Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 29 June 1908
• Parties: JOHNSON v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

112 S.W. 143

87 Ark. 45

JOHNSON v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 29, 1908

Certiorari to Yell Chancery Court; Jeremiah G. Wallace. Chancellor; judgment quashed.

Jo Johnson, pro se.

Wilful disregard or disobedience of public authority constitutes contempt. Bouv. Law Dict. Disrespect: wilful disregard of the authority of the court. Anderson, Law Dict. Contempt is disorderly or insolent language or behavior in the presence of the court. 3 Am. & Eng. Law, 1st Ed. p. 777. Petitioner had the right to file the motion suggesting the disqualification of the chancellor in this particular instance.

William F. Kirby, Attorney General, and Dan'l Taylor, for respondent.

Contempt may be shown either by language or manner. 9 Cyc. 7. The trial judge can best estimate the manner, spirit and intention of acts done in the presence of the court. Things in the light of surrounding circumstances, not apparent upon the record, might be grossly insulting, and tend to destroy respect for judicial action, which, to this court, might seem indifferent. 35 Ark. 458. Where there is not plain and apparent abuse of authority in matters of contempt, this court ought not to interfere. Id.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, J.

Petitioner is an attorney at law, and procured from this court a writ of certiorari to bring up for review the record of a judgment of the chancery court of Yell County against him for contempt. The judgment, which explains the whole proceedings, is as follows (omitting caption):

"Now on this day, the defendant Jo Johnson being plaintiff's solicitor in a cause pending in this court wherein W. T Dunbar is plaintiff and Joseph Evins and others are defendants and cross complainants, the said Johnson appearing for and representing the plaintiff W. T. Dunbar, and the said Johnson having filed and argued before the court a number of other vexatious motions in said cause, which had been overruled by the court, thereupon the said Johnson offered to file the following motion in said cause, to-wit:

"'Comes the plaintiff by his attorney and suggests to the court that the attorney's fee of Judge R. C. Bullock, one of the attorneys for the said cross-complainant, as well as the fees of all the attorneys for said cross-complainant, largely and substantially, if not wholly, depend upon the rendition of a judgment and decree in this case in favor of said cross-complainant; that said R. C. Bullock is related to the judge of this court within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Wherefore plaintiff prays that the said Bullock be interrogated as to his interest in the subject-matter of this suit and in the determination of same, so that the said judge may decline to sit at the hearing of this case, if found proper so to decline.

"'Jo Johnson, attorney for plaintiff.'

"Thereupon the court assessed a fine of fifty dollars against the said Jo Johnson for the contempt of court.

"It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the State of Arkansas do have and recover of and from the said Jo Johnson the sum of fifty dollars, as for fine and penalty for contempt, and all her costs in this behalf laid out and expended, and that the State of Arkansas have execution therefor; and said Johnson excepts."

This court in Ex parte Davies, 73 Ark. 358, 84 S.W. 633, settled the practice to be followed in reviewing judgments rendered by circuit and chancery courts for contempts committed in the presence of the court.

Judge RIDDICK, speaking for the court in that case, said: "As contempts committed in the presence of the court may be summarily tried and prosecuted without process or pleading of any kind, it is highly proper that the judgment should contain a finding of the facts constituting the contempt. Chief Justice Ruffin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a case of this kind before that court, said that 'it befits every court which has a proper tenderness of the rights of the citizens and a due respect to its own character to state in its judgment explicitly the facts constituting the contempt, not suppressing those on which the person might be entitled to be discharged, more than it would insert others which do not exist, for the sake of justifying the commitment.' Ex parte Summers, 5 Iredell's Law, 149. He shows clearly and convincingly the reasons why such a finding of facts should be made in the judgment, but he held that the absence of such a finding did not render the judgment void." Judge Riddick also added this, with respect to a judgment for contempt: "When a judgment of that kind is entered against an offender, the statements in the record must be taken in a proceeding of this kind as absolutely true, and we cannot interfere unless it clearly appears that the judgment is wrong."

We therefore indulge the conclusive presumption that the learned chancellor recited in his judgment all of the facts constituting the alleged contempt of court, and, as the face of the judgment does not disclose any finding that the petitioner's manner in presenting his motion was discourteous or disrespectful to the court, or that he was guilty of any contemptuous conduct, unless the presentation of the motion be found, in itself, to constitute contempt, we presume that there was no objectionable conduct other than the mere filing of the motion.

There is a recital, however, that petitioner had previously filed in the case and argued before the court other vexatious motions. When these motions were filed, the judgment does not recite, nor does it declare...