Johnson v. State, 46305

• Decision Date: 10 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 46305,46305
• Citation: 247 So.2d 697
• Parties: Milton 'Sonny' JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 697

247 So.2d 697

Milton 'Sonny' JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 46305.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 10, 1971.

Johnston & Felder, Pascagoula, for defendant-appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for plaintiff-appellee.

PATTERSON, Justice:

Milton 'Sonny' Johnson was indicted and tried in the Circuit Court of Jackson County upon a charge of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been lately stolen and carried away. He was convicted and sentenced to serve a term of five years in the penitentiary. This appeal is from that conviction and sentence.

Assuming, but not deciding, that there was probable cause for the arrest of Johnson and for the search of his vehicle where the stolen items were discovered, nevertheless the cause must be reversed.

In Sanford v. State, 155 Miss. 295, 124 So. 353 (1929), we stated:

The unexplained possession of stolen property shortly after the commission of a larceny is a circumstance from which guilt of the larceny may be inferred, but no inference can be drawn therefrom alone that the one in possession of the property received it from another knowing that it had been stolen. Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602; Manning v. State, 129 Miss. 179, 91 So. 902. (155 Miss. at 297, 124 So. at 353)

Again, in Crowell v. State, 195 Miss. 427, 15 So.2d 508 (1943), we stated:

* * * One guilty of larceny or burglary necessarily knows the facts and circumstances connected with the crime, but in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, guilty knowledge is the very gist of the offense. Such knowledge must be both alleged and proved. * * * (195 Miss. at 436, 15 So.2d at 511)

And, further, in Crowell, while discussing the propriety of an instruction, we said:

From the foregoing authorities, we conclude that it is never proper, in a case for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, for the jury to be instructed, in effect, that the unexplained possession alone of such recently stolen property is either a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred or that such possession is a circumstance strongly indicative of guilt which will justify, support, or warrant a verdict for the state, where such possession is unaided by other proof tending to show that the accused received such property knowing it to have been stolen. (Emphasis added) (195 Miss. at 436, 437, 15 So.2d at 511)

More recently, in the case of Madere v. State, 227 So.2d 278 (Miss. 1969), it was necessary to reverse a conviction of receiving stolen property where an instruction was granted for the state which permitted the jury to infer from the fact of possession of recently stolen property that the defendant received the property knowing the same to have been lately stolen. From these authorities, and others not necessary to cite, it is well established in the criminal jurisprudence of this state that guilty knowledge is the very gist of the offense of receiving stolen property and that such knowledge must be both alleged and proved.

With this principle of law in mind we next consider the evidence offered by the state. On December 11, 1969, between the hours of 12:00 Noon and 5:15 in the afternoon, the home of Al Bourgeois was broken into and a stereo set and color television set stolen...