Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 05 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A1926,A92A1926 |
| Citation | 427 S.E.2d 29,207 Ga.App. 34 |
| Parties | JOHNSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Nannette D. Garrett, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Gina C. Shuman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Johnson was tried and convicted of burglary and appeals.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it was that on December 14, 1991, Lurlline Chitman, Johnson's ex-girl friend, returned to her apartment and found a window broken. She suspected a burglary in progress, suspected that Johnson might be the perpetrator and called 911.
The police arrived, but found no signs of a forced entry. During a search of the apartment, they found insulation hanging out from a trap door in the bathroom closet. They climbed into the crawl space above the apartment and found Johnson lying between the rafters about eight feet away from the trap door. A letter which Johnson had written was located adjacent to the place Johnson had been lying. The letter was to Ms. Chitman, and referred to recent problems in their relationship and stated in part: "I understand that I get wild and violent from time to time...." In the top of the bathroom closet was a kitchen knife, which had been taken from Chitman's kitchen.
During his relationship with Chitman, Johnson had stayed overnight at her apartment on several occasions. Nevertheless, Chitman had not given Johnson a key to her apartment. On the night of December 14, Chitman was concerned that Johnson might come to her residence based on a hostile conversation between the two earlier that same day and on his previous violent behavior towards her.
Johnson also testified at trial. He claimed that he was living at Chitman's apartment on December 14, 1991, and that he had a key to the apartment. He also testified that he had arranged for a telephone line to be installed in the apartment, which he had contracted for in the name of "Darryl Walker." Johnson admitted that he and Chitman had an argument on December 14 and that he had previously been physically violent towards her. He also admitted that he was on probation on December 14 for theft by receiving of an automobile, that he had violated his probation by failing to report and pay his fine, and that he was attempting to elude authorities for as long as possible.
1. In his first enumeration of error, Johnson claims that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction for burglary. Citing Hamby v. State, 173 Ga.App. 750, 328 S.E.2d 224 (1985) and Johnson v. State, 158 Ga.App. 432, 280 S.E.2d 856 (1981), he argues that the burglary conviction was invalid, since it was predicated on Johnson entering the residence to commit an aggravated assault, and there was no showing that Chitman had any immediate apprehension for her safety, a necessary element of the crime of aggravated assault.
We do not agree. The crime for which Johnson was convicted was burglary, not aggravated assault. "To complete the crime of burglary, it is not necessary that a defendant actually commit a theft or a felony; it is sufficient if he enters without authority and with the intent to commit a theft or a felony." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 251(12), 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987); Whittlesey v. State, 192 Ga.App. 667, 385 S.E.2d 757 (1989). In this case, there was sufficient evidence that Johnson entered the apartment without authority and with the intent to commit an aggravated assault. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In his second enumeration, Johnson contends that the court erred by improperly charging the jury and thereby deprived him of his due process rights. At the outset, we note that appellant has failed to separately delineate his arguments as separate enumerations of error as required by the rules of this court. See generally Court of Appeals Rule 27(e).
(a) Johnson first contends that the court charged the jury in a confusing and misleading manner by failing to give his requested instructions regarding burglary. We...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Adams v. State, S99A1091.
...the suggested pattern jury instruction on burglary. See Thompson v. State, supra at 106, fn. 2, 519 S.E.2d 434; Johnson v. State, 207 Ga.App. 34, 36(2)(a), 427 S.E.2d 29 (1993). We find no reversible error 5. Appellant complains that the jury found her guilty of felony murder without specif......
-
Eskew v. the State.
...Ga. 324, 327(3), 676 S.E.2d 221 (2009). 9. See Daniel v. State, 248 Ga. 271, 272(1), 282 S.E.2d 314 (1981); Johnson v. State, 207 Ga.App. 34, 36–37(2)(d), 427 S.E.2d 29 (1993). Compare Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676, 678–679(3), 699 S.E.2d 302 (2010) (allowing for appellate review of denial......
-
Rampell v. Williams
...and consider the merits of this appeal. See Henderson v. State, 211 Ga.App. 102(1), 438 S.E.2d 181 (1993); Johnson v. State, 207 Ga.App. 34(2), 427 S.E.2d 29 (1993). 2. "There are four elements to any tort action: duty, breach, causation, and damages. With respect to causation, to recover d......