Johnson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-352 |
| Parties | KAREN JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA, LLC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This civil case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 44) filed by Defendants Swift Transportation Co., Inc. ("Swift") and Jerry Kelly ("Kelly") (collectively referred to as "Defendants") and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) filed by Plaintiff Karen Johnson ('Plaintiff"). The Motions are fully briefed by the parties (Docs. 56, 58, 59) and are ripe for decision by the Court.
This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in the early morning hours on March 12, 2007. Immediately before the collision, Plaintiff was traveling eastbound on Interstate 90 ("I-90") as a passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband Kenneth Johnson ("Johnson") in Ashtabula County, Ohio. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff and Johnson were New York residents and were traveling back to Buffalo, New York after dropping their child off at college in Springfield, Ohio.
At the same time, Kelly, a Missouri resident, was operating a tractor trailer westbound on I-90 in the course and scope of his employment with Swift. Kelly was transporting a load from New York to Missouri. At the time, Swift was incorporated in Nevada and headquartered in Arizona.1
At the point where the accident occurred, I-90 is a four lane interstate highway with two lanes traveling in each direction. Eastbound lanes and westbound lanes are separated by a grassy median. The parties do not dispute that the collision occurred after the vehicle driven by Johnson left its lane of travel in the eastbound side of the interstate, traveled through the median, and crossed into oncoming westbound traffic.
Following the accident, paramedics pronounced Johnson dead at the scene. The Ashtabula County Coroner concluded that Johnson died as a result of blunt trauma to the head, trunk and extremities. According to Plaintiff, however, Johnson appeared unresponsive and may have suffered a sudden medical emergency immediately before leaving the eastbound lanes of I-90. Postmortem testing revealed the presence of marijuana metabolites in Johnson's system.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). "Summary judgment is only appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Keweenaw Bay Indian Comm. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Weighing of the evidence or making credibility determinations are prohibited at summary judgment - rather, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.
Once "a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading[.]" Viergutz v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Instead, the party opposing summary judgment "must - by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule - set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citation omitted). In fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) states that "[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the material cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]" Where "a party fails . . . to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Finally, "there is no duty imposed upon the trial court to 'search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Buarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Instead, "[i]t isthe attorneys, not the judges, who have interviewed the witnesses and handled the physical exhibits; it is the attorneys, not the judges, who have been present at the depositions; and it is the attorneys, not the judges, who have a professional and financial stake in case outcome." Id. at 406. In other words, "the free-ranging search for supporting facts is a task for which attorneys in the case are equipped and for which courts generally are not." Id.
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate negligence on the part of Kelly or Swift, and that any negligence on Kelly's part must be excused on the basis of the sudden emergency doctrine. Plaintiff, in her Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, argues that Kelly was negligent because he was exceeding the speed limit at the time of the accident, and that any negligence on Johnson's part must be excused because he suffered a sudden medical emergency immediately before crossing left of center on the interstate. The parties also present arguments concerning marijuana found in Johnson's system postmortem and the applicable law governing the case with regard to loss allocation and damages.
Initially, the Court recognizes that there appears to be no dispute that, in the absence of a sudden medical emergency, Kenneth Johnson is negligent per se for traveling left-of-center on an interstate highway in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.25. See Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Ohio 1965) (). The question presented is whether Johnson's negligence is excused because Johnson allegedly suffered a sudden medical emergency just before crossing left of center on the interstate.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio:
"legal excuse, precluding liability for injuries resulting from negligence per se in the failure to comply with a safety legislative enactment directing the manner of the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways, must be something which makes it impossible to comply with the safety legislative enactment, something over which the driver has no control, an emergency not of the driver's making causing failure to obey the statute, or an excuse or exception specifically provided in the enactment itself."
Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ohio 1987) (citing Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (Ohio 1946). One such instance recognized by Ohio law is "[w]here the driver of an automobile is suddenly stricken by a period of unconsciousness which he has no reason to anticipate and which renders it impossible for him to control the car he is driving[.]" Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 99 Ohio St.3d 260, 791 N.E.2d 422, 423 (Ohio 2003) (citing Lehman v. Haynam, 164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N.E.2d 97 (1956)). In such a situation, the unconscious driver "is not chargeable with negligence as to such lack of control." Id.
In this case, in an effort to prove that Johnson was unconscious immediately before crossing left of center on the interstate, and thus not chargeable with negligence, Plaintiff points solely to her own testimony that, upon first hearing the car leaving the road, she began screaming at and shaking Johnson, but got no response. Plaintiff described Johnson as According to Plaintiff, Johnson did not appear to be sleeping. Based on these facts, which Plaintiff describes as not disputed, Plaintiff argues that Johnson was unconscious immediately before traveling left of center, and, therefore, any negligence must be excused.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently demonstrate a sudden medical emergency defense because: (1) Plaintiff presents no expert medical testimony confirming the existence of a medical emergency; (2) Plaintiff's testimony contradicts her previous statement that her "memory of the whole evening is gone[,]" a statement made when applying for corporate insurance benefits; (3) Johnson's official cause of death, as determined by the Ashtabula County Coroner, was "blunt trauma to head, trunk and extremities[;]" and (4) Johnson had an intoxicating level of marijuana in his system at the time of his death and a reasonable jury could conclude that, even if Johnson was unconscious, marijuana intoxication may have contributed to Johnson's unconsciousness, thus, negating the defense.
Certainly, "the party asserting the sudden medical emergency defense bears the burden of proof with respect to the defense." McCoy v. Murray, No. 4-08-36, 2009 WL 903936, *3 (Ohio App. Apr. 6, 2009) (citing Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 422; Lehman, 133 N.E.2d at 97). The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that, in situations where the moving party bears the burden of proof, a heightened standard for summary judgment applies wherein the moving party can prevail in demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact only where the "evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would...
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