Johnson v. State
Decision Date | 24 July 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 3-285A33,3-285A33 |
Citation | 480 N.E.2d 600 |
Parties | Thelma JOHNSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Diane McNeal, Appellate Public Defender's Office, Crown Point, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
On August 22, 1985, Thelma Johnson (Johnson) was sentenced to four (4) years in prison after a jury found her guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. 1 Johnson requested this Court to review:
(1) Whether an extrajudicial statement was erroneously admitted into evidence?
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a four (4) year sentence?
Affirmed.
In cases where the admission of evidence is an issue, whether such evidence is relevant is a matter of trial court discretion. Henderson v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 1117, 1119. Absent clear error or manifest abuse of discretion, such rulings do not constitute reversible error. Napier v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 1361, 1364.
Johnson has not contended that the evidence in issue was not relevant, thus, it remains to determine only whether its admission was the result of an abuse of discretion.
On January 14, 1984, Rochelle Cromwell 2 (Rochelle) was in her mother's apartment. On that night she observed her mother shoot Raymond Nunn. 3 After police arrived on the scene, Rochelle was taken to the police station where she provided them with a handwritten statement of what she saw. Rochelle later was called as a witness at her mother's trial, and a carbon copy of her prior written statement was introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit No. 8, over Johnson's timely objection.
Johnson's contention on appeal is that despite the Patterson rule, certain portions of Rochelle's extrajudicial statement should have been excluded as hearsay. The basis for this position is that Rochelle could not recall at trial certain portions of her written statement, and that portions of her in-court testimony varied from her out of court handwritten statement. In her appeal, Johnson claims that those portions of Exhibit 8 in variance with Rochelle's in-court testimony should have been stricken before it was given to the jury. 4 Such is not the law in Indiana.
Hearsay is an extrajudicial statement repeated in court and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Its value rests upon the credibility of the out of court asserter. Patterson v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 55, 57, 324 N.E.2d 482, 484 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) and Baker v. Wagers (1984), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 218, 220 (trans. denied ). Generally, hearsay is not admitted into evidence because of the threat of unreliability or presumed inefficacy of any possible cross-examination. 5 Baker, supra. This basic rule is replete with exceptions when sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness are present. The jurisprudence of the State of Indiana recognizes numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, and one of them is that a prior statement of a witness is admissible not only for purposes of impeachment, but also as substantive evidence if the out-of-court declarant is present at trial for cross examination. Franklin v. Duckworth (1982), N.D.Ind., 530 F.Supp. 1315, 1318, affm'd 714 F.2d 148. This rule was first announced in Patterson v. State, supra, and it has become known as the Patterson rule.
In Patterson, the Indiana Supreme Court decided that when a witness neither denies or professes ignorance of their extrajudicial statements in court, there is no reason to reject those extrajudicial statements as substantive evidence simply because their statements had been made out of court, at a time when the witness was not subject to cross examination. In the instant case, one requirement of the Patterson rule is easily satisfied because the author of the extrajudicial statement was present and available for cross examination. 6 Another requirement of the Patterson rule, that the witness neither deny or profess ignorance of their extrajudicial statement, presents a closer question for this Court.
In the instant case, the Carter procedural requirements were met. Rochelle did acknowledge making her handwritten statement before State's Exhibit No. 8 was admitted into evidence, and she did deny portions of it prior to its admission.
In dicta contained in a footnote of the Carter opinion, this Court said:
Carter, supra at 832, n. 4 (emphasis supplied). In the present case, Rochelle's handwritten statement was properly authenticated. The fact that the statement was written in the witness's own hand, at a time shortly after the events detailed in her statement occurred, is significant. It bolsters the trustworthiness of her extrajudicial statement providing a safeguard against the misuse of this evidence. Rather than accept Johnson's claim, our reading of Carter persuades us that Exhibit No. 8 was admitted without error.
The Indiana Supreme Court has provided additional support for our decision. In Watkins v. State (1983), Ind, 446 N.E.2d 949, that Court said:
Watkins, supra at 960 (original emphasis). Thus, the trial judge did not err as a matter of law by admitting the extrajudicial statement that contained portions which were denied or not recollected at trial. Here there was conflicting testimony by Rochelle. She could recall writing the whole statement, but she could not recall writing a part of it. When such a conflict arises, it is to be determined by the trial judge whether or not the portion of the statement in question is admissible as substantive evidence. Id. This Court finds neither clear error nor manifest abuse of discretion in the trial...
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