Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 13 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. S96A0325,S96A0326,s. S96A0325 |
| Citation | 470 S.E.2d 637,266 Ga. 775 |
| Parties | JOHNSON v. STATE. HARRIS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert L. Waller, III, Stone Mountain, for Demond Johnson.
Jeffrey H. Brickman, Asst. Dist. Atty., J. Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Decatur, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Caroline Wight Donaldson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State in No. S96A0325.
Desiree Sutton Peagler, Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur.
Paul J. McCord, DeKalb County Public Defender's Office, Decatur, for Ian Dwight Harris.
Jeffrey H. Brickman, Desiree Sutton Peagler, Asst. Dist. Attys., J. Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Decatur, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State in No. S96A0326.
Caroline Wight Donaldson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta.
Appellants Ian Dwight Harris and Demond Shalane Johnson were each convicted of malice murder and armed robbery, and were sentenced to life imprisonment. 1
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellants guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The evidence presented at trial indicated that the victim, Dr. Cesar Garcia, his wife, and their two children, were traveling from New York to Mexico when they stopped at an Atlanta hotel. Dr. Garcia and family, after getting settled at the hotel, went to dinner. When Dr. Garcia and his family returned from dinner and pulled into the parking lot of the hotel, the car in which Johnson and Harris were riding pulled up to the Garcias' vehicle. Johnson approached Mrs. Garcia, who was standing in the parking lot, pointed a gun in her face, and demanded money. She offered Johnson her purse which he did not take. Instead, Johnson entered the Garcias' vehicle via the passenger's side, exited the driver's side, approached Dr. Garcia, and demanded money. Mrs. Garcia heard her husband say, "Okay, man, okay, man, no man," and then heard a gunshot. Johnson ran to a waiting car where Harris sat in the driver's seat and they sped off. A truck driver, hearing the gunshot, ran over to the parking lot where he saw the victim lying face down on the ground clutching money in his hand, dead from a single gunshot wound to the head. Two witnesses told police officials that Johnson and Harris had confessed to committing the crime, and the police subsequently found Johnson's fingerprints in the Garcias' vehicle.
2. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress fingerprint evidence. Johnson filed his motion to suppress six days prior to trial, which the trial court denied, finding, inter alia, that it was untimely. Because Johnson's motion to suppress was not filed by the time of arraignment, it was untimely. Although the trial court should have dismissed the motion for untimeliness rather than denying it, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled adversely to the motion. Van Huynh v. State, 258 Ga. 663(2), 373 S.E.2d 502 (1988).
3. During the trial, the State sought to introduce and elicit testimony from an employee of U-Haul concerning the physical location and travels of the vehicle that the Garcias rented. The State called an employee of the vehicle rental agency who used the company's computer-generated records to answer questions. The employee testified that he is the custodian of the records, that he maintained the records in the regular course of business, and that the information in the documents was recorded at the time of the actual rental. Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 355 S.E.2d 649 (1987). After reviewing the record in this case, we determine that the State laid a proper foundation for admission of the records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14. We also hold that because the employee had personal knowledge of information contained in the records, he was authorized to answer questions and explain aspects of the records. Compare Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86(4), 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979).
4. Johnson finally contends that, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the manner in which the State exercised peremptory challenges against black venirepersons gave rise to an inference of racial discrimination that was not successfully rebutted by the State. Johnson argues that the State struck four black potential jurors for whimsical or fanciful reasons: a black female (Juror No. 13) because her son had been convicted of a crime and she did not believe that her son had been given a "fair deal"; another black female (Juror No. 16) because she was making facial expressions and because she was a postal worker, and postal workers, in the prosecutor's experience, do not make good jurors; a black male because of a lack of sufficient educational or work background (Juror No. 24); and another black male because he appeared to have rather an eccentric personality (Juror No. 27). The trial court denied Johnson's Batson motion, finding that the reasons given by the State were race-neutral.
We review the trial court's denial of the Batson motion under a clearly erroneous standard. Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195, 442 S.E.2d 754 (1994). We find that the State's reason for striking Juror No. 13 was race-neutral, and the trial court's decision to allow the strike is further evidenced by the fact that the State struck a white male potential juror for the same reason. See Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 668, 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993). We also find that the trial court's decision to allow the State to use a peremptory strike against potential Juror No. 16 was not clearly erroneous and supported under Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195, 442 S.E.2d 754, supra (). We further find that, giving the trial court great deference (see Lingo, 263 Ga. at 669, 437 S.E.2d 463), there was no error in denying Johnson's motion based upon the State's use of peremptory strikes against Juror Nos. 24 and 27.
5. Harris contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress a custodial statement which he claims was made in response to being shown a picture of the victim but was prior to being informed of his Miranda rights. Harris, who was already in police custody on an unrelated charge, was brought to the interview room for questioning. After being shown the picture, Harris stated, We hold that the trial court properly concluded that the statement was voluntary. The testimony of the police officers at the hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), indicated that prior to being read his Miranda rights, Harris was questioned routinely about matters unrelated to the Garcia murder and was shown a picture of codefendant Johnson, not the victim, at which time his incriminating statements were volunteered. Even assuming the trial court erred, we find such error harmless in this case because Harris made other incriminating statements after receiving the Miranda warnings which did not contradict but supported the pre-Miranda statement. The officers' testimony also indicated that Harris did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs; Harris stated that he wanted to talk to the interrogators; and he initially stated that he understood the Miranda warnings "to an extent," but when questioned as to what he did not understand, stated that he did understand. Harris' testimony at the hearing did not refute these facts, and under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's determination that the statement was voluntarily entered was not in error. Swinney v. State, 217 Ga.App. 657, 458 S.E.2d 686 (1995).
6. The trial court permitted testimony concerning an unindicted...
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