Johnson v. State, 8 Div. 232
| Decision Date | 29 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 232 |
| Citation | 222 So.2d 370,45 Ala.App. 40 |
| Parties | James Leland JOHNSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Nabors & Torbert, Gadsden, for appellant.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Walter S. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was in the custody of the Sheriff of Madison County, Alabama, by virtue of an arrest under two Governor's rendition warrants issued by the Governor of Alabama at the requests of the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina.
Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Madison County and, from an adverse ruling, he brings this appeal.
The Sheriff did not make a return; however, at the hearing the State introduced in evidence, over appellant's objections, the rendition warrants issued by the Governor of Alabama with allied documents. There was no testimony offered by either side.
A prima facie case for the detention of appellant is established by the introduction of a rendition warrant if it contains all the necessary jurisdictional recitals. Aldio v. State, 42 Ala.App. 653, 177 So.2d 107; State v. Freeman, 42 Ala.App. 240, 160 So.2d 12.
The recitals in the rendition warrants are not conclusive and when the allied or accompanying documents are put in evidence, as in this case, it is our duty to examine them to determine their legal sufficiency to justify the issuance of the warrants. State v. Freeman, supra; Harris v. State, 257 Ala. 3, 60 So.2d 266; Pierce v. Holcombe, 37 Ala.App. 305, 67 So.2d 278.
The request for extradition by the Governor of Georgia reads in pertinent part as follows:
'WHEREAS, It appears by the annexed documents, which are hereby certified to be authentic, that James Leland Johnson stands convicted of the crime of forgery; misdemeanor (simple larceny) committed in the County of Hall in this State, and it has been represented to me that the accused was present in this State at the time of the commission of said crime and thereafter, said Fugitive from Justice escaped from confinement and has fled from the justice of this State, and has taken refuge in the State aforesaid;
'NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the provision of the Constitution of Laws of the United States, in such cases made and provided, I do hereby request that the said Fugitive from Justice be apprehended and delivered to James McNeal and/or agent who is hereby authorized to receive and convey the said Fugitive from Justice to the State of Georgia, there to be dealt with according to law.'
There is also included with the request for extradition properly certified copies of (1) two indictments, one charging forgery and the other charging simple assault; (2) orders of the court sentencing appellant to the penitentiary in both cases; and (3) a certificate directed to the Governor of Georgia by Wallace Lambert, Assistant Director of the State Board of Corrections of Georgia, sworn to before a Notary Public certifying that the appellant was received in the penitentiary in Georgia and while confined in said penitentiary escaped. There is also a certificate by Robert J. Carter, Director of the State Board of Corrections, certifying that Wallace Lambert is his Assistant Director and also a certificate by Ben W. Fortson, Jr., Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, certifying that Robert J. Carter is the Director of the State Board of Corrections of Georgia.
Appellant contends in brief that he should not be detained under the Governor's rendition warrant because he was not charged with the offense of escape.
Tit. 15, Sec. 52, Code of Alabama, 1940, as amended, reads as follows:
'A warrant of extradition must not be issued unless the documents presented by the executive authority making the demand show that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that he thereafter fled from that state, and is now in this state, and that he is lawfully charged by indictment or by an information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made before a magistrate in that state, with having committed a crime under the laws of that state, Or that he has been convicted of crime in that state and has escaped from confinement or broken his parole.' (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of whether appellant should be charged with a new offense of escape in the demanding state to comply with extradition requisites, we quote from 78 A.L.R., p. 420:
'The general rule seems to be well settled that either a convict who escapes, or one who is released from prison on parole and violates the terms of his parole, may be extradited from another state in which he is found, as a fugitive from justice, on the ground that he is a convict whose time has not expired, and who, therefore, is 'charged with crime' under the United States Constitution.
'Cases supporting the general rule above stated, and holding that escaped convicts are properly the subject of extradition, are the following: Re Jones (1921) 54 Cal.App. 423, 201 Pac. 944; Drinkall v. Spiegel (1896) 68 Conn. 441, 36 L.R.A. 486, 36 Atl. 830; Re Hope (1889) 7 N.Y.Crim.Rep. 406, 10 N.Y.Supp. 28; Ex parte Bergman (1910) 60 Tex.Crim.Rep. 8, 130 S.W. 174; Ex parte Haynes (1924) 98 Tex.Crim.Rep. 609, 267 S.W. 490 * * *'
In the case of State ex rel. Treseder v. Remann, 165 Wash. 92, 4 P.2d 866, 78 A.L.R. 412, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
'A person is 'charged' with crime after his conviction as well as before.'
In the case of Re Hope, 7 Cr.R. 406, 10 N.Y.S. 28, the court stated:
* * *'
We feel that our statute hereinbefore quoted is broad enough to extradite fugitives from justice when they have been convicted of a crime in the demanding state and have escaped from confinement, without having to rely on the rationale of the Treseder and Hope cases, supra.
Appellant further contends in brief that there is some conflict between the Governor's rendition warrant and the request for extradition by the Governor of Georgia and allied papers.
We have reviewed very carefully the request of the Governor of Georgia for extradition and allied papers and find that the Governor of Alabama had before him necessary jurisdictional...
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