Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 21 April 2011
• Docket Number: Nos. SC08–418,SC08–1489.,s. SC08–418
• Citation: 60 So.3d 1045
• Parties: Andrea JOHNSON, Petitioner,v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.Bernard Joyner, Petitioner,v.State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

60 So.3d 1045

Andrea JOHNSON, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.Bernard Joyner, Petitioner,
v.
State of Florida, Respondent.

Nos. SC08–418

SC08–1489.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 21, 2011.

[60 So.3d 1047]

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Patricia McKenna, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioners.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Ha Thu Dao, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, Heidi Milan Caballero and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondents.CANADY, C.J.

In these consolidated cases we consider whether challenges to plea agreement provisions concerning credit for time served are cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Andrea Johnson seeks review of Johnson v. State, 974 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), and Bernard Joyner seeks review of Joyner v. State, 988 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). In each case, the Third District Court of Appeal determined that the trial court did not err in denying a rule 3.800(a) motion. The Third District reasoned that relief was not available under rule 3.800(a) because the defendants' assent to written plea agreements that provided the defendants would receive credit for time served for a specific period constituted waivers of any additional credit for time served. Johnson and Joyner correctly contend that the Third District's decisions expressly and directly conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), which held that a plea agreement provision regarding credit for time served could be challenged under rule 3.800(a). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

[60 So.3d 1048]

For the reasons we explain, we approve the decisions in Johnson and Joyner. We conclude that the challenges made by Johnson and Joyner to the credit-for-time-served provisions of their plea agreements were not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). We disapprove the Fifth District's decision in Davis.¹

I. BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2002, Johnson pleaded guilty to armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon. Johnson was placed on probation for a period of four years, with the special condition that he would participate in the Miami–Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program. During the probationary term, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed, alleging that Johnson violated his probation by committing new offenses, failing to report to his probation office as directed, and failing to pay his supervision costs.

The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on the alleged violations of probation. At the hearing, the State withdrew the allegation that Johnson had committed new substantive offenses, and Johnson admitted that he violated his probation by failing to report to his probation office and by failing to pay his supervision costs. Additionally, the State and Johnson reached an agreement on sentencing. The agreement specified that Johnson would receive a sentence of four years of incarceration, with credit for time served from November 14, 2005. The trial court sentenced Johnson in accordance with the plea agreement, repeatedly stating on the record that Johnson would receive credit for time served from November 14, 2005. That same day, at the clerk of court's suggestion, the parties and the trial court executed a document titled “Agreement on Credit for Time Served.” The document expressly provided that as part of his plea agreement, Johnson would receive “all credit for time served from 11/14/05.”

On April 16, 2007, Johnson filed a pro se rule 3.800(a) motion. Johnson asserted that he should have received credit for the time he spent in the boot camp program—which predated November 14, 2005—toward the four-year sentence he received upon his violation of probation. The trial court denied Johnson's request for additional credit, finding that Johnson “made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea” and was “only entitled to ... jail credit from the agreed upon date of November 14, 2005.”

On appeal, the Third District affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. While acknowledging that the Fifth District had reached a contrary conclusion in Davis, 968 So.2d at 1052 (holding that a plea agreement stating that defendant would receive 1531 days of credit was not “conclusive evidence” that defendant validly waived any additional credit), the Third District determined that “a provision in a plea agreement that the defendant is to be awarded credit for time served from a specific date effectively waives any claim to credit for time served before that date.” Johnson, 974 So.2d at 1152 (citing Hines v. State, 906 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). The Third District then held that in Johnson's case, “the defendant's agreement in writing and in the plea colloquy to having violated probation specifically in return for a four-year state prison sentence with ‘all

[60 So.3d 1049]

credit for time served from 11/14/05,’ precludes his present claim for credit for time spent in boot camp in 2002.” Id. at 1153.

Joyner's case is procedurally similar. According to his rule 3.800(a) motion, on May 17, 2004, Joyner pleaded guilty to false imprisonment and was sentenced to five years of probation. On November 28, 2006, he was arrested for allegedly violating his probation. On February 15, 2007, Joyner admitted the violation, and pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to two years of incarceration. The parties and the trial court executed a document titled “Agreement on Credit for Time Served.” The document expressly provided that as part of his plea agreement, Joyner would receive credit for time served “from 11–29, 2006 to 2–15, 2007.”

On October 9, 2007, Joyner filed a pro se rule 3.800(a) motion. Joyner asserted that in addition to the seventy-eight days of credit he received for the period of November 29, 2006, to February 15, 2007, he should have received 122 days of credit for time served while he was awaiting sentencing on the false imprisonment count in 2004. The trial court summarily denied Joyner's motion, and Joyner appealed in the Third District.

Citing its decision in Johnson, the Third District affirmed the trial court's denial of Joyner's motion. The Third District concluded that the provision in the plea agreement—which awarded Joyner credit for time served for a specific period—operated as a waiver of Joyner's claim for credit for the 122 days he served in 2004.

Johnson and Joyner petitioned this Court to resolve the conflict between the district courts of appeal regarding whether a rule 3.800(a) motion may be denied on the basis that assent to a term in a plea agreement about credit for time served waives any claim to credit not provided for in the plea agreement. We accepted jurisdiction and consolidated the cases. The State has moved this Court to dismiss review in Johnson because Johnson completed his term of incarceration. We hereby deny the motion to dismiss. The doctrine of mootness does not destroy this Court's jurisdiction in a case such as Johnson's where the controversy presented “is capable of repetition yet evading review.” State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 484 (Fla.2004).

II. ANALYSIS

We agree with the Third District that Johnson and Joyner are not entitled to relief. We conclude that challenges to plea agreement provisions regarding credit for time served are not cognizable under rule 3.800(a) because those challenges present factual questions that cannot be resolved on the basis of the court records.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) provides a mechanism for correcting the improper denial of credit for time served. The rule states in pertinent part:

(a) Correction. A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, or a sentence that does not grant proper credit for time served when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate...