Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 02 April 1930 |
| Citation | 99 Fla. 711,127 So. 317 |
| Parties | JOHNSON, Sheriff v. STATE ex rel. FOX. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Polk County; Harry G. Taylor, Judge.
Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of W. L. Fox, against J A. Johnson, as Sheriff of Polk County. To review an adverse judgment, defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Peterson, Carver, Langston & O'Quin, of Lakeland, and Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.
Johnson Bosaige & Allen, of Bartow, and W. C. Hodges, of Tallahassee for defendant in error.
An information was lodged against W. L. Fox in the criminal court of record of Polk county, charging him as 'public appointee, namely, a citrus fruit inspector of the State of Florida,' with 'accepting compensation and other remuneration other than those provided by law' for the 'nonperformance of a law' which it was the duty of Fox as 'such public appointee to administer, respect, perform and execute.' The duty alleged was 'properly inspecting certain citrus fruit to determine whether the same was mature as provided in the standards' fixed by the legislative acts, chapter 10103 and chapter 11875, Laws of 1925 and 1927, respectively. The place of the alleged violation of law was alleged to have been at the packing house of the Lake Wales Citrus Growers' Association in Polk county; the time, November 15, 1928.
There was a second count charging in substance the same alleged criminal act. A warrant was issued upon the information, and Fox was taken into custody by the sheriff. The warrant seems to have been issued on the 20th day of June, 1929, and on the same day Fox filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court for Polk county, and was immediately discharged upon the sheriff's return.
The state was allowed by order of the judge to take a writ of error to the judgment, which was done.
It is contended by the defendant in error that there is no such office under the law as citrus fruit inspector, and that the charge cannot be supported under section 7486, C. G. L. 1927, because the accused is neither a state, county, or municipal officer or appointee.
Section 7486, supra, is as follows: 'It shall be unlawful for any officer, State, county or municipal, or any public appointee, or any deputy of any such officer or appointee, to exact or accept any reward, compensation, or other remuneration other than those provided by law, from any person whatsoever for the performance, nonperformance or violation of any law, rule or regulation that may be incumbent upon the said officer or appointee to administer, respect, perform, execute or to have executed: Provided, that nothing herein shall be construed so as to preclude a sheriff or his deputies, city marshal or policeman from accepting rewards or remuneration for services performed in apprehending any criminal.'
The theory of the state's prosecuting officer in formulating the charge in the information is that the accused was a state officer or a public appointee. If he was a mere deputy of a state officer, it could not be said that the information wholly failed to state a case, although on the trial a question of variance might be raised between the allegation that the accused was a public appointee and the proof that he was a deputy of such an appointee. If a citrus fruit inspector is a term used to designate certain deputies of a public appointee or state officer, the information would not be amenable to the criticism that it wholly failed to charge an offense because it alleged the inspector to be a public appointee. See section 8368, C. G. L. 1927; Williams v. State, 97 Fla. 401, 121 So. 462; In re Robinson, 73 Fla. 1068, 75 So. 604, L. R. A. 1918B, 1148.
Where the indictment or information charges an offense substantially in the language of the statute, it is not the subject for an attack on habeas corpus, although there may be inaccuracies and imperfections rendering it vulnerable to attack by demurrer, or motion to quash, or even a motion in arrest of judgment. Nor can a habeas corpus proceeding be made the substitute for a writ of error or an appeal. These doctrines are familiar law in this state, and need no citations of authority to support them.
There is a defect in the information which may as well be noted here. The defect consists in the failure to negative the idea that the accused had good ground for believing that the remuneration accepted was authorized by law.
Section 7487, C. G. L. 1927, makes that ingredient an essential element of the crime of accepting a reward or compensation other than that provided by...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nell v. State
...892, 180 So. 357, and each essential element of the offense as set forth in the statute must be strictly proved, Johnson v. State ex rel. Fox, 1930, 99 Fla. 711, 127 So. 317; State ex rel. Grady v. Coleman, 1938, 133 Fla. 400, 183 So. 25; Younghans v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d The perti......
-
State v. Hazellief, s. 2790-2794
...Coleman, 1938, 133 Fla. 400, 183So. 25; State ex rel. Williams v. Coleman, 1938, 131 Fla. 872, 877, 180 So. 360; Johnson v. State ex rel. Fox, 1930, 99 Fla. 711, 127 So. 317. See also 5 Fla.Jur., Bribery, §§ 17, In Russell v. United States, 1962, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, ......
-
State v. Pendarvis
...question. State ex rel. Warren v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 970, 130 So. 716; Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81; and Johnson v. State ex rel. Fox, 99 Fla. 711, 127 So. 317. In the definition of 'apartment house' the Florida statute made an exception where rooms were occupied by the owner as......
- Johnson v. State