Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, B-J

• Decision Date: 02 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940165,B-J,940165
• Citation: 913 P.2d 723
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: Eva C. JOHNSON, C. Eugene Croxford, Burton J. Arrington, Cammon I. Arrington, Jeffrey B. Arrington, Irby N. Arrington,Dry Cleaning and Shirt Laundering, 4-A Alliance, Arthur Milne, Thomas Lloyd, Union Park Center Associates, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, Jerold H. Barnes, the Salt Lake County Commission, and the Salt Lake County Commissioners, individually, Defendants and Appellees, Hermes & Associates, Intervenor.

Page 723

913 P.2d 723

Eva C. JOHNSON, C. Eugene Croxford, Burton J. Arrington Cammon I. Arrington, Jeffrey B. Arrington, Irby N Arrington, B-J Dry Cleaning and Shirt Laundering, 4-A Alliance, Arthur Milne, Thomas Lloyd, Union Park Center Associates, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, Jerold H Barnes, the Salt Lake County Commission, and the Salt Lake County Commissioners individually, Defendants and Appellees, Hermes & Associates, Intervenor.

No. 940165.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 2, 1995.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1996.

Nolan J. Olsen, Martin N. Olsen, Midvale, and Walter F. Bugden, Salt Lake City, for Johnson, Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for Barnes and the Redevelopment Agency.

Paul G. Maughan, Douglas R. Short, Salt Lake City, for the County Commission.

Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for Hermes.

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:

Eva C. Johnson appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County ("the RDA") ¹ and the Salt Lake County Commission ("the Commission"). Johnson and others brought suit under the 1993 version of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, ² challenging the legality and regularity of a Salt Lake County ordinance adopting the Union Fort Redevelopment Plan. After each side moved for summary judgment, the district court granted defendants' motions and denied Johnson's, ruling that the RDA had sufficiently complied with the procedures set out in the 1993 Act to make the ordinance valid. ³ We reverse and remand to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Johnson in accordance with this opinion.

By way of background, the purpose of Utah's Neighborhood Development Act is to cure the problem of "blight" through economic redevelopment of the blighted area. Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1987) ("Acquisition and redevelopment of 'blighted' property contributes to the health of the community."). The first step in the redevelopment process is the designation of a redevelopment survey area. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1204. After boundaries are set for the survey area, the properties within the area are studied to determine if economic redevelopment is feasible. Id. If redevelopment is feasible, the RDA may formulate a preliminary plan for the redevelopment of all or part of the survey area. Id. § 17A-2-1206. Once the RDA approves a preliminary plan, it is submitted to the legislative body (i.e., city council or county commission) for ultimate approval. Id. §§ 17A-2-1215, -1225, -1227. "Upon adoption by the legislative body the agency shall carry out the redevelopment project set forth in the plan." Id. § 17A-2-1215. The RDA is empowered to use increased tax revenues generated by the redevelopment to fund the project. Id. § 17A-2-1247. "[B]ecause redevelopment is a serious action that may be in derogation of individual property rights," Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Utah 1979), the Utah Neighborhood Development Act contains numerous safeguards to protect property owners. For instance, eminent domain may not be used by the RDA if the purpose of the plan is economic development unless the area to be developed is first found to be blighted. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-1208, -1209.

With this background in mind, we move on to the instant case. The dispositive facts are undisputed. At the heart of this case are a 22.5-acre tract of land and a 4.3-acre tract of land, both located in an unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County. At the beginning of the events in question, a portion of the 22.5-acre tract was owned by Hermes & Associates, Ltd., an intervenor in this case. By the time this appeal was argued, however, Hermes owned all of the property in both parcels except for Johnson's.

In 1991, Hermes operated a shopping center known as the Family Center at Fort Union on property adjacent to the two tracts of land in question. As a shopping center developer, Hermes wanted to expand its Family Center operations onto the 22.5-acre tract. In furtherance of this desire, on October 14, 1991, Hermes requested that the RDA designate the 22.5-acre tract as a redevelopment survey area. See id. § 17A-2-1207 (1991). The RDA complied with Hermes' request and passed a resolution designating the 22.5-acre parcel as the "Union Family Center Redevelopment Survey Area." This survey area was to be studied to determine if redevelopment was feasible. The Commission then met and facilitated the study by changing the county's master plan to accommodate the use Hermes proposed for the survey area.

