Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 16 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-95-00806-CR,05-95-00806-CR |
| Parties | Johnny Ray JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Robert Udashen, Dallas, for Appellant.
Lorraine A. Raggio, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, for Appellee.
Before MALONEY, JAMES and MOSELEY, JJ.
A jury convicted Johnny Ray Johnson of murder and assessed a forty-five-year sentence. Appellant raised five points of error on appeal contending, among other things, that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson 1 objections to the State's peremptory strikes of two prospective jurors. For the reasons set forth below, we overrule all of appellant's points and affirm the trial court's judgment.
While on patrol in the early morning hours of October 8, 1994, a Dallas police officer came upon a van stopped on the street with the headlights on. He stopped to investigate and discovered several bullet holes in the passenger side of the van, as well as seven spent casings outside the van. Thomas Johnson was in the driver's seat with his foot on the brake pedal. Johnson was dead.
In his first point of error, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove he knowingly or intentionally caused the victim's death. We address this point first because if the evidence is legally insufficient, appellant is entitled to an acquittal. 2
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the critical inquiry is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 This Court does not ask whether it believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 5
The fact finder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. 6 The fact finder may reject all or part of any witness's testimony. 7 The fact finder need not believe even uncontroverted evidence. 8 The fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 9 We do not disturb the fact finder's decision unless it is irrational or supported by only a "mere modicum" of evidence. 10 We do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. 11
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Ferdinand Dominguez, a Dallas police officer assigned to the physical evidence section, collected evidence from the crime scene. He testified that most of the bullets entered the van aimed at the deceased. At least one or two of the bullets that hit the deceased also smashed the driver's side window. He opined that the shots could have come from a moving car. He found no weapons at the crime scene.
James Williams testified that on the evening of October 7, he saw the van in an apartment house parking lot. He thought that two people were in the van. Later that evening, he, Derrick Harris, and Roosevelt Hodge were passengers in an El Camino driven by appellant. Williams said that when appellant saw the van, he made a U-turn and drove about eighty miles an hour to catch up to the van. Appellant pulled the El Camino along side of the van's passenger side and shot at it five, six, or seven times. After appellant shot at the van, it stopped in the middle of the road. Williams thought two people were in the van, but he never saw the deceased point a gun at the El Camino.
Harris testified that earlier that evening they were in an apartment house parking lot. Although he heard appellant and the van's driver exchanging words, Harris did not know what was said. Later, when he, Williams, Hodge, and appellant were all in the El Camino, appellant chased the van. Appellant took a gun from his waistband. Harris did not see anyone in the van with a gun. When appellant caught up with the van, he started shooting and he continued shooting as he drove past the van. Appellant shot through the passenger side of the van about five times. Harris thought two people were in the van and both were killed.
Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used a gun in a deadly manner. And any rational trier of fact could have inferred from appellant's using a gun in a deadly manner that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the deceased's death. 15 We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Having found the evidence legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction, we now consider appellant's second point of error in which he argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction.
When reviewing challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, as opposed to the legal sufficiency, we view all of the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution." 16 In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must be appropriately deferential to the fact finder's determination and avoid substituting our judgment for the fact finder's. 17 We review the fact finder's weighing of the evidence and are authorized to disagree with the fact finder's determination. 18 However, it is not enough that we believe a different result is more reasonable. 19 We will set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. 20
In addition to the above evidence, appellant testified in his own defense. He stated that on October 7, 1994, he was visiting friends in Dallas. Appellant said he was standing outside the Highland Hills Apartments when he saw a van drive by. The driver said something to appellant as he passed but appellant could not understand what he said. When appellant saw the van a second time, he saw a handgun pointed at him from the van window. Appellant called the police, but they did not come.
According to appellant, the van came back a third time and tried to run him down. Appellant got into his friend's car and followed the van. Three friends were in the car with appellant. Appellant testified that he followed the van to obtain the license number to report to the police. Appellant knew his friend kept a nine-millimeter pistol between the front seats. As he approached the van, it slowed down and sped up again. Appellant stated that, because he saw a gun sticking out of the van window, he grabbed the nine-millimeter gun and shot at the van in an effort to protect himself. He claimed he was aiming at the vehicle to stop it; he was not trying to hit anyone inside the van.
To support his argument that the evidence is not factually sufficient to show he intentionally and knowingly caused the victim's death, appellant relies on his testimony that he was shooting at the van to stop it and was not shooting at anyone in the van.
After reviewing all of the evidence, including appellant's testimony, without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," we cannot conclude that the evidence produced by the State to discharge its burden of proof on each element is so uncertain, inconsistent, improbable, or unbelievable that it would be clearly unjust to allow the finding of guilt to stand. 21 Although appellant presented conflicting evidence, the jury was entitled to reject his testimony. We cannot conclude that the jury's verdict is so clearly against the overwhelming weight of the contrary evidence that it is clearly wrong or unjust. 22
In his third and fourth points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by overruling his objections to the State's peremptory strikes of two prospective jurors.
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury whose members were selected on a racially neutral, nondiscriminatory basis. 23 This principle was later codified in Texas. 24 Batson and its progeny, as well as the code of criminal procedure, set forth a three-step procedure to determine whether the State exercised its peremptory strikes in an unconstitutional manner.
In the first step, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 25 The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. 26 However, if the defendant makes the requisite prima facie case, the State must come forward with racially neutral explanations for the contested strikes. 27 A racially neutral explanation means only an explanation that, on its face, does not deny equal If the State presents a facially race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike, it rebuts the presumption of discrimination arising from the defendant's prima facie case. Thereafter, in the third step in the Batson process, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons given by the State in support of its contested strike are a sham or a pretext for discrimination; 30 simply stating his disagreement with some of the State's explanations is insufficient. 31 To meet this burden, the defendant may call witnesses, introduce documents, seek and obtain stipulations, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Petersen v. State
...perspective. Such distinctions may properly cause the State to challenge one potential juror and not another."" ‘ Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App. 1997). "This Court has recognized that for disparate treatment to exist, the persons being compared must be ‘otherwise similarly......
-
Lane v. State
...but in varying degrees’ " (quoting, respectively, Leadon v. State, 332 S.W.3d 600, 612 (Tex. App. 2010), and Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App. 1997) )). Furthermore, even if the failure to complete a term of military service as opposed to the completion of a term of military ......
-
Petersen v. State, CR-16-0652
...State's perspective. Such distinctions may properly cause the State to challenge one potential juror and not another.""'Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App. 1997). "This Court has recognized that for disparate treatment to exist, the persons being compared must be 'otherwise sim......
-
Lane v. State
...but in varying degrees'" (quoting,Page 82 respectively, Leadon v. State, 332 S.W.3d 600, 612 (Tex. App. 2010), and Johnson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App. 1997))). Furthermore, even if the failure to complete a term of military service as opposed to the completion of a term of mili......