Johnson v. State

Decision Date29 October 1912
Citation59 So. 894,64 Fla. 321
PartiesJOHNSON v. STATE.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Error to Circuit Court, Santa Rosa County; J. Emmett Wolfe, Judge.

Walter Johnson was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

One cannot escape the penalties for an act which in point of fact produces death, which death might possibly have been averted by some possible mode of treatment. When the wound is in itself dangerous to life, mere erroneous treatment of it, or of the wounded man suffering from it, will afford the defendant no protection.

The allowance of leading questions is not assignable for error.

An intelligent boy 13 years old may be a competent witness though not advised as to a temporal punishment for perjury.

A witness may testify that some one 'cursed' in his presence, though he may not remember the exact words used.

A witness, having testified that he had talked with no one about the case, may be asked by the court if he had not testified at a previous hearing and to explain.

A written statement, not a dying declaration, by the decedent declaring forgiveness of the injury done him is properly excluded.

It suffices to a conviction of a homicide that the wound inflicted was the proximate cause of the death, even though another cause may have contributed thereto.

An objection after verdict that jurors bearing the name of the deceased were related in a remote degree to him comes too late; they being also related in the same degree to the wife of the defendant.

COUNSEL W. W. Clark and H. S. Laird, both of Milton, for plaintiff in error.

Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., and C. O. Andrews, of Tallahassee, for the State.

OPINION

COCKRELL, J.

For killing Frank Jurnigan by cutting him with a knife, Walter Johnson was convicted of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation for mercy, and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The would, 1 1/2 to 2 inches long and 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 deep extended through the cavity of the stomach, and, while much of the intestines protruded, it does not appear that any of them were cut. The wounded man was treated by a surgeon, but death ensued in about a fortnight thereafter.

Much of the brief here is devoted to the theory that death was due to improper surgery, or that the life might have been saved by proper surgery; but at most the testimony is that, under different conditions, modern surgery might have been successful. The septic conditions surrounding this patient rendered it highly probable that death would ensue from this severe would, and a practical certainty that only most efficient outside assistance would have averted the fatality there was no testimony that this would, under the circumstances, was not in itself dangerous to life.

Without therefore, passing specifically upon the various assignments, we reply in general by adopting the language of Judge T. N. McClellan, speaking for the Supreme Court of Alabama in Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 So. 378: 'A defendant cannot escape the penalties for an act which in point of fact produces death, which death might possibly have been averted by some possible mode of treatment. The true doctrine is that, where the would is in itself dangerous to life, mere erroneous treatment of it or of the wounded man suffering from it will afford the defendant no protection against the charge of unlawful homicide.' See, also, Wharton on Homicide (3d Ed.) § 35, wherein it is said that the subsequent neglect or mismanagement must have been the sole cause of death.

There are several objections to testimony upon the sole ground that the questions were leading. The allowance of leading questions is within the discretion of the trial court and is not assignable for error. Reyes v. State, 49 Fla. 17, 38 So. 257.

The question asked a witness if she 'could have recognized any one any distance from her by moonlight that night'...

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20 cases
  • Hallman v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • March 15, 1979
    ...the fact of the hospital's negligence would not have precluded Hallman's conviction. As this Court explained in Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 323, 59 So. 894, 895 (1912): A defendant cannot escape the penalties for an act which in point of fact produces death, which death might possibly ha......
  • Kinya v. Lifter, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • April 29, 1986
    ...the substance of a conversation which he had with a party, even though he cannot recount the conversation verbatim. Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 59 So. 894 (1912); Ayers v. State, 62 Fla. 14, 57 So. 349 (1911); Kennard v. State, 42 Fla. 581, 28 So. 858 (1900). Section 90.701, Fla.Stat. (1......
  • Rowe v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • June 4, 1937
    ...... exercise of that discretion is not reviewable on writ of. error by an appellate court. Stinson v. State, 76. Fla. 421, 80 So. 506; Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 389,. 59 So. 946, Ann.Cas.1914B, 897; Penton v. State, 64. Fla. 411, 60 So. 343; Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321,. 59 So. 894; Camp v. State, 58 Fla. 12, 50 So. 537;. Falk v. Kimmerle, 57 Fla. 70, 49 So. 504, 17. Ann.Cas. 839. The conduct of the examination of the. witnesses, made the basis of assignments, was not such as to. warrant a holding that there was an abuse of the ......
  • Rose v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 6, 1991
    ...the supreme court adopted the doctrine that medical neglect did not excuse a defendant from a charge of murder. In Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 59 So. 894, 895 (Fla.1912) the court A defendant cannot escape the penalties for an act which in point of fact produces death, which death might ......
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