In June of 1992, after deciding that even more land was needed for the proposed expansion of its shopping center, Hermes requested that an additional 4.3 acres be added to the survey area. The request was granted by the RDA in September, and the Commission again changed the master plan to accommodate the proposed expansion. Plaintiff Johnson's property, a residence, was included in the additional 4.3 acres.

On November 18, 1991, while only the original 22.5-acre tract was proposed for redevelopment, the RDA hired independent consultants to study the survey area to determine whether "blight" existed and to assess the proposed redevelopment's impact on the area's traffic and economy. The consultants completed and published the blight survey in November of 1992. The final completed survey concluded that the whole survey area, including the additional 4.3 acres upon a portion of which Johnson's residence stands, was blighted and in need of redevelopment. The RDA then prepared a preliminary redevelopment plan, dated November 16, 1992, and published notice of a public hearing to be held on the consultants' blight survey and the preliminary redevelopment plan. Johnson and others filed their first complaint, seeking to delay the evidentiary hearing regarding blight.

The hearing eventually commenced on February 9th and was continued over a number of nonconsecutive days. It was held jointly before the Commission and the RDA. Redevelopment experts, real estate appraisers, and others presented evidence on the area's blight. On March 8, 1993, the members of the RDA voted unanimously to designate the entire survey area, including Johnson's property, as blighted. The RDA then referred the matter to the office of the county attorney to prepare written findings of fact regarding blight.

Although the RDA had already made its preliminary determination that the survey area was blighted, the hearing continued on March 16, 1993, to consider other matters related to the redevelopment project. At this meeting, Johnson testified that she would "hold out" and not sell her property to Hermes. On March 24th, Johnson and others filed an amended complaint in the district court under section 17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act, seeking de novo review by the district court of the March 8, 1993, blight determination. ⁴ At the time the complaint was filed, each of the plaintiffs owned property within the survey area. However, during the course of the instant legal action, all but Johnson eventually sold their properties to Hermes.

On April 19th, the RDA directed the county attorney to exclude the Johnson property from the redevelopment area. As a result of this action, Johnson's property, which was the only parcel excluded from the proposed redevelopment area, was left surrounded on three sides by the project. This exclusion was effected without any further public hearings. At this same April 19th meeting, the RDA and the Commission included provisions in the plan for the use of eminent domain against any landowners unwilling to sell to Hermes and confirmed the plan's authorization of the use of sales taxes from the project area to pay for the redevelopment project.

On May 5, 1993, while Johnson's action was pending in the district court, the RDA and the Commission adopted written, formal findings of fact regarding blight and prepared an ordinance to create the Union Fort Neighborhood Redevelopment Project Area, which excluded the Johnson property. On May 24, 1993, after further revisions, the Commission drafted the final ordinance, which was passed at the close of the meeting.

On June 23rd, Johnson filed an amended ten-count complaint challenging, under the 1993 Act, the regularity and legality of the redevelopment process and of the resulting plan and ordinance. Specifically, Johnson sought to invalidate the ordinance passed on May 24, 1993. Both Johnson and the RDA sought summary judgment. On January 12, 1994, the district court granted the RDA's motions and denied Johnson's. On the merits, the district court ruled that RDA had substantially complied with all of the applicable provisions of the 1993 Act. The district court also dismissed Johnson's demand for de novo review of the March 8th blight finding by holding that Johnson lacked standing to invoke section 17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act because she was not an owner of property within the redevelopment area. Johnson appeals.

We first state the applicable standard of review. "When no facts are in dispute, a challenge to a summary judgment presents only conclusions of law." Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942, 943 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, the proper construction of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act is a question of law. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, we grant no particular deference to the district court's statutory interpretations but review them for correctness. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994); accord Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).

The primary rule guiding us in statutory interpretation is that we give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). To discover that intent, we look...