Johnson v. Rooks, 42941
| Decision Date | 05 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 42941,No. 3,42941,3 |
| Citation | 116 Ga.App. 394,157 S.E.2d 527 |
| Parties | John G. JOHNSON v. Robert J. ROOKS |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The testimony given by the plaintiff as to the facts on which he based his opinion, while by no means comprehensive, was sufficient to admit his testimony as to value of and damage to his vehicle.
2. The trial judge properly overruled a motion to strike evidence regarding the plaintiff's medical expenses.
Robert J. Rooks brought suit in Fulton Superior Court against John G. Johnson. The petition alleged that there was an automobile collision between the parties on August 20, 1965, at the intersection of Northside Drive and Stonewall Street in Atlanta; that the collision was caused by various negligent acts of the defendant; that as a result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's automobile was damaged and that he incurred certain medical expenses, lost wages and was afflicted with physical pain at the time of the injury and would be in the future. The prayers sought a judgment for the plaintiff for $16,804.31.
The defendant filed an answer denying the material averments of the petition. He later amended the answer by adding a counterclaim which alleged that in the same collision, due to the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant suffered damages in the sum of $300.
The case came on for trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $1,675. This verdict was made the judgment of the court and the defendant filed a notice of appeal. In this court the defendant's enumerations of error are predicated on two principal grounds, which are: (1) The court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to strike, made at the close of the evidence, which sought to remove from the jury's consideration the issue of the difference between 'before and after value' of the plaintiff's automobile; (2) the court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to strike evidence as to medical expense incurred by the plaintiff and a certain exhibit which was a statement for the same.
Greer & Murray, Kenneth C. Pollock, Richard G. Greer, Atlanta, for appellant.
Grady E. Rozar, Atlanta, for appellee.
J. KELLEY QUILLIAN, Judge.
1. The evidence relating to the first ground was as follows: the plaintiff testified that the damage to the car was on the left side and that the market value of the car at the time was $1,600; that the make of the automobile was a 1964 Chevrolet which he had owned approximately six months; that the market value after the collision was $800 and the difference in value before and after the collision was $800. On re-direct examination the plaintiff further testified that prior to the accident he had owned, during his life, approximately 25 automobiles and had purchased around 20; that he had repaired automobiles himself, and had repaired the damaged automobile. In this regard he testified it cost him approximately $300 to repair the automobile; that it cost around $150 in labor, plus his own time; that his cousin helped him and that he and his cousin worked approximately 60 hours for which he paid his cousin $150; that he got the automobile parts from General Motors. On re-cross examination, the plaintiff admitted he had no receipt for the money he gave his cousin, nor for the parts from General Motors. A picture of the damaged automobile was introduced into evidence.
The appellant contends that the testimony as to value was inadmissible because a proper foundation had not been laid. Thus, under the rulings of Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga.App. 328, 147 S.E.2d 782, and Ricker v. Brancale, 113 Ga.App. 447, 148 S.E.2d 468, in order for a witness to give his opinion as to value, he must give his reasons for forming that opinion or show he had an opportunity to form a correct opinion.
We recognize the rule of the cited cases, to wit: that mere ownership of property does not authorize the owner to testify as to its value without giving facts on which he bases his opinion. However, as pointed out in the Hoard case, supra, a showing that the witness had some knowledge, experience, or familiarity as to the value of the item is the requisite foundation.
This court has held that testimony of a witness that he is familar with the value of the item in question is sufficient foundation to allow evidence as to the value. Wilson v. City of Bainbridge, 29 Ga.App. 692, 693(2), 116 S.E. 543; McCoy v. City of Atlanta, 96 Ga.App. 392, 395, 100 S.E.2d 96. Georgia law permits testimony as to value whenever the witness gives his reasons therefore or shows he has an opportunity for forming a correct opinion. Code §§...
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Hagin v. Powers
...to object to admission of this evidence on the basis of 'no showing of reasonableness' is a waiver of such objection. Johnson v. Rooks, 116 Ga.App. 394, 398, 157 S.E.2d 527. Accord: Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga.App. 248, 250(1), 125 S.E. 907. It is within the province of the fact finder to conside......
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