Johnson v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 June 1988 |
| Citation | 759 S.W.2d 925 |
| Parties | Johnny A. JOHNSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee. 759 S.W.2d 925 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Kathryn M. Swisher, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jeff Weintraub, Memphis, for defendant-appellee.
This is a retaliatory discharge case. After a jury verdict for plaintiff, Johnny A. Johnson, Jr., awarding compensatory and punitive damages, defendant, St. Francis Hospital, Inc., filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for directed verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. From the trial court's order granting defendant a directed verdict and conditionally a new trial, plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's amended complaint filed October 2, 1985, alleges that plaintiff, while employed by defendant, sustained a back injury on May 2, 1984, covered by the Tennessee Workers Compensation Law. He alleges that because of the injury, he was temporarily totally disabled for 159 weeks, underwent disc surgery and sustained a fifteen percent permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity. Plaintiff avers that after returning to work from this injury, he sustained another injury on October 19, 1984, which was also covered by the workers compensation law, and a lawsuit for this claim is presently pending. Plaintiff alleges that defendant discharged him from his employment because he had made the two workers compensation claims.
Defendant's answer joins issue on all of the material allegations of the complaint, specifically denying that plaintiff was discharged because of the workers compensation claims, and avers that plaintiff was discharged because he was unavailable for work.
Plaintiff was hired in October of 1979 as store room manager and his duties included, among other things, supervision of the store room personnel in the storing and distributing of supplies and equipment used in the hospital. Although the testimony conflicts as to the maximum lifting required in plaintiff's job, it is uncontradicted that he is required on occasion to lift up to 55 pounds in performing his duties.
Plaintiff testified that he sustained a back injury in May of 1984, and filed a complaint for workers compensation against the hospital on October 17, 1984. He returned to work from the May injury shortly before filing the October lawsuit, after having undergone back surgery. He sustained another injury, while at work, on October 19, 1984, which resulted in his missing additional time from work and undergoing further medical treatment. Plaintiff reported again for work on November 8, 1984, and presented to Jean Shelton, the employee health nurse, a certificate from his physician, Dr. Snyder, certifying that he could return to work, but was restricted to lifting 20 pounds or less. Plaintiff testified that later that day he was called to a meeting in the personnel director's office and was informed that he could not return to work because of the lifting restriction. This meeting was attended by the personnel director, Robert Halford, Chief Security Officer Richard Hunt, and the employee health service nurse, Jean Shelton. The plaintiff testified that he explained to Halford how the second accident had happened and that Halford responded, "I don't see how it could have happened and I don't think that it really did." Plaintiff also stated that Halford said in the meeting that he knew that plaintiff had filed a workers compensation claim and he wanted plaintiff to go back to his doctor, Dr. Snyder. Plaintiff alleges that Halford told him they would talk about him going back to work, although Halford said, "But I doubt that you will ever work here again."
By memorandum of November 12, 1984, defendant's employee sent to Dr. Snyder a copy of plaintiff's job description for the doctor to review before deciding if plaintiff could return to work without restriction. Apparently, this request was never answered by Dr. Snyder, although the record reveals that Dr. Snyder's file contained the memorandum with a notation thereon dated January 7, 1985, made by Dr. Snyder's secretary, Linda Dixon, which stated "that he can return to normal duties." There is no proof in the record that this information was conveyed to defendant.
A copy of the leave of absence policy in effect at the hospital was introduced in evidence, and provides for the granting of a six month leave of absence to employees under certain circumstances. Leave of absence protects the employees' accrued service record and benefits and the employee is accorded the privilege of returning to employment if a job is available within a six month period. The policy specifically provides:
... employees who receive worker's compensation benefits for 90 days will be taken off the active payroll and be terminated or be place [sic] on leave of absence not to exceed one year from date of injury.
Robert Halford, personnel director for defendant, testified that pursuant to the leave of absence policy he wrote a letter to the plaintiff dated January 23, 1985, a copy of which was introduced in evidence and which states On October 19, 1984, you were injured at St. Francis Hospital and have been unable to return to work since that date. The latest communication from your doctor indicates that you might remain off for an indefinite period of time. Since the period of time that you are unable to work is indefinite, I am requesting that you apply for a six months leave of absence. If you would like to apply for long term disability, contact Jane Cherry in the Personnel Department.
It is not my desire to effect your termination and I urge you to consider this request that you apply for a leave of absence. If I have not heard from you in five (5) days I will be obligated to terminate you.
I do hope that you continue to progress. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Plaintiff replied to this letter by letter dated January 28, 1985, entered in evidence, which states:
In response to your letter of January 23, 1985 in which you requested that I apply for a six months leave of absence or apply for long term disability, I wish to state that there is no need for either. You stated that the latest communication from my doctor indicates that I might remain off for an indefinite period of time. I do not know the date of your communication from him, but on January 22, 1985 I went to the doctor and he said I would be able to return to work by the last of February with no restrictions as to limits of lifting. As you should recall, in October, after the second injury and prior to the second surgery for the second injury, I tried to return to work and you refused to let me as the doctor imposed some restrictions on how much I could lift. The doctor naturally felt when I last saw him in January that it would do no good to let me go back before the end of February as he still felt that limits on lifting would apply until that time. He stated the normal recovery period for this type surgery is three months, which will be up the last of February.
I spoke with you on the phone today and you said the six months leave would be without pay and there would be no guarantee that I would...
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...workers' compensation benefits was a substantial motivating factor in the defendant's discharge decision. Johnson v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988); Anderson v. Standard Register Co., App. No. 01-A-01-9102-CV-00035, slip op. at 11, 17 T.A.M. 17-5, 1992 WL ......
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Henderson v. Corrections Corp. of America, 1:94-CV-163.
...a retaliatory discharge action based upon an employee's assertion of a workers' compensation claim. See Johnson v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925, 928-29 (Tenn.Ct. App.1988) (discussing the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge). The Tennesse......
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