Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 11 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 45764,45764 |
| Citation | 314 So.2d 573 |
| Parties | Christopher John JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gerald S. Rutberg, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
ALDERMAN, JAMES E., Circuit Judge.
This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Seminole County. The trial judge below directly passed on the constitutionality of Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this court under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellant, age fifteen (15), and an adult female co-defendant, age nineteen (19), were jointly indicted by a Seminole County Grand Jury. The three count indictment charged the crimes of Armed Breaking and Entering of a Dwelling with Intent to Commit a Felony, to-wit: Grand Larceny 1; Robbery 2; and Aggravated Assault 3. The first two counts of the indictment each carried a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes 4 is unconstitutional. The Court below denied the motion to dismiss and specifically held the statute to be constitutional. Subsequently appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to Attempted Robbery. The trial judge, under authority of Section 959.115, Florida Statutes, 5 adjudged appellant to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Division of Youth Services for an indeterminate period, provided such commitment not extend beyond his twenty-first birthday. The judge also ordered the Division of Youth Services to submit to the court quarterly reports as to the appellant's status and progress and further ordered that he not be released from the care, custody and control of the court until proper application for further disposition be made by the Division of Youth Services.
Appellant contends that Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of both the United States and the Florida Constitutions. Alternatively he argues that even if the statute is not unconstitutional on its face, it has been applied in such a manner as to deprive him of his constitutional rights. His attack is based upon the fact that some children charged with violations of Florida law punishable by death or by life imprisonment are indicted and may thereafter be handled in every respect as an adult, while others similarly charged are not indicted and are thereby retained within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court. He argues that State Attorneys and Grand Juries have 'unbridled discretion' to determine which child is to be indicted and threated as an adult and which is to be charged as a delinquent.
The determination of the validity of appellant's contention requires a consideration of the constitutional basis for the juvenile court system in Florida. With regard to juveniles, the Florida Constitution provides:
(Article I, Section 15(b), Constitution of the State of Florida, Florida Statutes Annotated, Volume 25A, Page 335).
This provision of the Florida Constitution becomes operative only after implementation by the Legislature. When authorized by law, a child in Florida may be charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of a criminal act. However, without legislative enactment there would be no separate juvenile court system in Florida.
The people of Florida, through their elected representatives, by enactment of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, have determined under what circumstances a person may be charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of a crime. A 'child' is presently defined as '. . . any married or unmarried person under the age of eighteen years or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of eighteen years. 6 A 'delinquent child' is defined as '. . . a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except a child who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case has not been transferred to the circuit court by the court having jurisdiction.' 7 The Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court is granted exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent. 8 However, the Legislature provided three methods by which jurisdiction over a 'child' could be transferred to the criminal division of the appropriate court and the 'child' treated as an adult.
First, a 'child' alleged to have committed a violation of law other than a juvenile traffic offense, prior to commencement of an adjudicatory hearing, may, if joined by a parent or, in the absence of a parent, by his guardian, demand to be tried as an adult. The judge of the juvenile division in such cases must waive jurisdiction and certify the case to the appropriate court for trial as if the child were an adult. 9
Next, if the judge of the juvenile division, after a waiver hearing as provided by law, finds that a child who is fourteen years of age or older and who, if an adult, would be charged with a violation of Florida law, should be tried as an adult, the judge may enter an order waiving jurisdiction and certifying the case for trial as if the child were an adult, and thereafter the child is subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate court as if the child were an adult. 10 This court has previously considered and upheld the constitutionality of the waiver hearing procedure. 11
The third method allows removal by indictment, from the juvenile to the criminal division, of a child charged with violation of Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment. 12 It was by indictment that the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Seminole County acquired jurisdiction over appellant, and it is this procedure which appellant contends is unconstitutional.
It should be clear that a young person charged with violation of criminal law does not have an absolute right to be treated as a 'delinquent child' solely because of age. The constitutional basis for the juvenile court system in Florida allows, but does not require, that a 'child' who has committed a violation of law be charged with an act of delinquency instead of a crime. The Legislature, by its enactment of Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes, created an exception to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court applicable to a 'child' charged by indictment with having committed a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. In our opinion this exception is within the scope of legislative authority allowed under Article I, Section 15(b) of the Florida Constitution.
This brings us to a consideration of appellant's argument that Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional because it results in a denial of 'due process' and 'equal protection of the law.' There is no basis for appellant's 'due process' argument. Any 'child', indicted by a Grand Jury for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment and thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court, has the same substantive and procedural rights of any other person. It also affirmatively appears from the record on appeal in this case that appellant was in fact afforded 'due process of law.'
Appellant's 'equal protection' argument is also without merit. He argues that the statute is defective because it sets no guidelines to assist the State Attorney or Grand Jury in determining which child should be indicted and which should be dealt with as a delinquent. He further alleges that the Grand Jury reviews only those cases brought before it by the State Attorney and that the State Attorney has complete discretion to determine which cases are submitted to the Grand Jury. It should be pointed out that the Grand Jury as established in Florida is not limited to those cases presented to it by the State Attorney, but may institute its own investigations and inquire into every offense triable within its jurisdiction. 13 However, assuming for the sake of argument that most offenses are brought to the attention of the Grand Jury by the State Attorney, it does not follow that this results in denial of 'equal protection of the law.' In both the adult and juvenile divisions of our court system, the State Attorney...
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