Johnson v. State
Decision Date | 15 June 2022 |
Docket Number | A20A0996 |
Citation | 874 S.E.2d 807 |
Parties | JOHNSON v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ricky Johnson, for Appellant.
Penny Alane Penn, James Aaron Dunn, for Appellee.
Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.
A jury found Ricky Johnson guilty of one count of burglary and four counts of theft by taking, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of forty years in prison. The trial court denied Johnson's motion for a new trial, and, on appeal, we affirmed his convictions and sentences. See Johnson v. State , 357 Ga. App. XXV (Case No. A20A0996) (Nov. 2, 2020) (unpublished) ("Johnson I "). In that decision, as relevant here, we rejected Johnson's claim that some of his theft-by-taking convictions should merge into each other. See id., slip op. at 14-15 (8) (b). On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated our holding in that regard on the ground that we applied the wrong legal analysis in evaluating Johnson's merger claim. See Johnson v. State , 313 Ga. 155, 160-161 (4), 868 S.E.2d 226 (2022) (" Johnson II "). The case is now again before us following the Supreme Court's remand with instructions to apply the proper analysis. See id. at 161 (4), 868 S.E.2d 226. For the reasons that follow, we vacate three of Johnson's four theft-by-taking convictions and sentences and remand this case for the trial court to resentence Johnson after merging those convictions into his remaining theft-by-taking conviction.
The Supreme Court set forth the following relevant facts in its decision:
Johnson II , 313 Ga. at 155-157 (1), 868 S.E.2d 226 (footnotes omitted).
On appeal, we rejected Johnson's contention that two of his three theft-by-taking convictions for the theft of the trucks should have merged, such that he could be convicted of only one count of theft by taking for the theft of the trucks.1 See Johnson I , Case No. A20A0996 (8) (b). In reaching that conclusion, we evaluated Johnson's merger claim using the "actual evidence" test enunciated in Braswell v. State , 245 Ga. App. 602, 604 (4), 538 S.E.2d 492 (2000), overruled in part as recognized in Johnson II , 313 Ga. at 158 (3) & n. 6, 868 S.E.2d 226. See Johnson I , Case No. A20A0996 (8) (b). Under that test, "[t]he key question in determining whether a merger has occurred [was] whether the different offenses are proven with the same facts." Braswell , 245 Ga. App. at 604 (4), 538 S.E.2d 492.
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court held that we erred by relying on Braswell ’s "actual evidence" test, which governed "merger for multiple counts of different crimes instead of multiple counts of the same crime — the latter being the type of merger claim Johnson presented ... with respect to his convictions for theft by taking."2 Johnson II , 313 Ga. at 158 (3), 868 S.E.2d 226 (emphasis omitted). The Court further explained that, to address a merger claim premised on multiple convictions for the same crime, a court must "ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of-prosecution analysis." Id. at 159 (4) , 868 S.E.2d 226 (citation and punctuation omitted). The Court observed that the course-of-conduct evaluation involves examining the defendant's intent and the time and location of the crimes at issue. See id. And the Court emphasized that the proper unit-of-prosecution test entails evaluating the statutory text to determine "whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). We now turn to the relevant analysis, as directed by the Supreme Court.
1. "The question of multiple punishments (as opposed to multiple prosecutions) for the same criminal conduct is addressed under the rubric of substantive double jeopardy." Smith v. State , 290 Ga. 768, 772 (3), 723 S.E.2d 915 (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). Under that rubric, we first must determine "whether [the] crimes arose from a single course of conduct." Johnson II , 313 Ga. at 159 (4), 868 S.E.2d 226 (citation and punctuation omitted). Factors relevant to that analysis include: (i) whether Johnson "acted with the same or differing intents"; (ii) "whether the crimes occurred at the same place"; and (iii) "whether the crimes occurred at the same time or were separated by some meaningful interval of time." Id. ; see also Lucas v. State , 328 Ga. App. 741, 743 (1), 760 S.E.2d 257 (2014).
The facts described above indicate that Johnson acted with the same intent — to steal the company's property — from the moment he first entered the company's building shortly before 11:00 p.m. on the night in question until he left the property at approximately 4:30 a.m. the following morning. Moreover, the crimes all occurred in the same targeted area: the building containing the company's shop and office space, a garage in front of the building, and a parking area outside of the building. Finally, while several minutes passed between the times Johnson could be seen exiting the building with equipment and returning to retrieve more items, those brief passages of time — on the facts of this case — are more appropriately viewed as resulting from limits on how much property Johnson could move in each trip (and therefore ancillary to a single plan to steal multiple items), and not as breaks during which Johnson ceased all criminal activity and then formed a new intent to steal other items. See Ingram v. State , 279 Ga. 132, 133-134 (2), 610 S.E.2d 21 (2005) ( ). Consequently, the intervals between Johnson's appearances on the surveillance recording are not "meaningful" for purposes of the relevant analysis. Our review of the pertinent factors therefore indicates that all of the thefts at issue here "arose from a single course of conduct." Johnson II , 313 Ga. at 159 (4), 868 S.E.2d 226 (citation and punctuation omitted); see Lucas , 328 Ga. App. at 743-744 (1), 760 S.E.2d 257 (...
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