Johnson v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 16 April 1929 |
| Citation | 97 Fla. 591,121 So. 793 |
| Parties | JOHNSON et ux. v. REYNOLDS et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Error to Circuit Court, St. Lucie County; Elwyn Thomas, Judge.
Action by Wilhelmina Reynolds, joined by her husband, against Willie Johnson and wife. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Bill of exceptions will be treated as not embracing all evidence in absence of trial judge's certificate that it contains all evidence (Special Rules of Circuit Courts, Rules 1-3). Where transcript was prepared under Special Rules 1-3 of Rules of Circuit Courts in law actions, but no certificate by trial judge reciting that bill of exceptions contained all the evidence introduced at the trial was appended to bill of exceptions, bill will be treated as one not embracing all the evidence.
Plaintiff in ejectment must recover solely on strength of his own title. In ejectment, plaintiff must recover if at all on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of defendant's title.
Presumption on appeal is that verdict and judgment were correct in so far as there is sufficient supporting evidence. On appeal presumption obtains that verdict and judgment are correct in so far as there is sufficient evidence to support the former.
If all evidence is not produced before reviewing court in properly authenticated bill of exceptions, plaintiff in error must fail on assignment of error attacking sufficiency of evidence to support verdict. If all evidence adduced at trial is not produced before appellate court in a bill of exceptions properly authenticated, plaintiff in error, whose duty it is to make error complained of to appear, must fail on an assignment of error which attacks sufficiency of evidence to support verdict or correctness of court's order declining to instruct verdict in his behalf.
Any errors in admitting evidence of common title in boundary dispute held harmless, where record did not show parties did not claim under same title. Where, from anything in record appearing to contrary, both plaintiff and defendants in boundary controversy claimed under same title, any errors in admitting evidence of common title were harmless.
Great latitude is allowed in cross-examination to show witness' opportunities for observation and his disposition and ability to speak truth. In cross-examination of a witness, great latitude is allowed that it may be shown what witness' opportunities for observation were, his disposition to speak truth, and his ability to speak accurately.
It is harmful error to deny right of cross-examination of witness to bring helpful light on subject of inquiry. Whenever counsel is within his rights and is seeking by cross-examination of witness to bring a helpful light on the subject of inquiry, it is harmful error to deny him the right.
Trial judge may easily abuse discretion in limiting cross-examination of witness by whom material points are sought to be established. In the exercise of discretion by trial judge to limit cross-examination of witness by whom material and controlling points in a controversy of fact are sought to be established, trial judge may easily abuse his discretion and commit reversible error.
Refusal to permit defendants in ejectment involving boundary dispute to amend plea of not guilty to allege they were not in possession of land described in declaration held error. In action of ejectment involving merely a question of boundary refusal to permit defendants to amend plea of not guilty by averring that they were not in possession of land described in declaration, but that their possession was confined to a tract, description of which was set forth with certainty in the plea, thereby raising the single question of location of dividing line, held error.
Plea of not guilty and plea denying possession may be filed together in same ejectment action involving merely boundary dispute. Plea of not guilty and a plea denying possession are not inconsistent with each other, and may be filed together in the same ejectment action merely involving a boundary dispute.
Denying challenge for cause to juror declaring he feared inability to render fair verdict because of friendly relations with plaintiffs' counsel held reversible error. Where proposed juror on his examination by defendant's counsel stated that he was afraid he could not render a fair verdict because of his friendly relations with plaintiffs' attorneys, and that he would give plaintiffs benefit of any doubt, and that it would embarrass him to render verdict against plaintiffs juror should have been excused on defendant's challenge for cause, and denial of such challenge was reversible error, notwithstanding on subsequent questions by plaintiffs' counsel and trial judge, juror said he could render impartial verdict according to evidence alone.
Juror should be excused on challenge for cause in case of doubt as to his fairness or mental integrity. If there is a doubt as to juror's sense of fairness or his mental integrity, he should be excused on challenge for cause.
Juror's prejudice is within judge's discretion, and, if discretion is abused, it is subject to review. Though question of juror's fitness to serve on score of his freedom from prejudice is determinable within discretion of trial judge, his discretion may be abused, and, if it is, it is subject to review.
Juror who is biased or prejudiced is not fair-minded and impartial, as required to prevent impairment of right to jury trial. Proposed juror, who is either biased or prejudiced, cannot be said to be fair-minded and impartial, and, if accepted as juror, he would not be of that standard of impartiality necessary to prevent impairment of right to jury trial.
Dame & Rogers, of Ft. Pierce, for plaintiffs in error.
Alto Adams and W. H. Wolfe, both of Ft. Pierce, for defendants in error.
Wilhelmina Reynolds, joined by her husband, George J. Reynolds, brought an action of ejectment against Willie Johnson and his wife Carrie Johnson to try the title to a strip of land 100 feet wide lying on the east side of the W. 1/2 of the E. 1/2 of the S.W. 1/4 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 4, township 35 south, range 40 east, in St. Lucie county. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered in her favor. The defendants seek a reversal of the judgment of writ of error.
In preparing the transcript of the record, Special Rules 1, 2, and 3 of the Rules of the Circuit Courts in Law Actions were followed. There is no certificate by the trial judge appended to the bill of exceptions that it contains all the evidence introduced at the trial, so the bill will be treated and taken as one not embracing all the evidence. Special Rule 1. The fifteenth assignment of error therefore, which challenges the ruling of the court denying a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant, cannot be considered.
In ejectment, the plaintiff must recover if at all upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of the defendant. Ropes v. Minshew, 51 Fla. 299, 41 So. 538; Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 56 Fla. 561, 47 So. 931; Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 998.
The presumption obtainst that the verdict and judgment were correct in so far as there was sufficient evidence to support the former, and, if all the evidence which was adduced at the trial is not produced before this court in a bill of exceptions properly authenticated, the plaintiff in error, whose duty it is to make the error complained of to appear, must fail upon an assignment of error which attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, or the correctness of the court's order declining to instruct a verdict in behalf of the complaining party. From anything in the record appearing to the contrary, both plaintiff and defendants claim under the same title; the question being merely a boundary dispute. In such case, even if there were errors in admitting improper evidence of the common title, they were harmless. See Rhodus v. Heffernan, 47 Fla. 206, 36 So. 572; Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 239, 40 So. 196, 120 Am. St. Rep. 159.
There are two errors appearing, however, which should cause a reversal of the judgment. The consideration of these and the conclusion we have reached upon the assignments covering them render it unnecessary to discuss other assignments. The questions presented in other assignments are interesting but unnecessary to the conclusion reached upon the two assignments above mentioned. However, it may not be out of place to observe that, in the cross-examination of a witness, great latitude is allowed that it may be shown what the witness' opportunities for observation were and his disposition to speak truthfully and his ability to speak accurately. The art of cross-examination is rarely possessed and many times greatly abused, particularly by those who seem to have no clear or definite conception of its use. In such cases the examination becomes a meaningless and tiresome expense of time which the court should suppress. But whenever counsel is within his rights and is seeking by the examination of a witness in cross to bring a helpful light upon the subject of the inquiry, it is harmful error to deny him the right. Under certain circumstances the limits to which a cross-examination may extend may not well be defined. It is difficult to lay down a rule with any precision. Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 305; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence (14th Ed.) 544.
But it might be well to observe that, in the exercise of discretion by the trial judge to limit the extent of cross-examination of a witness by whom material and controlling points in a...
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...to their magic question is “better and more worthy of belief than those that are potentially disqualifying”? See Johnson v. Reynolds, 121 So. 793 (Fla. 1929). It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a juror stands free of bias or pr......
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