an Amended Complaint on July 13, 2000, and a Second Amended Complaint on September 21, 2000.²

In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff raises discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In addition, plaintiff asserts that enforcement of federal regulations concerning the Quin Rivers Head Start Program was lax. Plaintiff also raises claims under state law, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and negligent supervision, and breach of contract. Since plaintiff does not specify against which defendants each cause of action lies, the Court has done its best to decipher plaintiff's claims.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Title VII and ADEA Claims

Plaintiff's Title VII and the ADEA claims against the Board of Directors, the Head Start Program, Ms. Ware, Ms. Greenidge, the Policy Council, and the HHS, are dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and (c) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Only employers are liable for illegal acts of employment discrimination against employees under Title VII and the ADEA. See Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998). Individual supervisors have no personal liability under Title VII or the ADEA because they are not "employers" within the meaning of either statute. See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir.1994). In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff clearly identifies her "employer" as "Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc." See Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶ 35. Plaintiff does not allege that any other defendant was her employer. As such, plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims against all defendants other than Quin Rivers are dismissed with prejudice.

With respect to plaintiff's remaining Title VII and ADEA claims against Quin Rivers, the Court dismisses plaintiff's claim of discrimination based on gender. Claims set forth in a Title VII complaint "are cognizable so long as they are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the [EEOC] charge and grow out of such allegations." Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 744, 752 (E.D.Va.1991) (citation omitted). To allow a complaint to encompass allegations outside of the ambit of the EEOC charge deprives the charged party of the notice of the charges, which is one of the reasons why plaintiffs must exhaust their remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. In determining the valid scope of a civil action, the critical element is the narrative statement in the charge. Id. at 752. Where a plaintiff's subsequent action complains of a type of discrimination never mentioned in the charge, jurisdiction over the claim does not exist. Id. at 744. Plaintiff's EEOC charge made no mention of discrimination based on gender, but alleged only that she was discriminated against based on her race and age. She also contended that she was retaliated against because she complained of discrimination. As such, plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination by Quin Rivers are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Violation of Federal Regulations Governing the Head Start Program

Next, plaintiff appears to assert numerous claims for defendants' alleged mismanagement of the Head Start program, in violation of federal regulations. The Court dismisses these claims against all defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because there is no private right of action by which plaintiff may bring these claims. Where a statute does not expressly create a private right of action, one may not be implied absent congressional intent. Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989) (citations omitted). The "ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981). A corollary rule is that where the statute provides a specific remedy, a court must be particularly reluctant to provide additional remedies. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). In such cases, "[i]n the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, [the court must] conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate." Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 15, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).

In this case, the applicable statutory scheme is set forth pursuant to the Head Start Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852a. Under the scheme, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services is directed to "establish by regulation standards applicable to Head Start agencies, programs, and projects under this subchapter," including "minimum levels of overall accomplishment that a Head Start agency shall achieve." 42 U.S.C. § 9836a(a)(1) & (2). The Secretary is also directed under this section to monitor the performance of every Head Start program and to take appropriate corrective action when a program fails to meet the performance standards established by the regulations. Specifically, the Act requires a full review of each grantee at least once during each three-year period, review of new grantees after the completion of the first year, follow up reviews and return visits to grantees that fail to meet the standards, and "other reviews as appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 9836a(c). If the Secretary determines, on the basis of such a review, that a grantee fails to meet the standards described in § 9836a(a), the Secretary shall, inter alia, institute proceedings to terminate the Head Start grant unless the agency corrects the deficiency. 42 U.S.C. § 9836a(d).

All but three of the regulations cited in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint were promulgated pursuant to the Head Start Act. See 45 C.F.R. § 1304.1. There is no provision in the Head Start Act, however, permitting a private citizen to enforce its provisions. Based on the alternative specific remedies mentioned above, Congress' intent is clear. The remedy for substandard performance by a Head Start program is an enforcement action by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, not by private litigants. For these reasons, the Court dismisses with prejudice plaintiff's claims alleging violations of statutory and regulatory provisions relating to the Head Start Act, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In addition, in paragraph 236 of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff seeks relief for the alleged violation of three regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 74.21, 74.52, and...