Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Bd. Members, 86-1747

• Citation: 815 F.2d 5
• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1747,86-1747
• Parties: Paul C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RHODE ISLAND PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

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815 F.2d 5

Paul C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RHODE ISLAND PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 86-1747.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 5, 1986.

Decided March 31, 1987.

Paul C. Johnson, on brief, pro se.

Richard B. Woolley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Arlene Violet, Atty. Gen., Providence, R.I., on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before COFFIN, BOWNES and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, while an inmate in a Rhode Island state prison, brought a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against the Rhode Island parole board members, seeking a declaratory judgment and monetary damages, for allegedly violating his constitutionally-protected liberty interest and due process rights in thrice denying his parole applications. A magistrate recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted for failure to state a claim since, in the magistrate's view, the allegations expressed in the complaint were vague, conclusory and lacking in specific facts. The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and, as an additional ground in support of dismissal, concluded that the defendant parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from damage claims stemming from the performance of their duties. We affirm.

This court has not, as yet, addressed the question of what immunity, if any, state parole board members have in Sec. 1983 actions seeking monetary damages for alleged constitutional violations. The U.S. Supreme Court has reserved judgment on this question, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559 n. 11, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980), although it has recently observed that several federal appellate courts have concluded that state parole officials enjoy absolute immunity as a matter of federal law. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985).

Assuming arguendo that under a liberal construction of this pro se pleading, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), we concluded that the allegations were sufficiently specific, we agree with the district court's further rationale for its decision, i.e., that the defendant parole board members are shielded by absolute immunity in Sec. 1983 actions seeking monetary damages for actions taken by the members in the performance of their official duties. ¹

Utilizing the functional approach to immunity law, see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S.Ct. at 501, the Ninth Circuit has cogently stated:

"We believe that parole board officials perform functionally comparable tasks to judges when they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole. The daily task of both judges and parole board officials is the adjudication of specific cases or controversies. Their duty is often the same: to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong feelings because the litigant's liberty is at stake. They face the same risk of constant unfounded suits by those disappointed by the parole board's decisions.

* * *

"We believe that the same degree of protection [given to the judicial decision-making process] must be accorded to the decision-making process of parole board officials. Just as the decision-making process of judges must be kept free from fear, so must that of parole board officials. Without this protection, there is the same danger that the decision-maker might not impartially adjudicate the often difficult cases that come before them. If parole board officials had to anticipate that each time they rejected a prisoner's application for parole, they would have to defend that decision in federal court, their already difficult task of balancing the risk involved in releasing a prisoner whose rehabilitation is uncertain against the public's right to safety would become almost impossible. Furthermore, time spent in depositions and on the witness stand defending their actions would leave these overburdened public servants with even less time to perform their crucial tasks."

Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981). The Ninth Circuit is careful to restrict absolute immunity to those actions taken in performance of the parole board's official duties, i.e., in processing parole applications and deciding whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole. Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908-10 (9th Cir.1983) (imposing parole conditions and executing parole revocation procedures are actions entitled to absolute immunity; disseminating allegedly false information about a parolee's criminal record to individuals and agencies beyond parole board members and the governor to members of the state racing commission and to local police authorities is an action entitled to only qualified immunity).

Other circuit courts which have addressed this issue are in accord with the Ninth Circuit's view that state parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from suits for monetary damages for actions taken in the performance of their official duties. E.g., Nelson v. Balazic, 802 F.2d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir.1986); Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 769 F.2d 396, 398 (7th Cir.1985); Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400, 405 (4th Cir.1975).

The Third Circuit agrees that a parole board member is entitled to absolute immunity when engaged in adjudicatory duties, such as serving as a hearing examiner at a detention proceeding and making a recommendation to the board. Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir.1986). Because parole board members are not judicial officers, however, but in reality are executive officers carrying out the policy of the State with respect to probation and parole, in that circuit's view, executive or administrative actions by parole officials (which that circuit court would define as including probation officers and parole board members) are protected by qualified immunity. Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 237-38 (3d Cir.1977); see Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d at 284 (general responsibilities as probation officer are more executive than judicial in nature; charging parolee with violating parole and presenting what parolee contended was fabricated evidence to that effect to the board appears to be more executive than judicial in nature). The Seventh Circuit has criticized this adjudicatory/administrative distinction, which it views as neither desirable nor even possible, and has expressly declined to adopt such a distinction. Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 769 F.2d at 397-99...