Johnson v. Stevenson
| Decision Date | 11 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | C/A No.: 5:13-cv-01714-TMC-KDW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Samuel T. Johnson, Petitioner, v. Robert M. Stevenson, III, Respondent. |
Petitioner Samuel T. Johnson is a state prisoner who filed this pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's Return and Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 26, 27. On December 27, 2013, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. ECF No. 28. On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 32. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 27, be granted.
Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Perry Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"). In June 2008, Petitioner was indicted by a Colleton County Grand Jury for first degree burglary, armed robbery, four counts of kidnapping,and escape/attempted escape. App. 98-111.1 On January 13, 2009, Petitioner appeared before the Honorable Perry M. Buckner, III, and entered a plea of guilty to the burglary, robbery, kidnapping and escape charges.2 App. 1-37. Attorney Harris S. Beach represented Petitioner, and Deputy Solicitor Sean P. Thornton appeared on behalf of the State. App. 1. Petitioner was sentenced to four 20 year-terms of imprisonment on the kidnapping charges, 15 years on the escape charge, 20 years on the armed robbery charge, and 15 years on the burglary charge, all sentences to run concurrent to each other. App. 36-37. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On June 19, 2009, Petitioner filed an Application seeking post-conviction relief ("PCR"). App. 39-49. In his Application, Petitioner argued he was entitled to relief on the following grounds:
App. 41. In response, the State filed its Return dated February 25, 2010, and requested an evidentiary hearing. App. 50-55. On April 21, 2011, an evidentiary hearing was conducted in Colleton County before the Honorable D. Craig Brown. App. 57. At the hearing Petitioner was represented by J.D. Bryan, Esq., while the State was represented by Assistant Attorney General Matthew J. Friedman. Id. Petitioner and his former defense attorney, Harris Beach, testified at the hearing. App. 59-88. On May 13, 2011, the PCR court issued an order denying Petitioner relief and making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony and arguments presented at the PCR hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe each witness who testified at the hearing, and to closely pass upon his or her credibility. This Court has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2003).
Applicant testified that he filed a speedy trial motion and wanted to go to trial. He asserted that he pled guilty on counsel's advice. He testified that he and counsel never discussed the elements of the crimes or what the State had to prove. He testified that he had statements from alibi witnesses. He admitted that these alibi witnesses were not available to testify at the PCR hearing, but he claimed that he asked his attorney to subpoena them for the PCR hearing. Applicant testified that plea counsel failed to move to dismiss based on lack of evidence and failed to move to suppress the gun. He contended that counsel failed to file a Brady/Rule 5 motion. Applicant also testified that counsel failed to properly investigate and failed to object to the amendment of the indictments.
Plea counsel testified that Applicant was facing twelve total charges and he ultimately pled guilty to seven charges. Counsel testified that he did not object to the amendment of the indictments because the amendments merely corrected names and did not change the nature of the offense. He testified that he discussed with Applicant the elements of each charge and what the State was required to prove. He asserted that Applicant informed him of some potential alibi witnesses, but these witnesses did not pan out. Counsel testified that he requested and received discovery, and he reviewed the material with Applicant. Counsel asserted that it was Applicant's decision to plead guilty after counsel informed Applicant of the consequences of the plea and the significance of a negotiated sentence.
The Applicant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not entered freely and voluntarily. In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 7l.1(e), SCRCP; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversaria1 process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Butler, 334 S.E.2d 813.
Courts use a two-pronged test to evaluate allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Id. at 625 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 625. When there has been a guilty plea, the applicant must prove that counsel's representation was below the standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 20, 546 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2001).
To be knowing and voluntary, a plea must be entered with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of the plea. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969); Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991). When determining issues relating to guilty pleas, the court will consider the entire record, including the transcript of the guilty plea, and the evidence presented at the post-conviction relief hearing. Anderson v. State, 342 S.C. 54, 57, 535 S.E.2d 649, 657 (2000)(citing Harres v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 318 S.E.2d 360 (1984). When a defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, the plea may only be attacked through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Roscoe, 345 S.C. at 20, 546 S.E.2d at 419 (citations omitted).
This Court finds that counsel's testimony was credible. This Court finds that counsel is a trial practitioner who has extensive experience in the trial of serious offenses. Counsel conferred with the Applicant on numerous occasions. During conferences with the Applicant, counsel discussed the pending charges, the elements of the charges and what the State was required to prove, Applicant's constitutional rights, Applicants version of the facts, and possible defenses or lack thereof.
The record reflects that Applicant understood the nature of the charges and the possible punishments. At the plea hearing, he indicated that he was fully satisfied with counsel and that no one threatened him or promised him anything to get him to plead guilty. He told the court that he understood the terms of the negotiated sentence. He also admitted guilt at the plea hearing. This Court finds that Applicant's plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently with a full understanding of the consequences. This Court finds that Applicant understood the terms of the negotiated sentence and that it was Applicant's decision to plead guilty.
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