Johnson v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 01 November 1968
• Parties: Joseph E. JOHNSON, III, Judge of the Fayette County Court, Appellant, v. W. Wood SIMPSON et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 644

433 S.W.2d 644

Joseph E. JOHNSON, III, Judge of the Fayette County Court Appellant, v. W. Wood SIMPSON et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 1, 1968.

Armand Angelucci, Fayette County Atty., Lexington, for appellant.

C. Gibson Downing, Lexington, for appellees.

OSBORNE, Judge.

This appeal involves the right of appellant, County Judge of Fayette County, to exclude members of the press from trials in what is referred to as the 'adult branch' of juvenile court held under KRS 208.020(3) and from juvenile sessions of the county court held under KRS 208.060. The question reaches this court by way of an appeal taken by the county judge from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court in a mandamus proceeding against him prohibiting him from excluding members of the local press from trials involving juveniles at which other members of the public, including other members of the press, were permitted to be present. The facts giving rise to the controversy are not in dispute and are precisely set out by the circuit judge in, what we consider to be, an excellent memorandum and opinion.

On September 20, 1967, a trial commissioner appointed by the judge in the 'adult juvenile' division of the court directed reporters for the appellee newspaper not to publish the names of certain witnesses who were juveniles. The Lexington Herald, in violation of this directive, published the names. On September 26, 1967, appellant announced in a meeting of the Fayette County Fiscal Court that thereafter the reporters of this paper would be barred from all future sessions of the juvenile court and the 'adult juvenile' sessions of the court. On September 27, 1967, appellees Simpson and Bacon were physically barred from both courts by members of the Fayette County Police Department under the directive of appellant.

Several questions are raised in this appeal. Does KRS 208.060 providing that in the hearings in 'All cases involving children * * * the general public shall be excluded * * *' apply to hearings of adults for contributing to the delinquency of minors held by the juvenile court pursuant to KRS 208.020(3)? In the absence of any statutory provision may a juvenile judge condition a reporter's presence at the trial of an adult for contributing to the delinquency of minors upon his agreeing to not publish the names of the children involved unless the judge allows him to? Can a juvenile judge open the hearings in juvenile cases to reporters only on the condition that they not publish the names of children unless the judge gives specific permission, and then exclude reporters who violate these terms while allowing others to remain?

In answer to the first question it is the opinion of this court that this provision does not apply to the trial of adults. A close reading of the statute does not clearly indicate that it does not. However, this court under a very similar previous statute held that it did not apply to adults. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423. The court in that case relied on a Washington decision interpreting their statute which is practically identical to our present statute. State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 P. 705 (1923). As the Marsh case points out, the other interpretation would lead to constitutional questions. Corpus Juris says in this respect, 43 C.J.S. Infants § 16, p. 73, 'Prosecutions for violations of the laws for the protection of children are criminal in nature and should be conducted in the same manner as other criminal prosecutions; and statutes denying defendant under these prosecutions the right to trial as for any other crime have been declared unconstitutional.' In light of this settled law, we do not believe that the legislature intended this statute to apply to the trial of adults.

On the second question, petitioner insists that the court has the inherent right to conduct its affairs in any manner that it deems fit in its discretion controlled only by what will serve the cause of justice. With this we disagree. The principle that justice can not survive behind walls of silence is so deeply imbedded in our Anglo-American judicial system as to give our people in today's modern society a deep distrust of secret trials. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682. One of the strongest demands of a democratic system is that the public should know what goes on in their courts. This demand can only be met by permitting them to be present in person and by permitting the press who have the facilities to properly inform them to be present upon their behalf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600; State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562. It is insisted by some the right to public trial is solely for the benefit of the criminal defendant and if he has no objection to a closed trial then the public should not be permitted to object. This contention overlooks the fact that the public is a party to all criminal proceedings. The proceeding is prosecuted in the name of the public. In our opinion there is nothing that better protects the rights of the public than their presence in proceedings where these rights are on trial. The news media should be accorded some priority in this respect for they have the facilities to disseminate the information of what transpires to a much broader audience than those who can gather in a crowded court room.

This proposition was very well put by the Arizona Supreme Court in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, ...