Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 44149,44149 |
| Citation | 555 P.2d 997,87 Wn.2d 577 |
| Parties | Geneve G. JOHNSON, personal representative of the Estate of Jack Alfred Johnson, Deceased, Appellant, v. SPIDER STAGING CORPORATION, a Washington Corporation, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Wolfstone, Panchot, Block & Kelley, J. Porter Kelley, Seattle, for appellant.
Guttormsen, Scholfield & Stafford, Jack P. Scholfield, A. Richard Dykstra, Seattle, for respondents.
Appellant, Geneve Johnson, appeals a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful death complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens and declaring Kansas law to be the applicable choice of law.
Jack Johnson owned an exterior building cleaning business in Topeka, Kansas. He purchased a scaffold for his business from respondents, Spider Staging Corporation, Spider Staging, Inc., and Spider Staging Sales Company. On July 19, 1971, Jack Johnson was killed when he fell 60 feet from the scaffold. Appellant sued respondents for wrongful death, claiming they defectively designed the scaffold in that it could not withstand the stress of normal use.
The parties initially argued the choice-of-law issue to the trial court. Kansas law has a $50,000 wrongful death limitation. 1 Washington has no damage limitation on wrongful death actions. The trial court applied both the lex loci delecti and the most significant relationship choice-of-law rules and concluded Kansas law applies to the facts of this case. The trial court also dismissed appellant's complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens with a stipulation that respondents will submit to the jurisdiction of Kansas and will not plead the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court entered a summary judgment in respondent's favor and appellant appeals from this judgment.
At the outset, we must determine whether the trial court properly applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens. If so, we need not reach the choice-of-law issue, as Kansas will assume jurisdiction and determine the applicable law. Forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if the action were brought and tried in another forum. See Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash.2d 360, 370, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the Supreme Court outlined the factors a court should consider when applying the forum non conveniens doctrine:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
(Footnote omitted.)
The factors in the present case do not strongly favor the respondents-defendants. For example, all of the evidence which pertains to the manufacturing and marketing of the scaffold is in Washington State. Respondents are Washington corporations, and all of their principal officers reside in King County. Both of the engineers who designed the scaffold live in King County. The two principal witnesses from Kansas stated in affidavits that they willingly would appear in Washington. Also, appellant will bring the scaffold to Washington and give respondents an opportunity to examine it. The trial court therefore should not have disturbed appellant's choice of forum.
We now proceed to determine the appropriate choice of law. Respondents contend this jurisdiction still follows the lex loci delecti choice-of-law rule. This rule would require the court to apply the law of the place of wrong. In wrongful death actions the law of the place of injury would be the applicable law, See G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflicts of Laws, 190--92 (3d ed. 1963), and in this case the injury occurred in Kansas. However, our recent decisions have rejected the lex loci delecti choice-of-law rule and have adopted the most significant relationship rule for contracts and tort choice-of-law problems. Werner v. Werner, supra; Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash.2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967); See Trautman, Evolution in Washington Choice of Law--A Beginning, 43 Wash.L.Rev. 309 (1967). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971), with which we are in accord, developed this new approach, and § 145 sets out the general principles which apply to a tort choice-of-law problem:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are Determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
(Italics ours.) Accord, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 175--180 (1971). Our approach is not merely to count contacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to determine where these contacts are found. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., supra at 900, 425 P.2d 623. We therefore must consider the significant contacts of this cause with the states of Washington and Kansas. The following is a summary of these contacts:
Washington Kansas
---------- ------
(1) Respondents are (1) Appellant and Jack
Washington corporations, Johnson were residents
and Washington is their and domiciliaries of
principal place of Kansas
business
(2) The scaffold was designed, (2) Jack Johnson's place
tested, and manufactured of business was in
in Washington. Kansas
(3) All of Respondents' (3) Jack Johnson ordered the
advertising originated scaffold from Respondents'
in Washington and was Kansas City distributor.
developed by Washington
personnel.
(4) The scaffold was shipped (4) Kansas was the place
from Washington to Kansas of the accident and
and pursuant to RCW death.
62A.2401(2)(a) 2
title passed to Jack
Johnson at the time and
place of shipment.
(5) Washington State set the
safely requirements for the
scaffold.
a distinct relationship with this cause, and the contacts are evenly balanced . However, Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, supra 76 Wash.2d at 810, 459 P.2d at 35, directs us to a 'consideration of the interests and public policies of potentially concerned states and a regard as to the manner and extent of such policies as they relate to the transaction in issue.' This state interest analysis was also contemplated in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 175, comment D at 523 (1971), wherein it states:
Whether there is such another state should be determined in the light of the choice-of-law principles stated in § 6. In large part, the answer to this question will depend upon whether some other state has a greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than the state where the injury occurred. The extent of the interest of each of the...
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